On 6 November 2005 Burma’s military
government abruptly moved the administrative capital of Burma from Rangoon to a
remote area - 2,723 square miles wide between Shan Yoma and Yegu Yoma ranges - at
about 200 miles north of the former capital city of Rangoon.
Even though the actual construction of
the new capital city Nay Pyi Daw has been going on quietly since 2002 by at
least 30 large construction companies the strategic plan to build the new
administrative centre had been secretly drawn up since 1995-96 by the Burma’s
ruling military.
Even though costing at least US$ 20
Billion after spending a considerable portion of Burma’s national budgets the Nay
Pyi Daw mega-project has been an ideal capital most country’s armed-forces can only dream of.
Strategic Reason For the Relocation of Burma’s Capital
Burma during the failed 8-8-88
(Four-Shit) Uprising in late 1988 was critically threatened from two fronts:
one from across the maritime-boundary at south by the US Navy and one from
across the land-boundary at North-East by the China’s PLA.
The nuclear-armed US Seventh Fleet was in Burma’s territorial waters and
the fleet’s Amphibious-Assault-Ship USS Belleau Wood was ready to land its
3,000 strong Marine Division in Rangoon while the one-million strong and
also-nuclear-armed South-Western Army of PLA with its Rapid-Armoured-Division
ready to march to Mandalay was amassing across Muse on the China border if US
ever made the first move.
US Navy's Seventh Fleet in Burma's waters (Aug 1988). |
Also the annual Cobra-Gold military
exercises by US and Thai militaries in neighbouring Thailand were really
unsettling for Burmese Army.
Especially the main exercise of special-forces operation of attacking and occupying a strategic location – geographically very similar to Rangoon – in Thailand aided by Naval and Air supports was really unnerving the Burmese military strategists and planners.
Especially the main exercise of special-forces operation of attacking and occupying a strategic location – geographically very similar to Rangoon – in Thailand aided by Naval and Air supports was really unnerving the Burmese military strategists and planners.
Rangoon was conveniently accessible by
sea from the down south and thus extremely vulnerable. British used that weak
point in their successful First Anglo-Burmese War in 1824. With a small landing
force supported by a powerful naval fleet British took Rangoon in a surprise
attack on 5 May 1824 and occupied Rangoon first and then gradually the whole
Burma for very long time till 4 January 1948.
The sudden grinding-stop of administrative-machinery by lawless-anarchy during the failed 8-8-88 (Four-Shit) Uprising had also given
the Burma’s military a reason to find a new capital which would not be
vulnerable to similar threats posed by the political and social unrests in the
future.
For all those reasons Burma army
decided at that time to relocate the administrative capital to a strategic-and-safer
location so that the parliament, high court, government, and especially the war
office could be relocated away from the major population centre Rangoon.
Impenetrable Security of Nay Pyi Daw
From security point of view alone the
fortress Nay Pyi Daw is impenetrable. A new light infantry division has been
specially established and assigned for the security of new capital filled with fortified
underground-caverns and tunnels.
Nay Pyi Daw is also protected by
advanced radar systems together with stationary and mobile air-defence-missile
systems capable of covering 50 miles radius round the capital. In addition more
SAM missile batteries and infantry divisions have been positioned along all
access roads in and out of Nay Pyi Daw.
The biggest military camp in Burma
Meikhtilar with armoured divisions and long-range artillery divisions is only
75 miles away from the new capital. The Shande air-force base with latest Mig
jetfighters squadrons is also at Meikhtilar to protect Nay Pyi Daw.
War Office - the nerve centre of Burma
army at Nay Pyi Daw - is directly connected to every local army battalion all
over Burma via highly-secured fibre-optic communication network buried deep at
least 6 feet underground.
Since Nay Pyi Daw is more than 200
miles away from the nearest sea any possible amphibious-landing threats are all
but eliminated, and any internal disturbances in Rangoon will never directly
affect the proper functioning of a Burmese government again.
Unless a direct attack from a
superpower like United States or China any other threats from the neighbouring
nations like Bangladesh or Thailand can safely be eliminated. That is the
beauty of our Nay Pyi Daw the brilliant-brainchild of former Senior General
Than Shwe.
Pain-and-Gain of the Mega-Project Nay Pyi Daw
New International Airport at Nay Pyi Daw. |
Army has accepted that the price tag US$
20+ billion was extremely expensive for a very-poor nation like Burma and the
Nay Pyi Daw mega-project would never have been implemented under any
democratically-elected civilian government.
