(Jason Tower’s post from The U.S. PEACE INSTUTUTE on 5 December 2024.)
Myanmar’s Resistance Manages to Defy Chinese
Pressure — For Now: Since August,
China has tried to weaken Myanmar’s resistance forces while offering legitimacy
to the junta. Many elements of the resistance are defying Chinese demands, but
tension and instability are rising. Myanmar may become a test case for more
robust Chinese security involvement overseas.
In early August, resistance forces in northern
Myanmar delivered yet another historic defeat to the Myanmar military. After
just 35 days of fighting, resistance actors toppled the Myanmar army’s
northeastern command, bringing expansive amounts of territories across northern
Shan State under their control. These developments rippled through Myanmar and
reinvigorated the resistance — but also triggered a dramatic response from the
Chinese Communist government.
Since August, China has unleashed punitive measures targeting key resistance groups, greenlit military airstrikes across northern Myanmar to push ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) out of newly captured territories, and showered Myanmar junta leader Min Aung Hlaing with unprecedented levels of legitimacy.
Despite this, resistance forces have shown
significant resilience to Chinese pressure and defied Beijing by continuing
revolutionary activities in both the northern and southern parts of the
country. Additional victories in November have brought some of the world’s
richest rare earth deposits under the control of resistance forces, creating
challenges for China’s dominant position in this market.
Despite this, resistance forces have shown significant resilience to Chinese pressure.
China’s response to these developments has
implications far beyond Myanmar, as it could set precedent for more aggressive
Chinese actions in other geopolitically sensitive hotspots and with respect to
how it secures its investments overseas.
The resilience of resistance forces — and their
growing leverage over the Myanmar economy — also provide a unique opportunity
for other international actors. The United States, other Western countries and
India should adopt much more deliberate and effective strategies to prevent
China from gaining a strategic advantage in Myanmar.
A Historic Series of Resistance Victories
From mid-January until mid-June of 2024, a
Chinese-brokered cease-fire (referred to as the Haigeng Agreement) effectively
froze the conflict in northern Shan State, where the Myanmar National
Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)
and the Arakan Army — collectively known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance, or
3BHA — had been fighting against the Myanmar military.
Beijing spent much of this period pushing the
involved parties to achieve a more elaborate deal so China could resume its
trade and economic cooperation in the region. But instead, both the Myanmar
military and the 3BHA spent this period preparing for the resumption of
hostilities. Consequently, talks collapsed in mid-May. A month later, on June
13, the Haigeng Agreement collapsed as well. In defiance of Chinese pressure,
the parties were back at war.
This shouldn’t have come as a surprise to China.
But what likely did catch Beijing off-guard was the rapid pace at which the
3BHA began rolling over one military post after another, capturing a series of
major townships in northern Shan State in just weeks.
By early July, fighting reached the largest town in
northern Shan State, Lashio, which was also home to the Myanmar military’s
northeastern command. After several weeks of fighting, the entire town of
Lashio — as well as the command — fell to resistance forces on August 3.
China Intervenes to Save a Military Regime on the Brink
For the first two weeks of August, resistance
forces continued to press onward, giving the impression that they would move
into Mandalay.
Rumors began to spread — even on Chinese-language
social media outlets — that a deal had been cut between the MNDAA and the
National Unity Government (NUG) to stand up an NUG office in Lashio and make
MNDAA leader Peng Deren the new vice president once the military is defeated.
While the MNDAA later dismissed these statements as
disinformation, by then, China had already set an unprecedented response in
motion.
Throughout the remainder of August, China proceeded
to cut off all resource flows to resistance forces in northern Shan State.
China also closed off border crossings, cut electricity and internet, and even
placed pressure on the most powerful northern EAO — the United Wa State Army
(UWSA) — to adopt the same policies in its own dealings with the MNDAA and
TNLA.
The extent that China was bullying the EAOs became apparent when leaked details of an August 27 meeting between a Chinese diplomat and two senior UWSA leaders began circulating.
The leak revealed that China believed the MNDAA’s
capture of Lashio had “deeply damaged China-Myanmar friendship,” and that the
resumption of Operation 1027 had undermined Chinese interests. China also
blamed the UWSA for failing to completely cut the flow of power, water,
internet, basic supplies, and people into MNDAA territory.
