(Angshuman Choudhury’s article from The FRONTIER MYANMAR on 28 Aug 2024.)
‘Two lions in a cave’: Revolutionary divisions in
Chin State: The Chin resistance has split into two rival coalitions, one of
which has the backing of the powerful Arakan Army, while both are keen to
engage Indian authorities across the border.
Since the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, Chin State
has emerged as a key battleground in the countrywide armed struggle against the
junta. The Chin National Front, formed in 1988, was one of the earliest groups
to join the war against the military regime. Numerous Chinland Defence Forces –
reflecting not only different townships but also the various ethno-linguistic
groups that make up the broader Chin population – also emerged to join the
fight.
In recent months, however, the Chin resistance has taken on a new shape, as latent fault lines between various factions have come to the surface. Until late last year, a common Chin front had been fighting the junta under the dual ambit of the Interim Chin National Consultative Council and Chinland Joint Defence Committee , both formed in 2021.
The common platform has now collapsed under the
weight of internal differences and shifts in the conflict on the ground. Two
distinct coalitions have emerged in its place: the Chinland
Council, established in early December last year, and the
rival Chin Brotherhood , which emerged soon after.
Areas of southern Chin have become particularly sensitive flashpoints in the dispute, partly thanks to the growing role played by the powerful Arakan Army, which mostly operates in neighbouring Rakhine State. After occupying all of Paletwa Township in January, the AA went on to assist the Chin Brotherhood in Matupi Township, prompting calls from the Chinland Council for the AA to stop encroaching on Chin land and return to Rakhine.
These tensions have also spilled across the
India-Myanmar border into Mizoram, whose Mizo majority has close ethnic ties
with the Chin. At the same time, Indian authorities are tentatively eyeing the
AA and the Chin resistance forces as future interlocutors, if not partners, in
matters of cross-border trade and security – even as New Delhi preserves its
ties with the junta in Nay Pyi Taw.
The midway split
The Chinland Council is dominated by the CNF and
its armed wing the Chin National Army, but also includes about 20 other armed
groups and political factions, including CDF-Mara, People’s Defence Army,
Mindat Council and Tonzang Township Council.
The Chin Brotherhood comprises six groups: the Chin
National Defence Force, PDF-Zoland, CDF-Mindat, CDF-Kanpetlet, Maraland Defence
Force and CDF-Matupi’s Brigade 1.
The rival Chin factions have overlapping areas of influence but have largely fought the junta on separate fronts. The Chinland Council groups are mostly concentrated in the central and northern townships, while the Chin Brotherhood is strongest in the south.
The Chin revolution began to splinter when the CNF
quit the ICNCC in April last year, following disputes with other members. The
split was then formalised when the CNF convened the Chinland Council Conference
in December at its headquarters in Thantalang Township.
The conference was attended by other groups and
individuals that had broken with the ICNCC. They included 17 of the 27 MPs in
the consultative council, who were elected from Chin in 2020 but unable to take
office because of the coup, and at least 18 local political and military
organisations that have emerged since early 2021.
The conference participants ratified the Chinland
Constitution, which established the Chinland Council as a ruling body, and
allowed a subordinate Chinland cabinet to be appointed shortly afterwards.
Some groups rejected the Council’s claim to
represent all Chin people and chose to stick by the ICNCC, which the Chinland
Constitution formally abolished. Six of the armed groups among them then joined
forces to establish the Chin Brotherhood, which technically operates under the
political ambit of the ICNCC, or what remains of it.
While the Brotherhood sees the Council as divisive,
the CNF deems it to be an instrument of pan-Chin unity. “The Chinland Council
was established to strengthen solidarity among the Chin people, which will only
enhance the ongoing revolution against the [junta],” Sui Khar, vice chairperson
of the CNF, told Frontier.
“The split happened largely because of differences
over composition of the local administrative units, including the fact that the
Brotherhood wanted to keep some of the townships for themselves,” he said.
