(Rajeev Bhattacharyya’s post from the DIPLOMAT on 04 May 2026.)
Arakan
Army Chief Twan Mrat Naing on Talks With the Myanmar Government, and Relations
With India and Bangladesh: “The military government wants to negotiate from a
position of strength but we will not succumb to such pressure.”
Arakan
Army (AA) and United League of Arakan (ULA) Chief Twan Mrat Naing gives an interview to
Rajeev Bhattacharyya at an undisclosed location somewhere in Myanmar’s Arakan
region, on March 2, 2026.
The Arakan Army (AA) and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), are among the largest revolutionary organizations in Myanmar currently battling the government. Seventeen years after it was formed in 2009, the AA controls almost 90 percent of Arakan, the narrow coastal region on the Bay of Bengal in the western region of Myanmar.
That
is arguably the largest area to be liberated so far by any armed outfit in the
country. Arakan has been in the limelight since the 1970s because of the
military operations that have been conducted by the government against Rohingya
Muslims in the region.
Twan
Mrat Naing, who heads the AA and the ULA, has given online interviews to media
outlets in the past, but never a one-on-one interview to a foreign
correspondent. In a first, he met The Diplomat’s correspondent Rajeev
Bhattacharyya at a location somewhere in Myanmar’s Arakan region on March 2.
For this correspondent, reaching the meeting spot entailed a long journey by
road and river, and a trek through jungle and hilly terrain.
Twan
Mrat Naing spoke his mind on various issues, including talks with the Myanmar
government, the AA’s relations with Bangladesh and India, and allegations of
human rights violations that have been leveled against the outfit.
Q: Could you tell us about your background, and how you became the leader of the Arakan Army?
I
studied at a law school in Sittwe, but I could not complete the course. I was
active as a student leader, and one day, when I was in Grade 9, I got into a
confrontation with the military. But nothing serious happened. That was my
first encounter with the military.
I
began to cross the border into Bangladesh in the late 1990s. The first time was
in 1998 after the demise of some Arakan revolutionaries during Operation Leech.
We learned a lot from the movements launched by the Arakan Liberation Party and
the National United Party of Arakan, but soon realized that these groups were
not as strong as we had imagined. I realized that there was a need for unity.
Until 2006, we were hoping to get all these Rakhine groups united.
That
year, I traveled to India without documents. After crossing the Indian border
at Manipur, we stayed in Imphal and then at Guwahati in Assam, where we
interacted with many leaders, including a leader from Tripura. From Guwahati,
we went to Delhi by train. In Delhi, we stayed for 20 days and attended the
first meeting of the Arakan National Congress at Vikaspuri. The leaders were
squabbling over petty issues. I was convinced here that it was impossible to
achieve the unity we desired. I realized that we could not waste time with
them.
Subsequently,
I began entertaining the idea of establishing ties with the Kachin Independence
Army (KIA) and organizations in other parts of Myanmar. We succeeded in
establishing links with the Karen National Liberation Army through friends at
Yangon University. I began working as a tourist guide and selling gems even as
I enrolled in a law course at Sittwe University. All this helped me expand my
network through tourists from Germany, Switzerland, and other countries. Some
American friends I was in touch with invited me to the U.S. to study, but I was
interested more in fieldwork.
I
was already married in 2005 and had told my wife about my plans for Arakan. My
elder brother, who is vice-chairman number three in our organization, helped
establish links with the KIA. I sold my Omega watch for $400 to go to Kachin
State. The first trip to Kachin in 2006 was to exchange views with the KIA and
to observe the training there for two weeks.
It
took us three years to build trust with KIA. KIA was in a ceasefire with the
government then, and there was pressure on the organization to transform into
border guards. There was a difference of opinion within the KIA on this
proposal.
We
received the green signal for training from the KIA in 2008, and the sessions
began a year later. KIA accepted only 26
trainees, although we planned to have 50 of our members trained. Some of our
friends were apprehended by the military intelligence en route to Kachin.
We
thought of returning from Kachin after two years with 200 rifles. We learnt
about military affairs. I also started reading a lot about military strategies
and tactics. Around the same time, we established contacts along the
Thailand-Myanmar border with youths studying abroad and began scouting for new
cadres for training.
The
KIA was worried as these training modules must be kept under wraps (it was in a
ceasefire with Myanmar’s military). In
two years, we were able to train about 300 cadres. On some occasions, we ran
out of rations, and later, we were involved in the jade business along the
border. In 2013, we sent 19 people to the Golden Triangle area and to the
Bangladesh border to increase our network. We also developed a rapport with
Kokang and Palaung in Shan State. We could gather some weapons from these
areas.
The
Arakan Army’s first encounter with the military was on March 28, 2015, in
Paletwa near the Bangladesh border, where we killed a captain of the Myanmar
military.
Q: You do not have military experience, yet what the AA has achieved militarily is stupendous. What is the secret of your success?
