(Billy Ford’s article from the United States Institute of Peace on November-16, 2023)
As the national uprising against Myanmar’s coup
regime has gained strength, a singular question has hovered over the widening
campaign: If this patchwork of ethnic armed groups, deposed elected leaders,
activists and armed defense forces manages to topple the junta, would they be
able to govern, or would the country descend into greater chaos?
That question has gained urgency as recent developments put the military’s staying power in growing doubt. Since October 27, armed resistance groups have seized numerous strategic border crossings along Myanmar’s frontier with China, India and Thailand and routed the army from more than 150 bases or posts.
Driving this
remarkable development is unprecedented interethnic coordination among three
ethnic armies and Bamar-majority People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) that sprung up
after the coup in 2021. In an additional blow to the junta, Beijing almost
certainly approved the offensive after the junta generals ignored its appeals
to crack down on lucrative crime centers along the border that prey on Chinese
nationals.
Prospects for Stability?
To assess the
possible future for governance in Myanmar should the regime fall, USIP
supported six research projects over the past two years. The work explored key
factors such as the relationship between resistance leaders and communities,
the impact of the post-coup movement on national identity and the state of intercommunal
relations.
Our research
concluded that the movement in Myanmar has characteristics that would
contribute to stability in a post-junta period. Expectations in the
international community that instability and chaos would follow the military’s ouster
are not without foundation — major challenges include political divisions,
longstanding grievances and criminality. Yet many of the worst-case scenarios
are based on historical precedents or cross-country comparisons that may not
apply to this unique movement and moment in Myanmar’s history.
Critically, the
sociopolitical advances in the new generation of leaders to emerge within the
resistance structures have been underestimated and even discounted, along with
plans they have made for a post-coup interim administration.
Four principal
findings from USIP research support this conclusion:
1. Fragmentation
and warlordism are unlikely because the resistance is connected to communities
and motivated by a desire for a new political paradigm.
Two unpublished
USIP-supported projects that involved wide-ranging interviews with resistance
actors found that most are motivated primarily by a desire to protect
communities from the rampaging army and to achieve a new political and social
paradigm. Many resistance fighters, including PDFs, have roots in communities
they serve. Likewise, the core ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) started
as social movements decades ago, not armed groups, and continue to serve their
own communities. They include the Kachin Independence Organization, Chin
National Front, Karenni National Progressive Party, and Karen National Union.
Despite
international anxiety that unaccountable armed groups may emerge and exploit
local communities, USIP research and programming has found few instances of
this phenomenon as compared to similar conflict settings. Other than a massacre
by the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) in mid-2021 (which led to the
KNDO being expelled from the Karen National Union), there are no documented
cases of civilian massacres by the resistance. When intra-resistance conflict
does occur, it receives widespread news coverage, yet evidence shows that these
flare-ups constitute an aberration.
Although
national-level political dialogue among resistance forces remains stuck,
including those within the National Unity Consultative Council, on the ground,
a continuity of mission exists across ethnic lines. This common objective is
likely to motivate resistance stakeholders to negotiate a shared future rather
than to pursue warlordism, fragmentation or their own political objectives.
Basic conditions on the ground in central Myanmar, especially the absence of
widespread high-value extractives, also limit these threats. Most resistance
actors there depend on public support to sustain themselves.
Achieving a new
political arrangement will not be straightforward and will likely require years
of national dialogue. But USIP research shows that the movement has already
made meaningful progress toward national reconciliation and building a shared
vision. The various forms of collaboration between EROs and Bamar communities
on military operations, social service provision and humanitarian response
further demonstrate growing solidarity.
2. Underlying
social cohesion is stronger than perceived.
Jangai Jap and
Isabel Chew’s research finds that interethnic relations in Myanmar are no worse
than in countries with substantially lower levels of violence. Furthermore,
national identity (i.e., Myanmar) is at least as important as ethnic identity —
another factor that would motivate resistance groups to seek a national
political agreement rather than to fragment.
Both findings
from Jap and Chew’s experimental research cut against the dominant narratives
about intercommunal relations in Myanmar. They undermine the fatalistic
perception that Myanmar is irreconcilably fractious and dispersed and its
citizens loyal to subnational ethnic identities. In fact, this movement has
been more resilient and effective against powerful military forces than many
comparable resistance movements (Myanmar in 1988, Iran, Syria, Sudan, etc.) —
because its participants aren’t as fractured as many observers believe them to
be.
These findings
suggest that intercommunal conflict is driven primarily by exclusionary
governance structures and divisive political dialogue. Both issues are
priorities for the resistance movement and are addressed in the Federal
Democracy Charter. Similar results on national identity emerged in a second,
yet to be published, USIP-supported survey of the Myanmar diaspora by Jap and
Amy Liu.
Jap and Chew’s
research also found that “collective effort” is a powerful narrative for
building intercommunal solidarity. A national reconstruction process based upon
the notion that “we are in this together” paired with major investment in
mental health and psychosocial support could help a stable federal democracy
take root.
3. Shifts in
political power and norms could enable a successful political dialogue where
past peace processes have failed.
Myanmar has
never had a genuine nation-building process. The peace processes that emerged
every decade or so from 1950 to 2021 failed under the weight of military
domination. A national dialogue freed from military control and led by
pro-democracy stakeholders tied to communities opens the way for a more
equitable, just, inclusive and stable political paradigm.
