‘Two lions in a cave’: Divisions in Chin State

 (Angshuman Choudhury’s article from The FRONTIER MYANMAR on 28 Aug 2024.)

‘Two lions in a cave’: Revolutionary divisions in Chin State: The Chin resistance has split into two rival coalitions, one of which has the backing of the powerful Arakan Army, while both are keen to engage Indian authorities across the border.

Since the 2021 military coup in Myanmar, Chin State has emerged as a key battleground in the countrywide armed struggle against the junta. The Chin National Front, formed in 1988, was one of the earliest groups to join the war against the military regime. Numerous Chinland Defence Forces – reflecting not only different townships but also the various ethno-linguistic groups that make up the broader Chin population – also emerged to join the fight.

In recent months, however, the Chin resistance has taken on a new shape, as latent fault lines between various factions have come to the surface. Until late last year, a common Chin front had been fighting the junta under the dual ambit of the Interim Chin National Consultative Council and Chinland Joint Defence Committee , both formed in 2021.

The common platform has now collapsed under the weight of internal differences and shifts in the conflict on the ground. Two distinct coalitions have emerged in its place: the Chinland Council, established in early December last year, and the rival Chin Brotherhood , which emerged soon after.

Areas of southern Chin have become particularly sensitive flashpoints in the dispute, partly thanks to the growing role played by the powerful Arakan Army, which mostly operates in neighbouring Rakhine State. After occupying all of Paletwa Township in January, the AA went on to assist the Chin Brotherhood in Matupi Township, prompting calls from the Chinland Council for the AA to stop encroaching on Chin land and return to Rakhine.

These tensions have also spilled across the India-Myanmar border into Mizoram, whose Mizo majority has close ethnic ties with the Chin. At the same time, Indian authorities are tentatively eyeing the AA and the Chin resistance forces as future interlocutors, if not partners, in matters of cross-border trade and security – even as New Delhi preserves its ties with the junta in Nay Pyi Taw.

The midway split

The Chinland Council is dominated by the CNF and its armed wing the Chin National Army, but also includes about 20 other armed groups and political factions, including CDF-Mara, People’s Defence Army, Mindat Council and Tonzang Township Council.

The Chin Brotherhood comprises six groups: the Chin National Defence Force, PDF-Zoland, CDF-Mindat, CDF-Kanpetlet, Maraland Defence Force and CDF-Matupi’s Brigade 1.

The rival Chin factions have overlapping areas of influence but have largely fought the junta on separate fronts. The Chinland Council groups are mostly concentrated in the central and northern townships, while the Chin Brotherhood is strongest in the south.

The Chin revolution began to splinter when the CNF quit the ICNCC in April last year, following disputes with other members. The split was then formalised when the CNF convened the Chinland Council Conference in December at its headquarters in Thantalang Township.

The conference was attended by other groups and individuals that had broken with the ICNCC. They included 17 of the 27 MPs in the consultative council, who were elected from Chin in 2020 but unable to take office because of the coup, and at least 18 local political and military organisations that have emerged since early 2021.

The conference participants ratified the Chinland Constitution, which established the Chinland Council as a ruling body, and allowed a subordinate Chinland cabinet to be appointed shortly afterwards.

Some groups rejected the Council’s claim to represent all Chin people and chose to stick by the ICNCC, which the Chinland Constitution formally abolished. Six of the armed groups among them then joined forces to establish the Chin Brotherhood, which technically operates under the political ambit of the ICNCC, or what remains of it.

While the Brotherhood sees the Council as divisive, the CNF deems it to be an instrument of pan-Chin unity. “The Chinland Council was established to strengthen solidarity among the Chin people, which will only enhance the ongoing revolution against the [junta],” Sui Khar, vice chairperson of the CNF, told Frontier.

“The split happened largely because of differences over composition of the local administrative units, including the fact that the Brotherhood wanted to keep some of the townships for themselves,” he said.

