(Aron Plamondon’s post from the EBSCO in 2023.)
The
Burmese-Chinese Wars were a series of military conflicts primarily between the
Burmese kingdoms and the Chinese Ming Dynasty, spanning from the mid-15th to
the late 18th centuries.
These
wars were largely influenced by the complex relationship between the Tai
peoples, including the Shans of Burma, and the Chinese, who sought to assert
control over the region, particularly the strategic Irrawaddy waterway.
The
first significant conflict began in 1438, driven by the ambitions of a Maw Shan
chieftain, Thonganbwa, which led to a protracted struggle for dominance. Throughout
the following decades, the wars involved numerous battles, shifting
allegiances, and periods of both conflict and uneasy peace.
Notably, the conflict in the 1760s was sparked by Burmese incursions into Shan territories, prompting Chinese military responses that ultimately ended in failure. The conclusion of the last major conflict in 1769 resulted in the Kuangton Treaty, which fostered a temporary restoration of trade and diplomatic exchanges.
Despite
the underlying tensions, the treaty brought about a period of improved
Sino-Burmese relations that persisted until the decline of the Manchu Dynasty.
Overall, these wars significantly shaped the historical dynamics between Burma
and China, influencing territorial control and regional politics for centuries.
Background
The
Shans, the Laos, and the Siamese (Thais) are all descended from a group cognate
to the Chinese and known among themselves as the Tai. Early in the Christian
era, the Tai came under Chinese suzerainty, but they were often in rebellion
and ever anxious to assert their independence.
With
the passing of Kublai Khan’s dynasty in 1368, China lost control over the route
across Asia to the West. In the search for new outlets for trade, the Ming
Dynasty, with its eyes upon the Irrawaddy waterway, decided that the Maw Shans
of Burma must be subdued.
In
addition, the Chinese were motivated by the attempt of an ambitious Maw Shan
chieftain, Thonganbwa, to revive the old Nanchao empire. The result was a long
struggle lasting from 1438 to 1465. After this time, the wars between Burma and
China were recurrent, as the border between the two was indeterminate.
Action
By
1441, Wang Chi, the president of the Chinese board of war, was appointed to
lead a strong army, which drove the Shans out of Luchuan. Some of them fled to
Hsenwi, but the majority, under Thonganbwa, crossed the Irradaway and took
refuge in Mohnyin.
Wang
Chi subsequently offered Thonganbwa’s land to whomever succeeded in arresting
him; however, Thonganbwa had already been captured and presented to the king of
Mohnyin, Narapati. Wang Chi’s forces, in due course, conquered Mohnyin, and he
demanded the surrender of the fugitive.
When
Narapati refused, the Chinese proceeded to invade Burmese territory. A battle
was fought near Taguang (1445) in which the Chinese general was killed and his
army defeated. In the following year, the Chinese invaded in greater strength
and stormed the walls of Ava.
Narapati
then acquiesced. Thonganbwa, however, committed suicide, and only his dead body
could be surrendered. Narapati formally accepted Chinese overlordship. In
return, the Chinese forces assisted him in subduing the rebellious chief of
Yamethin.
In
1451, he received from China a gold seal of appointment as “Comforter of Ava,”
and three years later, he was given a piece of Mohnyin territory. Although the
Shans were subordinate to China, a symbiotic relationship emerged and the Ava
king maintained some semblance of authority.
Although
relative peace transferred into the reign of the next ruler, Thihathura (r.
1469–1481), he was the last of the Ava kings to avoid omnipresent internal and
external struggles. These struggles may have been prevented had China agreed to
Thihathura’s request in 1472 for the cession of Mohnyin.
Instead,
however, China chose to rule from afar. Although China would intermittently
administer doses of fear to scatter the Burmese provinces, it failed to
effectively administer the Shans. The Chinese policy was designed to prevent
the development of any powerful state within its territories, but once China’s
control weakened, Upper Burma became enshrouded in chaos.
By 1520, the situation forced the Chinese to push across the Salween and move their advanced bases farther in to Tenyueh; however, this had no effect. The next series of Ava kings also failed to stem the disorders, and in 1555, Ava was absorbed into the reunited kingdom of Burma.
By
1648, the new Burmese ruler, Pindale, was placed in the unfortunate position of
being in China when the Manchus drove out the Mings. Yongli, also known as Zhu
Youlang, the last of the Mings, had, in 1644, fled to Yunnan, where for a long
time he defied the Manchus. His heavy demands upon Hsenwi and Maingmaw for men
and supplies led Pindale to send a force to their assistance.
When
Yongli was finally pushed back into Bhamo along the old Burma Road, the
following Manchus defeated a Burmese army at Wetwin (1648), and for three
years, Upper Burma was ravaged up to the walls of Ava.
Pindale,
who was incapable of mitigating the damage, was replaced by his brother Pye.
However, Pye was also too weak to hold the Manchu, and in 1662, the Manchu
viceroy of Yunnan marched into Burma and demanded Yongli. Pye agreed, and
Yongli was publicly strangled with a bowstring in the marketplace.
Burma
then entered into a long period of stagnation. After the death of Pye in 1672,
Minrekyawdin reigned for nearly twenty-six years but was little more than a
figurehead. Although internal peace was maintained, there was no leadership and
consequently no real vigor.
The
last three kings of the Shan dynasty, Sane, Taninganwe, and Mahadammayaza
Dipati, also maintained peace largely through inactivity. When Hsinbyushin
began his reign in 1763, he renewed the project of conquering Siam. The Burmese
incursion into Laos territory caused such a ferment among the states bordering
on Yunnan that the Chinese were forced to intervene.
The
war began in 1766 with a punitive expedition directed by the Yunnan viceroy
against Kengtung, the largest and most easterly of the Shan states subject to
Burma. The Burmese drove out the Chinese, however, and the disaster forced the
viceroy to follow the customary practice of defeated Chinese generals, which
was to commit suicide.
The
subsequent campaigns also ended in failure—meaning more ritual suicides for the
Chinese. In 1769, the Chinese made a final attempt to wipe out their failures.
This time, their army attempted to reach Ava, as they had before, by the Bhamo
route. Once more, they failed at Kaungton. When the Burmese drove them out,
they asked for terms, and a peace treaty was signed on the spot in December,
1769.
Aftermath
The
Kuangton Treaty called for a Chinese withdrawal, the restoration of trade, and
decennial missions of exchange. Once more the large caravans with hundreds of
pack animals began to traverse the Old Burma Road, and Sino-Burmese relations
gained a new cordiality that lasted until the end of the Manchu Dynasty.