Yet the split has had serious consequences on the
ground, including internecine clashes. In February, the MDF, which is part of
the Chin Brotherhood, accused forces from the rival Chinland Council-allied
CDF-Mara of attacking its positions near Lailenpi in Matupi Township with
drones supplied by the National Unity Government.
The NUG is a parallel administration appointed by
lawmakers deposed in the coup, which struck a formal alliance with the CNF in
2021. The CDF-Mara claimed that the offensive in February was retaliation for a
deadly attack by the MDF on its cadres.
R Lakher, an MDF leader who asked that his real
name not be used for security reasons, blamed the CNF for dividing the ethnic
Mara and causing such clashes. “This is a case of two lions in one cave. We had
some differences with CDF-Mara, but we expected the CNF to mediate between us.
Instead, it chose to exclusively finance and arm the CDF-Mara and widened the
divide among the Mara people,” he told Frontier in a phone interview.
He also hinted at a larger sense of disaffection with the CNF’s leadership. The CNF “formed the Chinland Council without proper stakeholder consultations,” Lakher said, adding that it “tends to dominate other groups”, citing its legacy as a 36-year-old armed organisation. “It is for this reason that we were forced to come together and form the Brotherhood to balance the CNF.”
The CNF disagrees. “We continue to encourage the
two groups to reunite and are willing to provide support to that end,” Sui Khar
told Frontier.
Besides disagreements over representation and
inclusion, the two factions also proclaim different political priorities. While
the Council intends to build a formal Chin political and administrative
structure at the same time as fighting the junta, the Brotherhood prefers
prioritising the armed struggle before moving on to local institution-building.
The Brotherhood’s choice is partly shaped by its belief that any
institution-building undertaken in wartime would invariably be dominated by the
CNF.
The CNF does not accept the Brotherhood’s perception of the Council. “The CC does not stop anyone from joining. Our doors are always open and we welcome all Chin people to join us,” Sui Khar said.
Enter the AA
Meanwhile, the AA’s growing presence in Chin has
deepened the division between Chin groups. After its seizure of Paletwa in
January gave it a presence on the India border, the Rakhine armed group
extended its influence northwards by joining hands with the Chin Brotherhood.
The Chinland Council has taken a strong exception
to this. It views the AA as an outsider trespassing on Chin territory and
engaging in “anti-Chin” activities. In the same vein, it sees the Brotherhood’s
collaboration with the AA as detrimental to the wider Chin struggle.
A source close to the CNF who wished to remain anonymous said the group sees the AA as a “threat to the national identity, sovereignty and interests of the Chin people”.
“The Chin Brotherhood is just acting as an AA
proxy. The Brotherhood claims to fight for federal democracy, but is colluding
with a group that has a one-party, authoritarian-style leadership,” the source
told Frontier.
The Council, in a statement dated June 10, made a
battery of serious accusations against the AA. These include forcibly
recruiting Chin to fight in its ranks, imposing coercive administrative
measures, restricting religious freedom and violating human rights in areas the
AA occupies in Chin.
“The AA’s actions are extremely dangerous and will
only escalate communal violence,” said the source close to the CNF. According
to Sui Khar, the AA continues to “play a dirty game in Chin society for their
own benefit and advantages”.
The Global Khumi Organisation released a similar
statement on June 4, charging the AA with committing “inhumane atrocities”
against Chin people and even engaging in “illegal drug sales and distribution”
in the state. The organisation is drawn from the Khumi Chin people, who
predominate in Paletwa.
The Brotherhood, however, casts its relationship
with the AA as a mutually beneficial collaboration between two groups with a
common enemy. “We really have to look at the larger picture here. It is about
defeating the military junta,” Salai Yaw Marn, a spokesperson for the
Brotherhood, told Frontier over the phone.
“This revolutionary war is bigger than Chin or
Bamar, and encompasses the whole of the union. We are taking down [junta] posts
across Chin State one after the other. So, the alliance is working for, and not
against, Chin national interests.”
The MDF, the first Chin group to ally with the AA,
says the geography makes it logical for them to ally with the AA. “Maraland and
Rakhine State are adjacent to each other,” Lakher of the MDF said. Maraland
refers to a loosely defined territory in southern Chin dominated by the Mara
Chin people. “Therefore, it makes much sense to join forces, not least because,
as a powerful armed group, the AA is able to give us political and military
support,” he said.
