(Professor Zachary Abuza’s RFA Commentary on 08 May 2024.)
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| Proffessor Zachary Abuza. |
Myanmar’s military on the back foot as the dry season comes to a close: Myanmar’s dry season is ending soon, with the military junta on the back foot after more than six months of reversals and losses to the opposition. This points to an intensification of attacks from the beleaguered regime.
With official forecasts that monsoon rains will
start in the second week of June, the
State Administrative Council (SAC), as the junta is formally known, is likely
to focus on six priorities before the rains set in, hampering the military’s
already weak logistics and troop mobility.
While the military recently retook control over the key Thai border city Myawaddy, they have not retaken much of the territory lost since the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s Operation 1027 began in late October, especially outside of the Bamar heartland. With the rainy season favoring the more flexible opposition, the junta is likely to focus on six strategic priorities in the coming weeks.
The first priority is to retake control along Asia Highway 1, which connects Myawaddy with Yangon. This road is the economic lifeline to Thailand, with over $1 billion in annual border trade.
The SAC cannot
afford a repeat of Muse in northern Shan state, where junta troops still
control the border town, but the Ta’ang National Liberation Army controls much
of the road to Lashio, the state’s largest town, which allows the rebel group
to collect taxes. And yet, their attacks have not only faltered, but also tied
down troops who are needed elsewhere.
Focus on Ann township
The second junta priority is playing out now in western Rakhine state’s Ann township, where the Arakan Army has captured two strategic outposts that protect the city after a two-month long battle. Ann is the headquarters of the Western Military Command, one of the 12 military regions, so its loss would be hugely embarrassing for the junta.
More
importantly, Ann is a critical transportation and logistics hub, the junction
for the road north to the Rakhine state capital of Sittwe and to a major Chinese special economic zone and port
project in Kyaukphyu. China’s oil and gas pipelines also pass through Ann.
In western Myanmar, the Arakan Army has already captured eight townships comprising most of northern Rakhine state, while reports are emerging that it has just captured Maungdaw, a key border port with Bangladesh, and surrounded Buthidaung.
The Arakan Army
has not tried to capture Sittwe or Kyaukphyu for now, seemingly content to try
to consolidate control of the roads to both. The capture of Ann would force the
junta to supply what they still control in Rakhine by sea or from the south
through the town of Toungup.
In sum, without
control of Ann, the chances for a significant and sustained military
counteroffensive in Rakhine get a lot harder. So the military is surging
reinforcements there now and stepping up airstrikes.
The third priority for the junta is to push for a new round of ceasefire talks with the Three Brotherhood Alliance and the Kachin Independence Army. As such, it will increase its lobbying of China, which borders Kachin state.
Beijing seeks border ceasefire
Beijing clearly
wants a ceasefire on its border. Both Beijing and Naypyidaw are keen to see
border trade return to pre-war levels. The junta now controls only 11 of 17 border posts with China, Thailand,
India and Bangladesh – and pinched trade flows have led to shortages and
spiking prices.
China has also
dispatched some 300 additional technicians to Kyaukphyu as construction there
ramps up, so Beijing is urgently trying to broker a ceasefire between the junta
and the Arakan Army. Before any such pact is reached, we should expect a lot of
fighting and air attacks before then.
Unlike the Three
Brotherhood Alliance, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is likely to reject a
ceasefire, as they seek to take advantage of the military’s distractions. Indeed,
on May 5, after a lull of several weeks, the KIA launched a second wave of
attacks, capturing a number of junta camps along the Myitkyina-Laiza highway,
as well as an assault on the town of Sumprabum, midway between the provincial
capital and Puta-O. The KIA has taken
over 12 positions in the past four days.
The fourth priority for the junta in the coming weeks must be the resupply of its deployed forces. One of the leading factors in military defections that have taken place since October has been the military’s failure to resupply remotely deployed forces with food, water, ammunition and medical supplies.
Sustaining
operations is getting much harder for the military. They have lost several of
the few helicopters in their inventory. This week in eastern Myanmar The
Karenni Nationalities Defense Force insurgent group said it shot down a junta
military helicopter and killed its pilot in Kayah State.
Convoys under threat
With roads and
bridges are increasingly being mined, and military manpower spread thin,
convoys are smaller and less well protected, making opposition ambushes more
costly. Captured weaponry has allowed opposition forces to target junta
riverine convoys more effectively.
If the junta is
unable to supply those light infantry battalions in the coming six weeks, the
ethnic resistance organizations and People’s Defense Forces will pick them off
one by one during the rainy season.
The fifth priority for the military regime will be to continue their assaults in Sagaing and Magwe. The heartland of the majority ethnic Bamars is arguably more important to the junta psychologically than militarily. That they do not have full control of Burmese-majority regions and have to worry about their supply lines in once-secure areas is hard for the generals to countenance.
While the
generals don’t have the means to hold territory, the junta is punishing
civilians with air and artillery strikes, serving up a harsh reminder of the
cost of supporting the opposition.
The sixth junta priority is to ramp up the production of arms and munitions. There is a parallel here with Russia, which also expected a very brief war in Ukraine, and did not have its logistics or defense industries prepared for a multi-year conflict.
Drones on both sides
The SAC is broke
and cannot afford the costly import of weapons and ammunition, forcing its own
defense industries to go into overdrive.
At the same
time, given the shortage of spare parts and regular servicing of their
overtaxed air force, which has led to the crash of several aircraft, the
military has stepped up the production of armed drones.
The opposition
National Unity Government (NUG) and the ethnic armies have used modified hobby
and crop dusting drones with incredible efficacy, including an attack that
purportedly wounded Soe Win the deputy junta commander.
There is concern
among the opposition that the military will be able to replicate the NUG
success with cheap drones. Evidence has surfaced that the military is already
fielding more lethal drone-specific munitions, rather than relying on mortar
shells.
The junta has lost significant amounts of territory since Operation 1027 began – which is notable because it happened during the dry season, when the military should have had all the advantages. The rainy season tends to benefit resistance forces.
Along with the
scorching heat, expect blistering, brutal attacks, as the military junta
desperately tries to retake lost territory and critical supply lines before the
rains set in.
(Dr. Zachary Abuza is a Professor at the National War College, in Washington, DC, where he focuses on Southeast Asian politics and
security issues, including governance, insurgencies, democratization and human rights,
and maritime security.
He is the author of five books, including Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand (2008), Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (2006), Militant Islam in Southeast Asia (2003), and Renovating Politics in Contemporary Vietnam (2001).
His latest book, Forging
Peace in Southeast Asia: Insurgencies, Peace Processes, and Reconciliation, is
a comparative analysis of the peace processes in Aceh, Mindanao and southern
Thailand (2016).
He authored the Southeast Asian chapter in the
acclaimed, study Leaving Terrorism Behind. In addition, he has authored four
monographs on security issues in Southeast Asia and has recently completed a
major survey on the media and civil society in Vietnam for the National
Endowment for Democracy.
He is currently working on a project on the insurgency
in southern Thailand for the National Defense University's Project on Irregular Warfare.)