Yet the split has had serious consequences on the ground, including internecine clashes. In February, the MDF, which is part of the Chin Brotherhood, accused forces from the rival Chinland Council-allied CDF-Mara of attacking its positions near Lailenpi in Matupi Township with drones supplied by the National Unity Government.

The NUG is a parallel administration appointed by lawmakers deposed in the coup, which struck a formal alliance with the CNF in 2021. The CDF-Mara claimed that the offensive in February was retaliation for a deadly attack by the MDF on its cadres.

R Lakher, an MDF leader who asked that his real name not be used for security reasons, blamed the CNF for dividing the ethnic Mara and causing such clashes. “This is a case of two lions in one cave. We had some differences with CDF-Mara, but we expected the CNF to mediate between us. Instead, it chose to exclusively finance and arm the CDF-Mara and widened the divide among the Mara people,” he told Frontier in a phone interview.

He also hinted at a larger sense of disaffection with the CNF’s leadership. The CNF “formed the Chinland Council without proper stakeholder consultations,” Lakher said, adding that it “tends to dominate other groups”, citing its legacy as a 36-year-old armed organisation. “It is for this reason that we were forced to come together and form the Brotherhood to balance the CNF.”

The CNF disagrees. “We continue to encourage the two groups to reunite and are willing to provide support to that end,” Sui Khar told Frontier.

Besides disagreements over representation and inclusion, the two factions also proclaim different political priorities. While the Council intends to build a formal Chin political and administrative structure at the same time as fighting the junta, the Brotherhood prefers prioritising the armed struggle before moving on to local institution-building. The Brotherhood’s choice is partly shaped by its belief that any institution-building undertaken in wartime would invariably be dominated by the CNF.

The CNF does not accept the Brotherhood’s perception of the Council. “The CC does not stop anyone from joining. Our doors are always open and we welcome all Chin people to join us,” Sui Khar said.

Enter the AA

Meanwhile, the AA’s growing presence in Chin has deepened the division between Chin groups. After its seizure of Paletwa in January gave it a presence on the India border, the Rakhine armed group extended its influence northwards by joining hands with the Chin Brotherhood.

The Chinland Council has taken a strong exception to this. It views the AA as an outsider trespassing on Chin territory and engaging in “anti-Chin” activities. In the same vein, it sees the Brotherhood’s collaboration with the AA as detrimental to the wider Chin struggle.

A source close to the CNF who wished to remain anonymous said the group sees the AA as a “threat to the national identity, sovereignty and interests of the Chin people”.

“The Chin Brotherhood is just acting as an AA proxy. The Brotherhood claims to fight for federal democracy, but is colluding with a group that has a one-party, authoritarian-style leadership,” the source told Frontier.

The Council, in a statement dated June 10, made a battery of serious accusations against the AA. These include forcibly recruiting Chin to fight in its ranks, imposing coercive administrative measures, restricting religious freedom and violating human rights in areas the AA occupies in Chin.

“The AA’s actions are extremely dangerous and will only escalate communal violence,” said the source close to the CNF. According to Sui Khar, the AA continues to “play a dirty game in Chin society for their own benefit and advantages”.

The Global Khumi Organisation released a similar statement on June 4, charging the AA with committing “inhumane atrocities” against Chin people and even engaging in “illegal drug sales and distribution” in the state. The organisation is drawn from the Khumi Chin people, who predominate in Paletwa.

The Brotherhood, however, casts its relationship with the AA as a mutually beneficial collaboration between two groups with a common enemy. “We really have to look at the larger picture here. It is about defeating the military junta,” Salai Yaw Marn, a spokesperson for the Brotherhood, told Frontier over the phone.

“This revolutionary war is bigger than Chin or Bamar, and encompasses the whole of the union. We are taking down [junta] posts across Chin State one after the other. So, the alliance is working for, and not against, Chin national interests.”

