(Chapter XII of Narrative of The Burmese War by Major John
Snodgrass, British Army, the Military Secretary to the Commander of the British
expeditionary force and the Assistant Political Agent in Ava.)
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| British March from Rangoon to Danubyu (February 1825). |
The appearance of the unfortunate people who had
passed so many months in the unwholesome jungles, exposed to the inclemencies
of an unusually severe monsoon, was truly miserable: they had been kept, even
to the women, at constant hard labour in constructing stockades and defences,
which were successively taken from them as soon as finished; subjected to the
cruelties and ill-treatment of innumerable petty chiefs, using, with despotic
severity, their arbitrary and brief authority; destitute of the usual
accessories of life, and forced to subsist, in a great measure, upon roots and
herbs.
Many had perished under the accumulation of misery,
or been cut off, for the most trivial offences, by the orders of their merciless
depots – most of those who returned to their former dwellings having to lament
the loss of a parent, son, or brother.
Familiarized from infancy, however, to occurrences
of this nature, our Burmese friends did not long lament such every-day misfortunes,
but set zealously to work in building and repairing their houses, and soon
began to resume their former trades and avocations.
In the course of a very few days a bazar made its
appearance; at first upon a small scale, but subsequently venison, fish, fruit
and country vegetables could be procured in great abundance.
Beef, their religion did not allow them to traffic in; but there was no scarcity of buffalos for the ample supply of all the troops.
But by far the most important result attending the
return of the inhabitants to their houses, was the means which they afforded of
equipping canoes for the transport of provisions, and of obtaining servants and
drivers for the commissariat, with which the force was very scantily provided,
owing to the impossibility of inducing that class of people in Bengal , to
volunteer their services in Ava.
At first the number of Burmese boats and boatmen
was small, and quite inadequate for the conveyance of the requisite supplies,
even when the army was only a few marches from Rangoon; but by kind treatment
and liberal payment, they subsequently increased so much in numbers, as for
some time to meet all the exigencies of the service, until our
gradually-increasing distance from the depot compelled us to seek for aid from other
quarters.
Plan of Operations
But even so late in the season as January, had
every arrangement been complete, the low delta, through which we had to march
to reach the Irrawaddy, was not sufficiently dry for the passage of artillery,
or to insure the troops against disease, from the still wet and unwholesome
state of the country.
The 10th day of February was, however,
fixed for the commencement of the advance; and although, from the shortness of
the season for active operations, we could not hope to reach higher than Prome,
the reduction of that important place, with the consequent liberation of Pegu,
might lead to pacific negotiations.
Even the defence of Donoobew (Da-nuu-byu), which
had been fortified with all the skill of Burmese art, was considered by many as
the last struggle of the court of Ava; and when the formidable preparations of
the Indian government, in other quarters, are considered, there was certainly
strong reason for anticipating an early termination of the contest.
On the south-east frontier of
Bengal, for the invasion of Arracan, a large and well-appointed force under
Brigadier-general Morrison, only awaited the proper season for advancing
through the insalubrious jungles of Arracan; and after the reduction of the
capital of that province, it was thought not improbable that the
Brigadier-general might be enabled to cross the lofty range of mountains
(Aoupectoumiew – Ah-nout-phet-yo-ma) which separate Arracan from Ava, by one of
the little-known and difficult passes, and join Sir Archibald Campbell on the
Irrawaddy. On the Sylhet frontier, another large force, under Brigadier-general
Shouldham, threatened to advance through Cassay upon the enemy’s capital; and
in Assam, Lieutenant-colonel Richards, with a small field corps, was prepared
to drive the enemy from his conquests in that quarter.
The means of the British commander at Rangoon did
not enable to equip a large land column, nor under any circumstances would it
probably have been practicable to attempt an exclusive land movement, upon a point at the distance of six hundred
miles from his depots; an unlimited command of carriage could alone have
enabled him to do so – in which case he might, probably, have advanced by the
shortest and best road upon the capital, via Pegu and Tonghoo (Taung-ngoo) ,
turning all the enemy’s positions on the Irrawaddy, and taking him unprepared
on a new line of operations, with his troops posted at a distance.