There
are things that you have to say but don’t do. There are things that you do but
don’t say, and there are things that you say and do. Rakhine State is a tiny
place of land, but we were not that small earlier. Instead of wrangling over a
piece of territory, we will have to do what we need to do. Instead of talking
about territorial ambition, it is better to be committed to the mission.
There
are so many factors contributing to our success. But we haven’t yet reached a
spectacular level of success. We have to be patient, remain focused, and manage
with limited resources.
The
main factor contributing to our success has been the support of the people. We
could rebuild trust among different communities in Arakan. There was a lot of
distrust, especially with the Muslim communities, after what happened with them
in 2012 and 2017, when a large section of the community was driven out of
Myanmar. In normal times, it would have been impossible to approach them. They
were also looking for friends and we explained to them our agenda, which was an
important step.
And
terrain was another significant factor. The military had a better
infrastructure. Our resources were limited, but we made optimum use of them. I
am very proud of our soldiers and officers who demonstrated extreme bravery and
prowess in the wars. Our headquarters has utilized all available technologies,
including satellite communication, effectively, and synthesized them for
effective communication.
In
retrospect, when I make a review, I find that my entire team has a huge number
of committed people who prepare a lot. I could work in harmony with them.
Q: 2025 was a year of stalemate. The AA refrained from launching attacks on Kyaukphyu and Sittwe, but it ventured into the Burmese heartland in alliance with other resistance groups. Does it indicate a change of strategy?
It
is still too early to go into details of the strategy. It will be premature.
Q: There
is speculation that AA could welcome a proposal from the military for a
negotiated settlement…
Political
dialogue and stability are in everybody’s interest. We need to be politically
mature. Let me keep it that way.
Q: Since
I arrived in Arakan almost a month ago, there have been six airstrikes in the
region. On February 24, I visited an area in Ponnagyun township, where 17
people were killed. There could be more
airstrikes now that the elections are completed. How do you plan to tackle this danger?
Civilian
safety is our priority. We are exploring
every option for effective protection of the civilian population. It is
difficult. We are working with the international community to record these
aerial bombings, but they have not been very effective. It is a very serious humanitarian
concern. That is why, as long as the
military keeps bombing civilians, it will be very difficult for us to explore
the political process. The military government wants to talk from a position of
strength. But we will not succumb to such pressure.
Q: The AA had discussions with representatives of the Myanmar junta in China two years ago. It had insisted then that junta forces should not be stationed in Arakan, and the talks collapsed. Would you be willing to have such discussions with the government now?
You
are correct; that is what we wanted. The government wants us to go back to the
position that existed pre-2023. In that case, we also want to go back to 1784
[Arakan ceased to exist as an independent kingdom in 1784]. Instead of asking
for unrealistic things, the government should focus on inclusive and sincere
negotiations grounded in reality. Negotiations shouldn’t be disconnected from
the ground reality.
Q: When
I visited Sagaing Region and Chin State in 2023, I met leaders of several
resistance groups. Most of them were
confident that the military government would be toppled by the end of 2025. But
that didn’t happen. On the contrary, the military has made a comeback in some
regions. How do you explain that?
The National Unity Government (NUG) is an
important actor. We respect them. There are other actors also. We wish
everybody would come together for a clear political future. The current
situation remains unpredictable. There will be more bloodletting with the
tactics adopted by the military government.
Q: Now,
about your relations with the neighboring countries. You have already
congratulated the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government in
Bangladesh. The general perception is
that the BNP government will avoid adopting extreme positions and will pursue a
dual policy on Arakan – pressuring the AA to take back Rohingya refugees and
also arming Rohingya militant outfits like the Rohingya Solidarity Organization
(RSO) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). What are your expectations of
the new government?
Our
expectation is to be able to work together with Bangladesh to create a
conducive atmosphere. First, the existing actors in the region must be
empowered instead of hurling false accusations at them. Without empowering the
Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government, it will be very difficult to create a
conducive situation. We want to create a conducive situation for the return of
refugees. Our topmost priority is to
resolve the problems faced by the people.
But the activities of the militant outfits will create more problems. We
are ready to face all kinds of situations.
The
Myanmar military has provided weapons to the Rohingya armed groups. The
military could be more aggressive now. The RSO and ARSA have camps in
Bangladesh very near the border in Maungdaw. The possibility of the AA fighting
a war on two fronts cannot be ruled out.
We
will do everything to avoid that situation, as it will do us no good. It will not be in the interest of Bangladesh
either.
Q: And
you would want trade with Bangladesh to resume immediately?
Yes.
There are many merchants and organizations on both sides of the border waiting
for the trade to resume. Bangladesh is a populous country and there are many
people and communities along the border, including fishermen who depend on the
border trade. These issues can be resolved amicably once the ground realities
are accepted. Once this is done, we will also respond favorably. We will permit
fishermen and regulate their activities.
Q: What was the humanitarian corridor in Bangladesh? Was the United States really interested in getting involved?