The MDF, the first Chin group to ally with the AA, says the geography makes it logical for them to ally with the AA. “Maraland and Rakhine State are adjacent to each other,” Lakher of the MDF said. Maraland refers to a loosely defined territory in southern Chin dominated by the Mara Chin people. “Therefore, it makes much sense to join forces, not least because, as a powerful armed group, the AA is able to give us political and military support,” he said.

Between the two factions, the Chinland Council has captured the largest share of territory from the junta thanks to the CNF’s superior troop numbers and firepower. Conquered towns include Rikhawdar, a trade hub on the India-Myanmar border, taken in November last year, and Tonzang and Cikha towns in northern Chin, seized in May.

But the Brotherhood, with the AA’s assistance, has also made important territorial gains in recent months. In late April, the alliance captured Kyin Dway village in Kanpetlet Township in the south, as well as regime posts in Tedim Township in the north.

However, these gains have exacerbated frictions between the Council and the Brotherhood. After it seized Kyin Dway, the Brotherhood accused the Council of trying to “invade” its rightful territory.

Tensions surged even further when the Brotherhood seized the headquarters of the junta’s Light Infantry Battalion 304 in Matupi town on June 17. The following day, joint Brotherhood and AA forces reportedly clashed with the CNF, resulting in casualties on both sides, as well as among the junta forces. Each side also accused the other of blockading its respective movements.

Competition was particularly fierce in Matupi because of its strategic importance. The town is a crucial waypoint between northern and southern Chin, and onwards to Rakhine. “Whoever controls Matupi will have strong leverage over other groups in both Chin and Rakhine states,” a researcher from Paletwa told Frontier over the phone, asking to remain anonymous for security reasons. “For example, if the CNF wants to get the upper hand and pressure the AA, controlling Matupi would be a good idea.”

An anxious neighbour

Tensions between Chin groups, and over the presence of the AA, have spilled across the India-Myanmar border into Mizoram.

In June, the Central Young Lai Association, an influential civil society organisation based in Mizoram’s Lawngtlai district, began a blockade of goods going from the Indian state to southern Chin. This route has been a lifeline through the import of goods from India into Rakhine via Paletwa, amid a separate embargo imposed by the military on goods from the rest of Myanmar. The Mizoram-based association represents the Lai Chin people, who also dominate the CNF, and its blockade was aimed at pressuring the AA to withdraw from Chin.

The move has been denounced by the Mara Thyutlia Py, an ethnic Mara civil society organisation based in Mizoram’s Siaha district. The MTP rejected the CYLA’s decision to include Siaha in its blockade, which affects trade with a swathe of Chin north of Paletwa, while also calling for the resumption of trade with the latter township.

Lakher attributed the CYLA’s move to its supposed intimacy with the CNF. “The CNF and its allies are behind this act. They want to starve the AA of crucial supplies from southern Mizoram through this CYLA-imposed blockade. The move not only makes little sense, but also risks spiking tensions between the Chin and Rakhine people,” Lakher said.

The border between Mizoram and Paletwa is also one of the key nodes in the India-funded Kaladan Multi Modal Transit and Transport Project. The project, which has been under construction for more than a decade, envisages goods being transported by sea from Kolkata, India, to Rakhine’s Sittwe seaport. From there, the goods travel up the Kaladan River to Paletwa, where they are offloaded for an overland journey on a 110-kilometre (68-mile) road snaking north to Mizoram’s Zorinpui.

Thanks to the project, Paletwa has received large tranches of infrastructure-related investment in recent years. While the project is suspended due to the fighting in Chin and Rakhine, whoever controls Paletwa once the hostilities cease will be able to tax a potentially lucrative trading route and exercise leverage over authorities in both India and Myanmar.

Sensing that its security and economic interests are at stake, India has begun tentatively reaching out to resistance actors. K Vanlalvena, an MP in Mizoram’s upper house, visited Paletwa in January and met members of the AA to discuss the Kaladan project and the group’s presence near the Indian border. It is unclear if New Delhi green lit the cross-border trip, but it established a precedent for engaging with anti-junta groups along the border. The foreign minister S Jaishankar hinted at such a shift with a July 11 post on X that said India “engages all stakeholders” to support “a return to democracy in Myanmar”.

