(Tom Clifford’s post from the COUNTER PUNCH on 01 July 2025.)
President
Xi Jinping has put the Chinese military in the crosshairs as he proves once
again that Mao Zedong’s metaphor, power is gained through the barrel of a gun,
remains as relevant today as it was when the communists took power in 1949.
Admiral
Miao Hua was responsible for ideology and loyalty within the armed forces. His
own loyalty was questioned and he was removed after allegations of corruption.
Miao was originally suspended from the CMC in 2024 as he was under
investigation for “serious violations of discipline”. Those words, in China,
mean guilty of corruption and are as damming as any court verdict.
Miao is the eighth member of the Central Military Commission (it only has six members) to be ousted since Xi took power in 2012. The expulsion of CMC members was previously unheard of since the era of Mao.
His
official and permanent departure from the CMC, confirmed on Friday by the
National People’s Congress Standing Committee, means the government has sacked
more than a dozen senior military figures since launching a corruption
investigation. Ostensibly the probe, initiated last summer, was looking into
the purchase of equipment and weapons going back to 2017. It focused on multi-million dollar kickbacks.
Xi is
getting accustomed to removing senior officers. Two defence ministers Li
Shangfu and Wei Fenghe have gone as have two heads of the PLA’s rocket force,
responsible for missiles and the nuclear arsenal.
The commission is the military’s premier decision-making body. But its influence stretches across all aspects of politics. No man could assume the presidency without its approval. Ironically, Xi is proof of their power.
Their backing for Xi was key to him becoming president even though initially it looked like Li Keqiang, who died in 2023, might be selected. Xi persuaded the CMC that he was a safer pair of hands and more committed to party supremacy than Li who championed economic reform above all else.
Xi
broke the convention set by Deng Xiaoping (the leader who launched the
country’s post-Mao reforms) that presidents should step aside after two terms.
His third term in power has been marked by what many view here as the building
of a cult of personality and stark contradictions.
Xi has
accumulated power but seems unable to offer a cohesive vision for the country.
What is it and what does it aspire to? Russia’s main ally? A reliable trading
partner for the United States? An isolated behemoth? China’s aggressive actions
in the South China Sea alienated what should be its regional allies. Social
freedoms, such as they were under previous regimes, have been curtailed.
The
economy is stuttering and bears little resemblance to the vibrancy normally
associated with one growing officially at 5 per cent.
There
is unease in the corridors of power as more purges are probably in store. Xi
may appear unchallengeable at the moment, but the removal of so many once
considered his close associates reveals the fragility of his position and the
increasingly precarious status of those close to him.
Xi took
power with a promise to root out corruption in China, vowing to come after both
the “tigers and the flies”. Since then, millions of officials have been
investigated. But that policy now seems like a cover to attack those he does
not trust. Purges seem primarily to be about managing internal rivalries and
ensuring his supremacy.
But too
many purges can undermine authority and may foster a ‘nothing to lose attitude’
among his rivals. The gun remains frimly in the party’s hand but the ties that
bind are fraying.
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| General Zharn Youxia |