USIP-supported
research by Bertil Lintner identifies three main ways that past peace processes
have failed — all of which are less likely to plague a post-junta dialogue.
First, whereas
past peace processes have failed because key actors were excluded, the
resistance is led by the most inclusive political coalition in Myanmar’s
history. If it continues to be governed by the principle of inclusion and collective
leadership, a dialogue is more likely to succeed.
Second, whereas
misinformed foreigners ignored the public and injected resources into past
peace processes, thereby creating unbalanced negotiation, there has been
considerably less international involvement in intra-resistance dialogue
processes.
And, third, the
military did not participate in the peace process in good faith and structured
the process (called “among the most complicated in the modern world”) to serve
its own aims. If the military is involved in a political dialogue process, it
would do so from a position of weakness.
Furthermore, the
lack of a single charismatic leader or political party has allowed the
emergence of a new political landscape of younger and more diverse leaders.
Although many analysts have cited this as a vulnerability for the movement, it
has proven to be a critical asset. This diversity will continue to be a plus in
a post-conflict national dialogue.
4. Positive
shifts in intercommunal relations since the coup have diminished the potential
for intercommunal violence and offer a better environment for dialogue.
Three
USIP-supported research projects found improvements in interethnic and
interreligious trust and affinity since the coup. A team of researchers from
among the pro-democracy movement interviewed young people in the movement from
seven states and four regions.
Respondents from
across ethnic and religious communities articulated a remarkably consistent
vision for an inclusive federal democracy characterized by secularism,
nondiscrimination and protection for the cultures of traditionally marginalized
communities.
Many cited an
exclusionary national identity propagated by successive Bamar-dominated
governments, both military and National League for Democracy-led
administrations, as the primary driver of conflict and violence in Myanmar.
Respondents in
this research, as well as in a separate project by USIP student scholar Thin
Zar Htet, confirmed marked improvements in interethnic relations since the
coup. Sympathy and understanding of traditionally marginalized groups,
including Rohingya, has increased. Virtually all respondents in these two
projects, many of whom hold important positions within the resistance movement,
see the movement as a unique historic opportunity to build a more stable and
equitable Myanmar around a more inclusive national identity.
This is visible
in the previously inconceivable military collaboration and resistance
solidarity between Bamar and ethnic minority organizations — as manifested in
the most recent coordinated multi-group operations involving Kokang, Rakhine,
Bamar, Shan and Ta’ang fighters and with Karen, Karenni and Chin groups
operating in parallel.
Thin Zar Htet’s
research found that while extreme forms of religious nationalism persist, the
public has become more politically informed and resistant to extremist
propaganda and incitement, so extremist viewpoints are less likely to escalate
to violence.
Respondents also
indicated support for a more secular governing structure, wary of politicians
who manipulate religion for political gain. The younger generation saw what was
possible during the transition period of relative freedom under an elected
government. Their sense of empowerment has been supercharged by the
achievements of the resistance movement.
The Resistance Is Laying the Foundation for a New
Nation
The research
findings echo throughout USIP’s programs. For example, demand for USIP’s Peace
Education program, which trains nonviolent actors in core peacebuilding skills
and mental health awareness, has grown considerably since the coup.
Although
“dialogue” has taken on negative connotations since misinformed international
actors began pressing resistance groups to engage in talks with the coup
government, resistance stakeholders continue to request more training on
peacebuilding methods. In response, USIP has trained nearly 1,000 nonviolent
resistance actors in peacebuilding skills since the coup.
The participants
tell USIP that they join the training not only to build more effective
resistance cohesion and resolve community-level tensions, but also to prepare
for a national dialogue process. Demand for these skills aligns with the
conclusion that this movement is about political transformation and that
communities will push their leaders to engage in dialogue toward that end.
USIP research on
local governance structures in areas controlled by the resistance identified a
widespread and interconnected network of institutions that could serve as a
starting point for stable administration and distribution of assistance in a
post-junta period.
Work to Be Done
Many respondents
in USIP-supported research agree that the resistance leadership, particularly
the National Unity Government (NUG), reflects progress over the past senior
actors. But in their view, leaders must show a greater commitment to a new
governing paradigm by devolving more authority to ethnic minority-led
organizations and to local leaders who hold moral authority in their
communities.
Critically, the
various studies summarized here indicate positive trends among the public for a
dialogue process. That support, however, is unlikely to hold up if elites who
do not share the public’s perspectives or have ulterior motives control the
process — as happened in the past. It is essential, therefore, that the
bottom-up nature of this movement be maintained in all dialogue efforts.
Participation in the national process should be based on community legitimacy,
not coercive power.
Many in the
international community seem to prize stability above all, making them
indifferent to whether Myanmar is under the control of a military dictatorship.
Of course, the military is the primary cause of instability, while the
resistance movement offers the most credible path to stability. But stability
per se is not the movement’s foremost objective. USIP’s research clearly shows
that this is a national uprising aimed at building a new nation, with the
accompanying hope that stability will follow.
Myanmar’s
problems are challenging and complex, but not intractable. Military domination
is not inevitable. Despite constant contention in the international community
that the military cannot be defeated, the resistance is gaining. Despite
receiving little tangible assistance, the regime’s opponents have persisted. As
the resistance movement enters a new phase, its participants should be allowed
to choose their own future.
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| Will Burma collapse and be fragnated like former Yugoslavia? |