Between the two factions, the Chinland Council has
captured the largest share of territory from the junta thanks to the CNF’s
superior troop numbers and firepower. Conquered towns include Rikhawdar, a
trade hub on the India-Myanmar border, taken in November last year, and Tonzang
and Cikha towns in northern Chin, seized in May.
But the Brotherhood, with the AA’s assistance, has
also made important territorial gains in recent months. In late April, the
alliance captured Kyin Dway village in Kanpetlet Township in the south, as well
as regime posts in Tedim Township in the north.
However, these gains have exacerbated frictions
between the Council and the Brotherhood. After it seized Kyin Dway, the
Brotherhood accused the Council of trying to “invade” its rightful territory.
Tensions surged even further when the Brotherhood
seized the headquarters of the junta’s Light Infantry Battalion 304 in Matupi
town on June 17. The following day, joint Brotherhood and AA forces reportedly
clashed with the CNF, resulting in casualties on both sides, as well as among
the junta forces. Each side also accused the other of blockading its respective
movements.
Competition was particularly fierce in Matupi because of its strategic importance. The town is a crucial waypoint between northern and southern Chin, and onwards to Rakhine. “Whoever controls Matupi will have strong leverage over other groups in both Chin and Rakhine states,” a researcher from Paletwa told Frontier over the phone, asking to remain anonymous for security reasons. “For example, if the CNF wants to get the upper hand and pressure the AA, controlling Matupi would be a good idea.”
An anxious neighbour
Tensions between Chin groups, and over the presence
of the AA, have spilled across the India-Myanmar border into Mizoram.
In June, the Central Young Lai Association, an
influential civil society organisation based in Mizoram’s Lawngtlai district,
began a blockade of goods going from the Indian state to southern Chin. This
route has been a lifeline through the import of goods from India into Rakhine
via Paletwa, amid a separate embargo imposed by the military on goods from the
rest of Myanmar. The Mizoram-based association represents the Lai Chin people,
who also dominate the CNF, and its blockade was aimed at pressuring the AA to
withdraw from Chin.
The move has been denounced by the Mara Thyutlia
Py, an ethnic Mara civil society organisation based in Mizoram’s Siaha
district. The MTP rejected the CYLA’s decision to include Siaha in its
blockade, which affects trade with a swathe of Chin north of Paletwa, while
also calling for the resumption of trade with the latter township.
Lakher attributed the CYLA’s move to its supposed intimacy with the CNF. “The CNF and its allies are behind this act. They want to starve the AA of crucial supplies from southern Mizoram through this CYLA-imposed blockade. The move not only makes little sense, but also risks spiking tensions between the Chin and Rakhine people,” Lakher said.
The border between Mizoram and Paletwa is also one
of the key nodes in the India-funded Kaladan Multi Modal Transit and Transport
Project. The project, which has been under construction for more than a decade,
envisages goods being transported by sea from Kolkata, India, to Rakhine’s
Sittwe seaport. From there, the goods travel up the Kaladan River to Paletwa,
where they are offloaded for an overland journey on a 110-kilometre (68-mile)
road snaking north to Mizoram’s Zorinpui.
Thanks to the project, Paletwa has received large tranches of infrastructure-related investment in recent years. While the project is suspended due to the fighting in Chin and Rakhine, whoever controls Paletwa once the hostilities cease will be able to tax a potentially lucrative trading route and exercise leverage over authorities in both India and Myanmar.
Sensing that its security and economic interests
are at stake, India has begun tentatively reaching out to resistance actors. K
Vanlalvena, an MP in Mizoram’s upper house, visited Paletwa in January and met
members of the AA to discuss the Kaladan project and the group’s presence near
the Indian border. It is unclear if New Delhi green lit the cross-border trip,
but it established a precedent for engaging with anti-junta groups along the
border. The foreign minister S Jaishankar hinted at such a shift with a July 11
post on X that said India “engages all stakeholders” to support “a return to
democracy in Myanmar”.
