(Natasha Kaneva’s post from The JPMORGAN USA on 01 July 2025.)
De-dollarization: Is the US dollar losing its
dominance? Top dollar no more? Learn more about the factors threatening the
dominance of the world’s reserve currency. While the U.S.’s share in global
exports and output has declined, the dollar’s transactional dominance is still
evident in areas including FX volumes and trade invoicing.
On the other hand, de-dollarization is unfolding in
central bank FX reserves, where the share of USD has slid to a two-decade low.
In fixed income, the share of foreign ownership in the U.S. Treasury market has
fallen over the last 15 years, pointing to reduced reliance on the dollar.
De-dollarization is most visible in commodity markets, where a large and
growing proportion of energy is being priced in non-dollar-denominated
contracts.
The U.S. dollar is the world’s primary reserve currency, and it is also the most widely used currency for trade and other international transactions. However, its hegemony has come into question in recent times due to geopolitical and geostrategic shifts.
As a result, de-dollarization has increasingly
become a substantive topic of discussion among investors, corporates and market
participants more broadly. What are the potential implications of
de-dollarization, and how is it playing out in global markets and trade?
What is de-dollarization?
In short, de-dollarization entails a significant
reduction in the use of dollars in world trade and financial transactions,
decreasing national, institutional and corporate demand for the greenback.
“The concept of de-dollarization relates to changes
in the structural demand for the dollar that would relate to its status as a
reserve currency. This encompasses areas that relate to the longer-term use of
the dollar, such as transactional dominance in FX volumes or commodities trade,
denomination of liabilities and share in central bank FX reserves,” said Luis
Oganes, head of Global Macro Research at J.P. Morgan.
Importantly, this structural shift is distinct from
the cyclical demand for the greenback, which is shorter term and has in recent
times been driven by U.S. exceptionalism, including the relative outperformance
of the U.S. equity market. “The world has become long on the dollar in recent
years, but as U.S. exceptionalism erodes, it should be reasonable to expect the
overhang in USD longs to diminish as well,” Oganes said.
What are the causes and implications of de-dollarization?
There are two main factors that could erode the
dollar’s status. The first includes adverse events that undermine the perceived
safety and stability of the greenback — and the U.S.’s overall standing as the
world’s leading economic, political and military power. For instance, increased
polarization in the U.S. could jeopardize its governance, which underpins its
role as a global safe haven. Ongoing U.S. tariff policy could also cause
investors to lose confidence in American assets.
The second factor involves positive developments
outside the U.S. that boost the credibility of alternative currencies —
economic and political reforms in China, for example. “A candidate reserve
currency must be perceived as safe and stable and must provide a source of
liquidity that is sufficient to meet growing global demand,” said Alexander
Wise, who covers Long-Term Strategy at J.P. Morgan.
Fundamentally, de-dollarization could shift the
balance of power among countries, and this could, in turn, reshape the global
economy and markets. The impact would be most acutely felt in the U.S., where
de-dollarization would likely lead to a broad depreciation and underperformance
of U.S. financial assets versus the rest of the world.
“For U.S. equities, outright and relative returns
would be negatively impacted by divestment or reallocation away from U.S.
markets and a severe loss in confidence. There would also likely be upward
pressure on real yields due to the partial divestment of U.S. fixed income by
investors, or the diversification or reduction of international reserve
allocations,” Wise said.
Global trade
The U.S.’s share in global exports and output has
declined over the past three decades, while China’s has increased
substantially. Nonetheless, the transactional dominance of the dollar is still
evident in FX volumes, trade invoicing, cross-border liabilities denomination
and foreign currency debt issuance.
In 2022, the greenback dominated 88% of traded FX
volumes — close to record highs — while the Chinese yuan (CNY) made up just 7%,
according to data from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
Likewise, there is little sign of USD erosion in
trade invoicing. “The share of USD and EUR has held steady over the past two
decades at around 40–50%. While the share of CNY is increasing in China’s
cross-border transactions as it moves to conduct bilateral trade in its own
currency terms, it is still low from a global standpoint,” Oganes observed.
The dollar has also stoutly maintained its
superiority when it comes to cross-border liabilities, where its market share
stands at 48%. And in foreign currency debt issuance, its share has remained
constant since the global financial crisis, at around 70%. “The daylight from
the euro, whose share is at 20%, is even greater on this front,” Oganes added.
FX reserves
On the other hand, de-dollarization is unfolding in
central bank FX reserves, where the share of USD has slid to a two-decade low
in tandem with its macro footprint. “However, the dollar share in FX reserves
was lower in the early 1990s, so the recent decline to just under 60% is not
completely out of the norm,” said Meera Chandan, co-head of Global FX Strategy
at J.P. Morgan.
