(Simon Tisdall’s opinion-piece from The GUARDIAN UK on 25 August 2024.)
Symbol of Chinese Power in Myanmar? |
Things fall
apart, if you let them – and ethnically, religiously, ideologically fractured
Myanmar, formerly Burma, has never been a model of harmonious, integrated
nationhood. Yet since the 2021 military coup and ensuing civil war, new and old
divisions have grown rapidly. Western and neighbouring states supporting a
democratic restoration now face a more fundamental, urgent challenge: how to
prevent Myanmar’s anarchic disintegration.
A break-up would send destabilising shock waves
coursing across the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh and all of south-east Asia. The
humanitarian implications for its 54 million people are dire. A collapse would
boost separatist forces and non-state actors elsewhere. And it would severely
dent China’s claims to regional leadership. If President Xi Jinping cannot
manage Myanmar, what price Beijing’s superpower pretensions?
Reasons to fear a fatal implosion proliferate. About two-thirds of the country, including borders, is now beyond the control of the junta, led by Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing (The slowly-going-mad Little-Dictator). A sweeping offensive begun last October by northern ethnic armed groups has rocked a desperate, illegitimate regime whose writ is confined increasingly to the capital, Naypyidaw, and urban areas.
Crimes against
humanity, war crimes and “horrific levels of brutality” are escalating at an
alarming rate, the UN says. Its latest report details systematic military
killings of civilians, torture, rape, illegal detentions and school and
hospital bombings. Thousands of people have died and more than three million
are displaced, a 50% increase in six months. Junta forces are mostly to blame,
but some ethnic militias are culpable, too.
Every resistance-fighter is armed with a Type-81 rifle provided in-millions by China. |
Three bosses of three Northern-Alliance armies. |
“The Myanmar
state is fragmenting as ethnic armed groups consolidate control of their
homelands, while in the country’s centre a weak regime clings to power and
launches revenge air attacks on territories it has lost. Further fragmentation
seems inevitable,” the independent International Crisis Group (ICG) warned
recently.
Although
flailing Min Aung Hlaing might soon be ousted, the regime was not about to
fall, the ICG argued, partly because its many disparate ethnic militia
opponents lacked a unifying national vision. At the same time, post-coup,
pro-democracy resistance forces, represented by the federalist National Unity
Government and its armed wing, the People’s Defence Force, lacked sufficient
firepower to prevail.
Mad-Little-Dictator: Before-Coup & After-Coup. |
Although the junta has promised elections, Beijing evidently has no intention of helping restore democracy
Even if
Myanmar’s demise as a unitary state is not imminent, this prospect of unceasing
warfare and instability greatly alarms China. Contemplating a 1,250-mile shared
frontier, it worries about security, negative impacts on its huge trading and
infrastructure interests and unchecked cross-border criminality. Human
suffering seems less important. Visiting Naypyidaw this month, China’s foreign
minister, Wang Yi, said Beijing “opposes chaos and conflicts” and urged the
regime to “safeguard Chinese personnel and projects”.
China is part of the problem. Although the junta has promised elections, Beijing evidently has no intention of helping restore democracy or creating a level playing field for the opposition.
Like the vanquished British imperialists it so
reviles, Beijing is playing a duplicitous game of divide-and-rule, covertly
backing ethnic groups where they control border areas in order to secure its
investments and geostrategic interests. Radio Free Asia reported that Chinese
artillery opened fire on junta forces inside Myanmar this month in defence of
an insurgent base. It wasn’t the first time.
It is also reported that October’s offensive, known
as Operation 1027 and led by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, a coalition of
northern ethnic militias, some with communist sympathies, was coordinated with
China’s security services – even as Beijing, along with its Russian ally,
continued to supply arms to the junta. In return, the alliance promised Beijing
it would crack down on billion-dollar Myanmar-based online scams and people
trafficking from China.
Nearly 20% of China's crude-import flows through Burma-Pipeline. |
PLA units have entered the Muse Bordertown. |
As the advancing insurgents seized up to 200 army bases and border crossings, the junta, infuriated by Beijing’s machinations, reportedly authorised anti-China protests in several cities. Switching again, China announced in December that it had miraculously brokered a ceasefire and offered to facilitate peace talks. But nobody trusts anyone. Fighting resumed in earnest in June.
Far from acting as honest broker, China is likely to
persist with divide-and-rule tactics while looking for advantage. “China is
continuing its long-term strategy of hedging its bets, which means that it will
engage with a number of stakeholders and try to retain influence over as many
factions in Myanmar as possible,” Hunter Marston, an Australia-based analyst,
told Voice of America.
This
self-serving approach by the region’s most powerful state, coupled with the
deteriorating internal security and humanitarian situation and a lack of any
credible peace process, suggests that Myanmar’s crisis is waxing terminal.
To prevent the
worst, the ICG argues, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) neighbours
and international and multilateral aid donors such as Britain, the former
colonial power, must overcome their reluctance to deal directly with
“sub-national entities” – meaning the ethnic armed groups controlling most of
the country.
Yet effectively recognising such groups, some of
which are abusive, authoritarian and anti-democratic, as legitimate rulers of
autonomous fiefdoms is risky. It could hasten the very outcome that Myanmar’s
friends most fear – a descent into chaos and ultimate disintegration of the
state.
What else might
be done? Sanctions should be expanded and enforced. Diplomatic pressure via
Asean and the UN should be intensified. Burma Campaign UK has good ideas worth
supporting, including disinvestment and a ban on sales of aviation fuel. More
than anything, the Myanmar emergency must be prioritised. In April, Barbara
Woodward, a UK ambassador, told the UN security council: “We will not allow
Myanmar to become a forgotten crisis”. Britain must keep its word.
(Blogger’s Notes: The Tibeto-Burman-Pagan-Tribe known in Chinese as the MIANs (Myan), the war-like ancesstors of the ethnic-Bamar-majority of Burma used to live in North-Western-China. They called themselves Myanmar. In their language Myan means Fast and Mar means Hard but colloquially they refer themselves as BAMAR and the British colonialists anglicised their nation as BURMA and the people BURMESE. But Chinese still call us Burmese the Mian and our Burma the MianDian (Land of Mians).
Back then they were horse-warriors and they used to serve as the Cavalary-Scouts of China’s Imperial-NanChao Army then invading the Middle-Burma many times and basically wiped-out the ancient PYU Kingdom during AD 832-835. The Burman warriors liked the place, stayed on and most of their Mian (Myan-Mar) Tribe moved down and occupied the Middle-Burma mainly to flee from the hated Chinese-Yoke, and the rest is the history. As history always repeats the Chinese masters are now coming back-in to make Burma another Tibet-like satellite state as always meant to be.)