No movement in advance had as yet been made by our
cautious and wary allies; probably still impressed with the belief, that
ultimately the British troops would have to retire, worn out and disgusted with
the sanguinary and inconclusive struggle.
It was necessary, however, to keep up appearances;
and in answer to the various messages that had been sent, urging them to act,
the Siamese chiefs at length sent a complimentary embassy to Martaban, begging
to be forwarded to the British head-quarters, for the ostensible object of
congratulating the British general on his victories over the Burmese, on the
part of the court of Bangkok, but probably with real view of observing the
actual state of affairs in Ava.
The congratulatory epistle brought by these worthies
from the Siamese chiefs, contained many high-flown compliments and professions
of friendship, but nothing from which an expectation could be formed of any
assistance being derived from that quarter; and the banks of Irrawaddy thus
became the exclusive line of operations from the south.
Force Equipped for Field Service
This column was to move in a direction parallel to the Lain (Hlaing) river, driving the enemy from all his posts, upon that branch; and to join the Irrawaddy at the nearest accessible point, for the purpose of co-operating with the marine column proceeding up the Panlang (Pan Hlaing) channel, in driving the Bandoola from Donoobew (Da-nuu-byu), should its aid for that purpose be required; and to keep up their supplies, a fleet of commissariat canoes, under an officer of the navy, was to accompany the column as high up the Lain (Hlaing) river as the depth of water would permit.
The point upon which the column would join the
Irrawaddy, in a country so little known, could not be fixed. The island formed
by the Lain (Hlaing) and Panlang (Pan Hlaing) rivers, was represented as a
wilderness of impassable jungle, but across which it was said the Carians
(Karens), by Bandoola’s order, had cut a path, for the sake of communication
from Meondaga (Myaung-da-gar) on the Hlaing river, to the Irrawaddy opposite to
Donoobew, by which, should it prove correct, it was intended the column should
advance; but by much the most certain route, and in many respects most
eligible, led to Sarrawah (Thar-ra-waw), on the great river, about sixty miles
above Donoobew.
The marine column, which was placed under the
orders of Brigadier-general Cotton, consisted of eight hundred European
Infantry, a small battalion of Sepoys, and a powerful train of artillery: these
were embarked in the flotilla, consisting of sixty boats, some carrying two,
and all of them one piece of artillery, twelve and twenty-four pounds carronades,
and commanded by Captain Alexander of His Majesty’s navy, escorted by the boats
of the men-of-war lying at Rangoon, containing upwards of one hundred British
seamen.
This force was directed to pass up the Panlang (Pan
Hlaing) river to the Irrawaddy, and driving the enemy from his stockades at
Panlang, to push on with all possible expedition to Donoobew.
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| Pan Hlaing, Hlaing, and Rangoon Rivers (2011). |
The impossibility, however, of procuring sufficient
carriage prevented the second part of the instructions from being carried into
effect, but the reduction of a place of such importance as Bassein, could not
but operate materially in the general result of the campaign.
These arrangements completed, on the 11th
of February the land column marched from Rangoon to Mienza eight miles, where
they encamped, with the exception of His Majesty’s forty-first regiment, which
moved by water as far as Meondaga (Myaung-da-gar), for the purpose of affording
protection to the provision vessels proceeding up the Lain (Hlaing) river, and
of clearing its banks from any parties of the enemy which might offer to impede
its navigation.
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The campaign, the most poorly managed one in British military history, cost the British five million pounds sterling (roughly 18.5 billion in 2006 US dollars) to 13 million pounds sterling (roughly 48.1 billion in 2006 US dollars) that led to a severe economic crisis in British India in 1833. For the Burmese, it was the beginning of the end of their independence. The Third Burmese Empire, for a brief moment the terror of British India, was crippled and no longer a threat to the eastern frontier of British India. The Burmese would be crushed for years to come by repaying the large indemnity of one million pounds (then US$5 million), a large sum even in Europe of that time. The British would make two more wars against a much more weakened Burma, and swallow up the entire country by 1885.)
First Anglo-Burmese War
(1824-1826) – Part 13