I
don’t think the U.S. was really interested. Only NGOs and some individuals were
interested, and perhaps there were other global players interested in the
project. There was a lot of media hype over the plan. But it is not realistic
because war is on in Rakhine State. Pushing the refugees into a war zone is not
humane. Even after the war, there should be a conducive environment for
refugees to return.
Q: Why
are Pakistan and Turkiye engaging with the Rohingya refugees and armed groups?
It
is quite concerning and one of the aggravating factors [of militancy among the
Rohingya]. This is bad for both Bangladesh and us. We hope that the BNP
government will initiate the right policies and actions. Sometimes the policies
are correct, but the implementation goes awry.
Q: Do
you think Pakistan could use the Rohingya armed outfits to target India?
The
refugees might be exploited and we need to keep a watch on them. We have security concerns that are common
with India. The militancy in the region can spill over and become a regional
security threat. We are ready to
cooperate with our neighbors.
Q: What
are your expectations from the Indian government?
India
is a very important player in the region. We wish to see India get more
developed and successful. We hope to cooperate more with India. We are ready to
help with the Kaladan project.
Q: The
AA is under severe pressure from China to stop the war. How have you responded?
It
is not pressure but China is keen to see a stable Myanmar. Some people may say
it is pressure. China will have to do its best to protect its interests, which
every country does.
Q: Regarding
human rights violations by AA, there have been frequent allegations from
Rohingya, Khumi, and Chin groups that the AA engages in forced conscription.
What do you have to say?
Some
people are weaponizing the human rights laws. If you see the source of these
allegations, you will notice some particular groups, and especially the
diaspora activists, coming up with such accusations because they benefit from
such narratives.
The
Chin human rights activists do not represent the entire Chin community. We are
getting along very well with most Chin communities in Chin State. We help each
other and will have better cooperation even with the Muslim (Rohingya)
community in the days ahead. We are building trust, which takes time. There
were accusations because of the wrong policies of the previous government.
With
regard to forced conscription, Rakhine State is witnessing war and emergency
measures are necessary. We are very careful in recruitment and we explain the
duties and responsibilities to anyone who is recruited.
Q: You have clarified that the AA is not involved in drug trafficking. But as I gleaned from my stay in Arakan, there is a danger of drugs flowing from Bangladesh and mainland Myanmar. Only three days ago, a person from Maungdaw in Rakhine State was arrested in the Indian state of Mizoram with a huge quantity of synthetic drugs. Don’t you see this is an emerging challenge for Arakan?
It
is a complex situation. The problem of drugs in Rakhine State is much less now
than it was during the military rule. Many of the routes are blocked from the
mainland. There are so many checkpoints. Drug production (in Myanmar) is at an
industrial level. Last month, the largest seizure of drugs was in Shan State.
The junta made nonsensical accusations. The whole factory complex was
confiscated. They knew the existence of that complex for a long time.
We
cannot say that the drug problem has been totally eradicated in Rakhine State.
There are addicts and traffickers. Fishing boats are plying up and down, and we
don’t know what they are carrying. There are ships going from Rangoon to
Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong. It will take time to eradicate the
problem.
Q: In the past few days, I have visited some villages along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border and interacted with some residents. The non-Rohingya villages and some Rohingya villages live in constant fear of ARSA. Your government has not been able to consolidate itself here. What are your plans for these areas?
It’s
not simple. We are offering assistance to remote villages in the region and
especially to Mro-inhabited villages. A section among them is involved in drug
trafficking. We are receiving reports that some among them have also joined
hands with ARSA. Many have been killed in internecine battles, which is not
surprising.
Before
Maungdaw was liberated, the military and drug barons like Dil Mohammad were
very active in drug trafficking. We are
now focusing on that region so that there can be better security for the
residents. There is also a severe shortage of doctors and medicines. The
conditions of internally displaced persons are depressing.
We
are addressing these issues and trying to improve the delivery of health
services and other services. We are in the process of acquiring more equipment,
ensuring a steady flow of medicines and recruiting more doctors and health
workers. We have decided to open a medical college and nursing academy in
Rakhine State and we are very excited about these ventures. We plan to train
120 nurses this year. We have 50-60 doctors currently and expect more to join
us soon. We are not concerned about the background and ethnicity of doctors and
nurses. We will welcome whosoever wants to join us, including Indian doctors.
Q: What
do you expect of the Spring Revolution in the months ahead?
The
expectations of the AA alone are not enough to determine the Spring
Revolution’s outcome. We have to take other factors, including the people of
the Burmese heartland, their problems and local dynamics, into consideration.
We fully respect their situations. We have cordial ties with them and have
helped like-minded organizations.
Q: How
do you see the situation panning out in Arakan over the next two years?
I
wish to see people’s suffering end at the earliest and to find a feasible and
lasting solution. We should prepare for the worst to fulfil the aspirations of
the people of Myanmar.