While much of the reallocation of FX reserves has
gone to CNY and other currencies, USD and EUR still dominate levels. “The CNY
footprint is still very small, even if growing, and its push for bilateral
invoicing is likely to keep this trend on the upswing,” Chandan noted.
The main de-dollarization trend in FX reserves,
however, pertains to the growing demand for gold. Seen as an alternative to
heavily indebted fiat currencies, the share of gold in FX reserves has
increased, led by emerging market (EM) central banks — China, Russia and
Türkiye have been the largest buyers in the last decade.
Overall, while the share of gold in FX reserves in
EM is still low at 9%, the figure is more than double the 4% seen a decade ago;
the corresponding share for DM countries is much larger at 20%. This increased
demand has in turn partly driven the current bull market in gold, with prices
forecast to climb toward $4,000/oz by mid-2026.
Bond markets
In a sign of de-dollarization in bond markets, the
share of foreign ownership in the U.S. Treasury market has been declining over
the last 15 years. USD assets, principally liquid Treasuries, account for the
majority of allocated FX reserves. However, demand for Treasuries has stagnated
among foreign official institutions, as the growth of FX reserves has slowed
and the USD’s share of reserves has dropped from its recent peak.
Similarly, the backdrop for foreign private demand
has weakened — as yields have risen across DM government bond markets,
Treasuries have become relatively less attractive. While foreign investors
remain the largest constituent within the Treasury market, their share of
ownership has fallen to 30% as of early 2025 — down from a peak of above 50%
during the GFC.
“Although foreign demand has not kept pace with the
growth of the Treasury market for more than a decade, we must consider what
more aggressive action could mean. Japan is the largest foreign creditor and
alone holds more than $1.1 trillion Treasuries, or nearly 4% of the market.
Accordingly, any significant foreign selling would be impactful, driving yields
higher,” said Jay Barry, head of Global Rates Strategy at J.P. Morgan.
According to estimates by J.P. Morgan Research,
each 1-percentage-point decline in foreign holdings relative to GDP (or
approximately $300 billion of Treasuries) would result in yields rising by more
than 33 basis points (bp). “While this is not our base case, it nonetheless
underscores the impact of foreign investment on risk-free rates,” Barry added.
Commodity markets
De-dollarization is most visible in commodity
markets, where the greenback’s influence on pricing has diminished. “Today, a
large and growing proportion of energy is being priced in
non-dollar-denominated contracts,” said Natasha Kaneva, head of Global Commodities
Strategy at J.P. Morgan.
For example, due to Western sanctions, Russian oil
products exported eastward and southward are being sold in the local currencies
of buyers, or in the currencies of countries Russia perceives as friendly.
Among buyers, India, China and Turkey are all either using or seeking
alternatives to the dollar. Saudi Arabia is also considering adding
yuan-denominated futures contracts in the pricing model of Saudi Arabian oil,
though progress has been slow.
Notably, cross-border trade settlement in yuan is
gaining ground outside of oil too. Some Indian companies have started paying
for Russian coal imports in yuan, even without the involvement of Chinese
intermediaries. Bangladesh also recently decided to pay Russia for its 1.4 GW
nuclear power plant in yuan.
“The de-dollarization trend in the commodity trade
is a boon for countries like India, China, Brazil, Thailand and Indonesia,
which can now not only buy oil at a discount, but also pay for it with their
own local currencies,” Kaneva noted. “This reduces the need for precautionary
reserves of U.S. dollars, U.S. Treasuries and oil, which might in turn free up
capital to be deployed in growth-boosting domestic projects.”
Deposit dollarization in emerging markets
At the other end of the spectrum, deposit
dollarization — where a significant portion of a country’s bank deposits are
denominated in the U.S. dollar instead of the local currency — is still evident
in many EM countries. “The tendency of EM residents to dollarize in times of
stress appears to be correlated across markets,” said Jonny Goulden, head of EM
Fixed Income Strategy at J.P. Morgan.
According to J.P. Morgan Research, dollar deposits
have grown mostly uninterrupted over the last decade in EM, reaching around
$830 billion for a sample set of 18 EM countries (excluding China, Singapore
and Hong Kong). “While there are large regional divergences in deposit
dollarization across EM, all regions are more dollarized now than they were a
decade ago,” Goulden noted.
Latin America is the most dollarized region, with
an aggregate dollarization rate of 19.1%. EMEA’s rate stands at 15.2%, while
Asia (excluding China, Singapore and Hong Kong) has the lowest rate at 9.7%.
China is the exception, as its dollarization rate has been persistently falling since 2017. “This is not surprising, as this was around the time when U.S.–China relations began shifting into their current state, marked by the trade war and growing diplomatic, security and geopolitical tensions,” Goulden said. “This suggests that China, alongside progress on de-dollarizing its own cross-border transactions, has effectively been de-dollarizing the deposits of Chinese residents, adding another dimension to its efforts to separate from U.S. dominance.”