Government sources in New Delhi say there is a strong appetite to work with whichever groups are willing to secure the border and, in turn, Indian interests. However, they remain unsure of whom to talk to, given the diverse number of actors, often with competing interests. For New Delhi, intra-Chin unity as well as peaceful coexistence between Chin groups and the AA is important for stabilising the border.

Chin groups, for their part, remain keen on engaging New Delhi too.

“It’s getting clearer every day that India’s engagement in the revolutionary war in Myanmar, especially in Chin State, is a must,” said Brotherhood spokesperson Yaw Marn. “Chin is vital for the developmental interests of both India and China, but it is closer to India. Therefore, for India, Chin State is critical. As the Chin Brotherhood gets stronger, India should engage in discussions on economic development, regional stability and peace talks.”

Salai Timmy, a spokesperson for the Brotherhood-allied Chin National Organisation, agreed.

“We are thankful to the Mizoram government for giving shelter to refugees from Chin State. Having good neighbours during crises is very important. We would also like to request New Delhi to help our refugees and the revolution,” he said.

The CNF has similar views. “India, as our neighbouring country, would like to see peace and stability along its border,” Sui Khar said.

These sentiments suggest India could potentially be a conflict mediator in western Myanmar, similar to China in the north of the country. However, this is unlikely in the near term. Some in New Delhi have suggested that India appoint a “special envoy” for Myanmar so that it can openly talk to resistance actors without jeopardising the ambassador’s relationship with the junta, but this idea has not yet gained traction.

Repairing the rift

Despite the fractures, there is still a desire among Chin groups for unity.

“Nothing is impossible if Chin leaders are willing to engage in peace talks,” said Salai Timmy of the CNO. “We already had CJDC before, under which we were united. And if there is political dialogue between the Chinland Council and Chin Brotherhood, things are possible.”

But the source close to the CNF was mindful of the challenges. “Taking up arms might be straightforward, but maintaining integrity, stability and principled leadership are much harder,” they said.

Yaw Marn was more cautious still. “The idea of a common Chin revolutionary front appears hypothetical. Both the Chinland Council and the Brotherhood sought such a common front, but it seems impossible for the meantime. The leaders don’t want to come together unless they have the upper hand or can control the united organisation,” he said.

Given its national mandate, the NUG could have a role in fostering Chin unity, but it’s unclear if it has the capacity to do so.

“We have been in touch with all stakeholders in Chin State to hear their differences [of] opinion,” U Kyaw Zaw, spokesperson of the President’s Office of the NUG, told Frontier over the phone.

“We have been encouraging them to engage in dialogue to solve the issues quickly, and come together to create a united Chin front in order to defeat the terrorist military council.” The presidential spokesperson suggested that while factionalism in Chin is an internal issue, some external mediation could help.

“The differences within Chin State will have to be resolved by the Chin brothers and sisters through dialogue. But, because the NUG is striving to achieve unity by building a genuinely federal democratic union, we will also have to help the Chin people to solve their differences in order to eliminate the military dictatorship from both Chinland and Myanmar,” Kyaw Zaw said.

On differences over the AA’s involvement in Chin State, Kyaw Zaw believed the Chin and Rakhine peoples’ history as neighbours, and their shared opposition to the junta, formed the basis of a productive partnership rather than competition. “Rakhine and Chin states have shared a relationship for a long time, including through the British colonial period. They had strong people-to-people and trade relations,” he said.

“While we understand that there are some disagreements within Chin State over the AA’s involvement, we are all one single family with a common objective – that is to defeat the military dictatorship. We need to fight together to achieve that across regions and states.”

(Angshuman Choudhury is a researcher from India and a PhD candidate in Comparative Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. He writes a weekly column on Northeast India for the Hindustan Times and was previously an Associate Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi.)