Is China stuck with Bloodied Myanmar Army?

                  (Yun Sun’s article from The NIKEI ASIA REVIEW on 10 June 2024.)

Myanmar Army on the roof, thier last refuge.

China will not give up on Myanmar's military: Fresh elections seen as best way out of stalemated conflict.

After more than three years of post-coup turmoil, Myanmar is gridlocked in a political and military stalemate. Despite the remarkable progress ethnic armed groups and resistance forces have made against the military regime, particularly since October, they still face a difficult, if not impossible, challenge in seeking to push the military out of its urban strongholds.

China looms as the most consequential external party that could affect developments in Myanmar. Many who seek a solution to Myanmar's crisis have urged Beijing to use its influence to curb the military, to support the resistance or, at least, to help the Burmese people.

Beijing has yet to respond to such calls and is unlikely to do so. Since the Myanmar military's February 2021 takeover (Bloody-Coup claimed by Myanmar Army as a Peaceful-Takeover), China's attitude toward the ruling State Administration Council has been both ambiguous and ambivalent.

Beijing has not formally recognized the SAC as Myanmar's legitimate government. Yet it has readily extended formal invitations to senior regime representatives, including the foreign minister, to join official meetings in China.

While China has accepted the presence of the U.N. ambassador appointed by the previous democratically elected government, it has also openly received a new SAC-appointed ambassador in Beijing.

While China has refrained from supporting Myanmar's National Unity Government-led resistance, it has also tacitly allowed ethnic armed groups to occupy territory along the border between the two countries.

Beijing's seemingly conflicting behavior is a direct manifestation of its varied interests and priorities.

China does not support ousting Myanmar's military regime due to its policy of noninterference in other countries' internal affairs. In Beijing's view, no matter how Myanmar's domestic politics evolve, and regardless of the legality of the military's ouster of a democratically elected government, any decisive moves should be made by the Burmese themselves, including the military.

For China, the legitimacy of the National Unity Government (NUG) is up for debate since the parliamentary members who started it represent just a fraction of those elected in 2020. Beijing also questions the status of the NUG as Myanmar's alternative government, given how the leading role of ethnic armed groups in the nationwide resistance campaign has often overshadowed the NUG's efforts via its own People's Defense Forces.

China will accept a definitive NUG victory if it happens but will not put its finger on the scale to determine the outcome. A democratically elected government in Myanmar is no problem for China as shown by its positive relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy when it was in power. What Beijing objects to is a foreign-supported NUG fighting a revolution against the military government. For Beijing, this would amount to Western intervention.

Border security remains a top priority, which is why Beijing was willing to give tacit approval to last October's rebel offensive, known as Operation 1027. China was not supporting the ethnic armies per se, but rather was punishing the Myanmar military for its involvement in cyber scam operations in border areas, something Beijing viewed as a national security threat.

China's indulgence of the ethnic alliance's attacks can be viewed as a slap on the wrist of the military regime. When ethnic armies have threatened to make even more significant gains, Beijing has sought to curb them. For example, when the Kachin Independence Army mounted an offensive against the military in April, China signaled its stance by staging live-fire drills on the border.

So what is China's strategy regarding Myanmar? Beijing takes a stance distinct from other external parties, favoring new elections as the only way out of Myanmar's political and military quagmire.

Recent SAC pronouncements about preparing for elections in 2025 have reinforced Beijing's stance. Myanmar's seven decades of civil conflict attest to the inconvenient truth that the military cannot be banished from national politics. To make the path to negotiation more viable, the country has to move beyond the junta.

There is some precedent for this. The government of Thein Sein, a quasi-democratic administration in place from 2011 to 2106, was engineered by the military through a skewed election but pursued political and economic reforms. It also oversaw the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Accord, perhaps the most significant peace deal ever reached between any Myanmar government and ethnic armed groups.

Beijing is under no illusion that an election would be free of manipulation by the SAC. It would lack representativeness and would be neither free nor fair. But for China, given the circumstances, a half-baked election is better than no election, and certainly better than the ongoing armed conflict and military stalemate.

What China wants is stability in Myanmar. One might argue that Beijing should then be supporting the Burmese people but China would counter that there has been no moment since the founding of Myanmar in 1948 during which the military has been excluded from national politics. In China's view, it can be no different now.

Myanmar is full of intricate contradictions and conflicts that were embedded in the foundation of the nation. These include conflicts between the Bamar majority and ethnic minorities, between the democratic opposition and the military, and between Buddhists and non-Buddhists.

The Chinese simply do not see any alternative for Myanmar but to muddle forward. This should serve as a reality check for observers and analysts who harbor any illusion that China might wake up one day and throw out Myanmar's military regime.

Yun Sun is a senior fellow and director of the China program and co-director of the East Asia program of the Stimson Center, a Washington-based think tank.

(Blogger’s Notes:  Is this article, in my opinion, direct from the CCP’s mouthpiece The Global Times? It sounded like the official policy of CCP Politburo and Central Committee.)