(Joshua Yaffa’s article from THE
NEW YORKER on 31 July 2023.)
On May 20th, Yevgeny
Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, stood in the center of Bakhmut, in
eastern Ukraine, and recorded a video. The city once housed seventy thousand
people but was now, after months of relentless shelling, nearly abandoned.
Whole blocks were in ruins, charred skeletons of concrete and steel. Smoke hung
over the smoldering remains like an early-morning fog. Prigozhin wore combat
fatigues and waved a Russian flag. “Today, at twelve noon, Bakhmut was
completely taken,” he declared. Armed fighters stood behind him, holding
banners with the Wagner motto: “Blood, honor, homeland, courage.”
More
than anyone else in Russia, Prigozhin had used the war in Ukraine to raise his
own profile. In the wake of the invasion, he transformed Wagner from a niche
mercenary outfit of former professional soldiers to the country’s most
prominent fighting force, a private army manned by tens of thousands of storm
troopers, most of them recruited from Russian prisons. Prigozhin projected an
image of himself as ruthless, efficient, practical, and uncompromising. He
spoke in rough, often obscene language, and came to embody the so-called “party
of war,” those inside Russia who thought that their country had been too
measured in what was officially called the “special military operation.” “Stop
pulling punches, bring back all our kids from abroad, and work our asses off,”
Prigozhin said, the month that Bakhmut fell. “Then we’ll see some results.”
The aura of victory in
Bakhmut enhanced Prigozhin’s popularity. He had an almost sixty-per-cent
approval rating in a June poll conducted by the Levada Center, Russia’s only
independent polling agency; nineteen per cent of those surveyed said they were
ready to vote for him for President. His new status seemed to come with a
special license to criticize top officials in Moscow. Prigozhin had accused his
rivals in the Russian military, Sergei Shoigu, the defense minister, and Valery
Gerasimov, the chief of general staff, of withholding artillery ammunition from
Wagner. “That’s direct obstruction, plain and simple,” Prigozhin said. “It can
be equated with high treason.” In the battle for Bakhmut, he said, “five times
more guys died than should have” because of the officials’ indecisive
leadership.