China’s bottom line: This “5-cuts policy” should
continue to be enforced on the TNLA and MNDAA until they end involvement in
revolutionary activity and the latter hands Lashio back to the Myanmar army.
In September, Chinese pressure on the EAOs
increased even further. China traditionally responds strongly to airstrikes
conducted along its border. But when Myanmar’s military regime indiscriminately
perpetrated airstrikes on MNDAA and TNLA positions across Shan State, Beijing
stood and watched — even refusing to respond when airstrikes hit one of the
most important Chinese temples in Lashio.
In early November, in response to Chinese pressure
to cut off flows of goods into MNDAA territory, the UWSA publicly convicted 9
people for smuggling goods into “conflict areas” in northern Shan State.
However, the most concerning development of all was
the sudden disappearance of MNDAA leader Peng Deren. Peng was last seen
publicly in mid-August. According to EAO sources, Peng traveled to the Chinese
city of Kunming for health reasons in mid-September but has been out of
communication since.
Officially, China maintains that Peng is in Kunming for medical treatment. But Peng’s lack of communication is very unusual given his high profile. It is also notable that the leaked meeting minutes referenced above showed Chinese officials questioning how much longer Peng might remain the leader of the MNDAA.
In addition to all this, China invited Myanmar
junta leader Min Aung Hlaing to visit in early November. Beijing had snubbed
the general in recent years, refusing his participation at signature Belt and
Road Initiative events.
While Min Aung Hlaing was not afforded a trip to
Beijing or a meeting with Xi Jinping, the visit was a windfall: The junta
helmsman was able to engage with leaders from a range of subgroupings within
ASEAN. This flurry of meetings sent a strong signal to ASEAN that both China
and subregional blocs preferred re-engagement with the Myanmar military at the
highest levels.
The Price of Chinese Assistance
Immediately following Min Aung Hlaing’s return from
China, the quid-pro-quo became clear. In exchange for this support, China
demanded a major concession from the Myanmar army: Changes to the country’s
laws to establish a joint venture security company that would permit China to
directly secure its cross-border investments in Myanmar, including through the
deployment of armed Chinese security guards.
The Myanmar military opted to divulge information
about China’s request to the public — an indication that the Myanmar military
sees this move as controversial. The move breaks the Myanmar military’s
monopoly on providing security services for Chinese projects in the country,
which is one of the most significant sources of leverage that it holds against
China.
Min Aung Hlaing might be able to argue this could
provide the Myanmar army with new access to equipment and intelligence — and
that the presence of highly trained Chinese security could also free up Myanmar
military troops, security guards and police to be redeployed to the front lines
against resistance forces. But there is also the distinct possibility that once
in the country, Chinese security could act in ways counter to the military’s
interest.
Belt and Road in the Crossfire?
China’s desire to directly secure its investments
in Myanmar is based on highly problematic logic. Coupled with China’s openly
hostile posture toward resistance forces, this desire could draw Chinese
investments directly into the crossfire.
By partnering with the Myanmar regime to gain
access for Chinese security personnel, China is ignoring the fact that vast
territories — including many of the areas through which Chinese projects run —
are no longer under the control of the military. As such, the population and
vast ranks of resistance forces are now likely to see these projects as aligned
with an enemy force.
Chinese analysts have proposed a scheme to address
this issue: Have the security company recruit from the ranks of the EAOs and
Peoples Defense Forces. However, this is only likely to trigger much greater
chaos in Myanmar.
Resistance actors could struggle to identify
strategies to prevent movements for federalism, democracy and the end of
military dictatorship from being overrun by Chinese economic interests. The
military might also move to prevent resistance actors from infiltrating the
security company, dragging these projects even further into the conflict.
China’s Plans for Myanmar’s Future
The contours of China’s game plan for Myanmar are
increasingly clear: First, through a combination of bullying, economic coercion
and the manipulation of tensions across Myanmar’s EAOs, China aims to fragment
and ultimately undermine resistance forces while supporting the Myanmar
military. The end goal is to secure a series of deals that place the country on
a trajectory toward consolidation of military rule and cease-fire capitalism.