Government sources in New Delhi say there is a
strong appetite to work with whichever groups are willing to secure the border
and, in turn, Indian interests. However, they remain unsure of whom to talk to,
given the diverse number of actors, often with competing interests. For New
Delhi, intra-Chin unity as well as peaceful coexistence between Chin groups and
the AA is important for stabilising the border.
Chin groups, for their part, remain keen on engaging New Delhi too.
“It’s getting clearer every day that India’s
engagement in the revolutionary war in Myanmar, especially in Chin State, is a
must,” said Brotherhood spokesperson Yaw Marn. “Chin is vital for the
developmental interests of both India and China, but it is closer to India.
Therefore, for India, Chin State is critical. As the Chin Brotherhood gets
stronger, India should engage in discussions on economic development, regional
stability and peace talks.”
Salai Timmy, a spokesperson for the
Brotherhood-allied Chin National Organisation, agreed.
“We are thankful to the Mizoram government for
giving shelter to refugees from Chin State. Having good neighbours during
crises is very important. We would also like to request New Delhi to help our
refugees and the revolution,” he said.
The CNF has similar views. “India, as our
neighbouring country, would like to see peace and stability along its border,”
Sui Khar said.
These sentiments suggest India could potentially be
a conflict mediator in western Myanmar, similar to China in the north of the
country. However, this is unlikely in the near term. Some in New Delhi have
suggested that India appoint a “special envoy” for Myanmar so that it can
openly talk to resistance actors without jeopardising the ambassador’s
relationship with the junta, but this idea has not yet gained traction.
Repairing the rift
Despite the fractures, there is still a desire
among Chin groups for unity.
“Nothing is impossible if Chin leaders are willing
to engage in peace talks,” said Salai Timmy of the CNO. “We already had CJDC
before, under which we were united. And if there is political dialogue between
the Chinland Council and Chin Brotherhood, things are possible.”
But the source close to the CNF was mindful of the
challenges. “Taking up arms might be straightforward, but maintaining
integrity, stability and principled leadership are much harder,” they said.
Yaw Marn was more cautious still. “The idea of a common Chin revolutionary front appears hypothetical. Both the Chinland Council and the Brotherhood sought such a common front, but it seems impossible for the meantime. The leaders don’t want to come together unless they have the upper hand or can control the united organisation,” he said.
Given its national mandate, the NUG could have a
role in fostering Chin unity, but it’s unclear if it has the capacity to do so.
“We have been in touch with all stakeholders in
Chin State to hear their differences [of] opinion,” U Kyaw Zaw, spokesperson of
the President’s Office of the NUG, told Frontier over the phone.
“We have been encouraging them to engage in
dialogue to solve the issues quickly, and come together to create a united Chin
front in order to defeat the terrorist military council.” The presidential
spokesperson suggested that while factionalism in Chin is an internal issue,
some external mediation could help.
“The differences within Chin State will have to be
resolved by the Chin brothers and sisters through dialogue. But, because the
NUG is striving to achieve unity by building a genuinely federal democratic
union, we will also have to help the Chin people to solve their differences in
order to eliminate the military dictatorship from both Chinland and Myanmar,”
Kyaw Zaw said.
On differences over the AA’s involvement in Chin
State, Kyaw Zaw believed the Chin and Rakhine peoples’ history as neighbours,
and their shared opposition to the junta, formed the basis of a productive
partnership rather than competition. “Rakhine and Chin states have shared a
relationship for a long time, including through the British colonial period.
They had strong people-to-people and trade relations,” he said.
“While we understand that there are some
disagreements within Chin State over the AA’s involvement, we are all one
single family with a common objective – that is to defeat the military
dictatorship. We need to fight together to achieve that across regions and
states.”
(Angshuman Choudhury is a researcher from
India and a PhD candidate in Comparative Asian Studies at the National
University of Singapore. He writes a weekly column on Northeast India for the
Hindustan Times and was previously an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Policy
Research in New Delhi.)