(Nian Peng’s guest article from THE DIPLOMAT on 05 December 2023)
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| Pro-China Kokang leader General Peng Daxum |
In late October,
three ethnic rebel groups in Myanmar known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance –
Kokang’s Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National
Liberation Army, and the Arakan Army, initiated Operation 1027 against the
junta.
In the weeks
since, they have successfully seized control of hundreds of security outposts
and three government-controlled areas in northern Myanmar. The MNDAA, in
particular, has advanced and encircled the junta-aligned town of Laukkai,
situated merely five kilometers from the border with China.
This conflict reflects a perpetuation of the ethnic tensions in northern Myanmar over recent decades, specifically concerning the control of Kokang territory – a strategically significant area in the northern part of Shan State with a Mandarin-speaking population.
The MNDAA held
control of Kokang until 2009, when the Myanmar military seized it. In February
2015, the MNDAA launched an unsuccessful attack to reclaim the territory,
setting the stage for the current conflict. Despite the MNDAA’s justification
for Operation 1027 as being partly a crackdown on a recently exposed mega
telecom scam operations in Laukkai, its underlying objective is to regain
control of Kokang.
Although the
junta has military advantages in terms of the number of soldiers, weapons, and
equipment at its disposal, it has suffered great losses in the fighting against
the rebels.
Considering the
overall economic downturn in Myanmar since the pandemic and the nationwide
anti-military movements, particularly those led by insurgencies such as the
People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) under the National Unity Government, it is
unlikely that the junta can launch a large-scale counterattack in a very short
time. However, frequent air strikes remain possible. Hence, the conflicts in
northern Myanmar are unlikely to conclude in the next few weeks.
Affected by the
conflict, a large number of refugees are flocking to Yunnan’s border. This
situation has resulted in increased living costs and poses high risks to the
social stability of local regions of Yunnan.
Additionally, it
should not be forgotten that four Chinese citizens were killed in air strikes
during the Myanmar military’s fighting with the MNDAA in 2015. Therefore, China
must closely monitor the ongoing fight in northern Myanmar and take preventive
actions to avoid air strikes and minimize the risk of Chinese casualties.
On November 25, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
announced that it would commence actual combat training on the border with
Myanmar. The training areas include the cities of Mangshi and Ruili, and Gengma
County, and other locations in southern Yunnan, focusing on testing the combat
capabilities of the troops in the war zone, such as rapid mobility, border
sealing and control, and fire strikes. The exercises aim to prepare for
emergencies and safeguard national sovereignty, border stability, and the
safety of people’s lives and property.
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| Chinese soldiers in Myanmar Police uniform. |
China’s military exercise has drawn significant attention from the West, with claims that China is supporting the Three Brotherhood Alliance in its attacks on Myanmar’s junta. The purpose of such propaganda is to fuel anti-China sentiment in Myanmar and sabotage China-Myanmar relations.
There is no
truth in such speculations. China has consistently pursued a policy of
non-interference in Myanmar’s internal affairs and has never intervened
militarily in the ethnic conflicts in Myanmar. Instead, it has committed to
promoting peace talks between the junta and the ethnic armed groups and
providing humanitarian assistance to Myanmar refugees.
The purpose of
the recent military drill, which concluded on November 28, was to deter both
the junta and ethnic armed groups from escalating tensions. It serves as a
practical exercise aimed at securing the border in the event of escalated
conflict, particularly cross-border air strikes or artillery attacks that could
pose a threat to China’s national security.
The Chinese
government has collaborated with the junta instead of the ethnic armed groups
to jointly combat telecom scams. Therefore, the assertion that China is
assisting ethnic armed groups in cracking down on telecom fraud is incorrect,
although China does not oppose their efforts in this regard. It is clear to
Beijing that the genuine intention of the ethnic armed groups is to regain lost
territories, extending beyond the goal of combating telecom fraud.
Finally, China
deems it unworthy to interfere in the civil war in Myanmar, as doing so could
result in the loss of trade and investment and undermine cordial relations with
Myanmar. In fact, traffic and logistics on the two main roads, from Lashio to
Muse and Lashio to the Qingshui River, have been completely cut off since the
outbreak of the conflict in October.
Moreover, approximately 120 cargo trucks, which
carried a substantial amount of daily necessities, clothing, and building
materials across the China-Myanmar border, were destroyed by drone strikes in
Muse on November 23. Given that the trade volume from Yunnan to northern
Myanmar constitutes half of the trade share between China and Myanmar, both
sides would incur significant economic losses if border trade were to be
suspended due to the civil war in Myanmar.
More
importantly, amid claims that Beijing has been supporting anti-junta forces,
pro-military groups in Myanmar last month staged protests against China in
Yangon. China is concerned that its substantial strategic and economic assets
could be undermined due to escalating anti-China sentiment in Myanmar.
Therefore, China aims to avoid interfering in the civil war in Myanmar to quell
the growing wave of anti-Chinese sentiments in the country.
To conclude,
China is more a victim than a beneficiary of the current ethnic conflicts in
northern Myanmar. China desires a ceasefire agreement between the junta and the
ethnic armed groups, as well as peace and stability in the border region.