Second, seeing the junta’s decreasing capacity,
China aims to directly secure its geostrategic investments and assets in the
country. They may use their ongoing influence over northern EAOs as leverage to
compel the Myanmar military to trade away some measure of sovereignty to enable
this.
Third, by using leverage and divide-and-conquer
tactics through mini-laterals and subregional platforms, China aims to tilt
ASEAN and other external actors in the direction of normalizing ties with the
military regime.
And fourth, through support for a junta-led
election, China aims to help the regime achieve its so-called five-point
roadmap toward “stability.” China has
followed a small number of other international actors in arguing that a
junta-led election might open space for reform in the country.
While it is extremely unlikely that Min Aung Hlaing
has made any such commitments, this argument is predicated on the assumption
that the general will relinquish his control over the Myanmar military
following such an election — a step that Min Aung Hlaing is almost certain not
to take.
However, even if Min Aung Hlaing were to make such
a commitment, there is no case to be made that any election conducted under
current circumstances would be anything other than a catalyst for greater
violence.
EAO Resilience
The change in China’s posture has significantly
impacted the resistance. But surprisingly, resistance actors are defying
Chinese pressure across the country on an ongoing basis.
The front lines of this defiance are in Kachin
State, where the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has significantly picked up the
pace of its military operations since mid-August. Despite Chinese demands that
it cease fighting and negotiate with the regime, the KIA recently defeated a
Myanmar military-aligned militia with close ties to China.
Known also as the “rare earth militia,” the group
has aligned closely with Chinese mining companies since 2016 to transform
Kachin’s Pang War township into the primary source for rare earth imports into
China.
But in late October, the KIA took control of the
whole of Pang War, bringing all of the mining operations under its control.
This prompted Chinese industry insiders to publicly announce a coming surge in
prices — sparking significant volatility in the Chinese stock market in
November.
Signaling just how big of a shock this was to
China, the Chinese government undertook a massive overhaul of the leadership of
six of its top mining companies just days later, and banned rare earth exports
to the United States.
With billions of dollars in rare earth mines now
under its control, the KIA sent an even bolder signal to China: It announced
the closure of the key border crossing servicing the rare earth mineral
industry, indicating that they are in no hurry to resume business as usual.
The KIA’s moves are likely driven not only by a
desire to avoid being bullied by China, but equally by the Kachin public, which
has repeatedly protested the serious environmental and health impacts of the
rare earth mining. If the KIA does not introduce more sustainable practices, it
will likely come under popular pressure.
The KIA is not alone in its resilience. Despite the
pressure from China, the MNDAA has continued to hold its ground in Lashio
despite issuing a series of statements that it will not engage in any further
movements toward Mandalay. Meanwhile, in Rakhine State, the Arakan Army presses
ahead with military operations and has not indicated any concerns related to
Chinese pressure.
International Implications
While China continues to pay lip service to ASEAN
centrality and leadership on the Myanmar issue, it has emerged as the dominant
external actor pushing to shape developments to its advantage.
In many respects, Myanmar is emerging as a test
case for more robust Chinese security involvement overseas. Everything is on
the table, from deploying Chinese police, to using technology to monitor and
surveil activities beyond China’s border, to rolling out new approaches for
overseas security on Belt and Road Initiative projects, to gaining a strategic
advantage in platforms such as ASEAN.
In many respects, Myanmar is emerging as a test
case for more robust Chinese security involvement overseas.
Despite this interference — and the tensions and
chaos that it has triggered — Myanmar’s resistance forces are remaining
resilient and have gained very significant economic leverage over both China
and the military regime. More importantly, they are now ultimately the only
players in Myanmar that can provide a viable path for a return to stability.
The United States, other Western countries and
especially India should take careful note of the critical role that Myanmar’s
resistance can play and consider how they might leverage the incredible
resilience and growing influence of these resistance forces vis-à-vis China’s
moves to exploit Myanmar to its strategic advantage.
They should also look closely at the shifting
control over critical rare earth minerals in northern Myanmar, and the possible
implications for breaking down China’s dominance of rare earth mineral supply
chains.