But the bitter experiences during last
40 years of civil war and civil strives had basically forced army to put clear preferences
on National security over other social, commercial, health, and education
sectors and Burmese military believed that people of Burma would understand and
accept that Pain-and-Gain policy eventually within next few decades.
Amazing result from the Nay Pyi Daw
mega-project was that according to the UN’s poverty census statistics the
poverty percentage in Burma dropped significantly from 36% at 2004-2005 when
the project rapidly accelearted to 26% in 2009-2010 because of the massive
employment gain from the construction activities due to the Nay Pyi Daw
mega-project.
Strategic Plan to Partially Withdraw From Civilian Politics
Peace talks between KIA and Burmese Government after Burma army's devastating massive offensive last year. |
Burma army has truly accepted the fact
that ongoing civil war must end to improve the living standard of the people of
Burma. And to end the civil war the negotiations with the armed-ethnic
insurgent organizations must be continued.
And the ultimate success for these negotiations relies totally on the fair and agreeable sharing of power and natural resources between the future civilian government of Burman-majority Mainland and the ethnic-majority States.
And the ultimate success for these negotiations relies totally on the fair and agreeable sharing of power and natural resources between the future civilian government of Burman-majority Mainland and the ethnic-majority States.
At the same time the army also understands very well the fact that without a strong and powerful armed-forces behind a
civilian-controlled Burmese government the ethnic insurgents with substantial
foreign backing will be ever bringing unfair demands to the negotiation tables.
Such demand like hardliner-Shans' push to reorganize present seven divisions of Burma-proper to a single Burman State will never be tolerated by the Burmese majority and their army.
Such demand like hardliner-Shans' push to reorganize present seven divisions of Burma-proper to a single Burman State will never be tolerated by the Burmese majority and their army.
The grand strategy is that army will
eventually withdraw and let the civilian government negotiate with the ethnic
insurgent organizations. In Rooseveltian parlance the government will softly
speak to the ethnic insurgents while the army will carry a big stick.
Recalcitrant KIA (the so-called Kachin Independence Army) had bitterly tasted that big stick just last year and they are now back at the negotiations table.
Recalcitrant KIA (the so-called Kachin Independence Army) had bitterly tasted that big stick just last year and they are now back at the negotiations table.
So when the agreeable sharing of power
and resources is achieved with most ethnic-insurgent organizations the army
will forcefully eliminate some insurgent organizations still refusing to
compromise.
2008 Constitution: Legal Safeguards for the Retreating Army
Appointed Military MPs in Union Parliament. |
By 2007-2008 our army has reached the
final stages of that grand strategy the brainchild of former SG Than Shwe.
Since then army has been implementing a very successful retreat or withdrawal back
to the barracks.
In war, for any retreat to be
successful the withdrawing forces must implement sound defensive steps so that
the enemy forces do not have the chance to attack or even disturb them. Sometimes
the retreating forces must even stage small-scale counter-offensive operations
to kill the enemy’s momentum in chasing after them.
The 2008 Constitution is one of those
major defensive lines for the army to be able to maintain the physical
integrity and the sovereignty of our beloved Union of Burma. Especially the
section absolutely mandating 25% of the total members of parliament to the
army.
So if the civilian MPs from opposition parties such as NLD and various
ethnic parties of future parliaments try any attempt to weaken the army such as
cutting substantially the military expenditures in the budget they will not be
able to do so.
(Blogger's Notes: I was born in a CPB's field hospital inside then-very-remote Pa-Lway Kyo-waing on Pegu-Yoma Ranges in 1956 and that exact area now is cleared and developed as part of Burma's new capital Nay-pyi-daw. I even think Burma Army's War Office now is right at that spot where I was born. Thus I am very happy and excited to claim myself as a Nay-pyi-daw born Burmese. Bravo and cheers!)
Related posts at following links:
Sister Daw Moe Swe: The Red Matron
(Blogger's Notes: I was born in a CPB's field hospital inside then-very-remote Pa-Lway Kyo-waing on Pegu-Yoma Ranges in 1956 and that exact area now is cleared and developed as part of Burma's new capital Nay-pyi-daw. I even think Burma Army's War Office now is right at that spot where I was born. Thus I am very happy and excited to claim myself as a Nay-pyi-daw born Burmese. Bravo and cheers!)
Related posts at following links:
Sister Daw Moe Swe: The Red Matron