(Staff article from the International Crisis Group (ICG) on 04 September 2023.)
Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in
Myanmar’s Shan State. With Myanmar’s military fighting on other fronts, the
Ta’ang National Liberation Army is firming up its foothold in the country’s
north. Clashes with other ethnic armed groups are possible. The Ta’ang group
should focus on improving governance in its areas, in conjunction with civil
society.
What’s new? The Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) has used Myanmar’s post-2021 coup crisis to expand its territory in northern Shan State, recruit fighters and strengthen its parallel administration. Although it has quietly supported anti-coup resistance forces, it has clashed with the military only rarely and has met with regime representatives.
Why does it matter? The TNLA’s expansion has created tensions with other ethnic armed groups and non-Ta’ang communities in northern Shan State. The group’s ambiguous political positioning since the coup reflects the complex environment in which ethnic armed groups operate. It also helps explain why building a countrywide anti-regime alliance has proven so difficult.
What should be done? The TNLA, which seeks greater autonomy, should focus on caring for the people under its control through improved self-administration rather than expanding its territory further. It should also reform its recruitment practices. Foreign donors should increase funding for local civil society organisations delivering services in Shan State.
I. Overview
Since the February 2021 coup in Myanmar, the Ta’ang
National Liberation Army (TNLA) – one of the country’s most powerful ethnic
armed groups – has strengthened its control of a swathe of territory in
northern Shan State.
In conjunction with Ta’ang civil society
organisations, it is working to maintain the rule of law, deliver health and
education services, and improve the local economy. Unlike some of Myanmar’s
other ethnic armed groups, it has mostly avoided confronting the military since
the coup. Instead, it has provided only covert support to anti-junta forces and
engaged indirectly with new opposition political institutions.
The group’s ambiguous post-coup positioning
reflects its long-term ambition to achieve autonomy. As it assumes the role of
a quasi-state, the TNLA should focus on supporting the population in its areas
and avoiding military adventurism that might provoke conflict with other ethnic
armed groups or the military; it should also cease coerced and underage
recruitment for its armed forces. Outside actors should support the provision
of services in Shan State, working through local civil society.
Since its inception in 2009, the TNLA has slowly
acquired more strength and territory. It garnered popular support among the
Ta’ang by pushing a strict anti-drug use policy and bringing together disparate
communities under a common ethnic identity.
Other ethnic armed groups in Myanmar – including
the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) and, more recently, the United Wa
State Army (UWSA), which is the largest such group and controls an autonomous
region in Shan State – provided the training and weapons the TNLA needed to
build up its armed forces.
Over the past decade, it gradually expanded its
geographical footprint. For much of that time, it regularly clashed with the
Myanmar military and its allied militias, as well as the Restoration Council of
Shan State (RCSS), a rival ethnic armed group.
The 2021 coup has further strengthened the TNLA’s hand. Busy fighting on other fronts, the Myanmar military has largely withdrawn from the northern Shan State battlefield, enabling the group and its allies to gain territory and expel the RCSS from the area. The TNLA, which counts an estimated 10,000 to 15,000 personnel, can now project power into nearby towns.
The military’s withdrawal has also enabled the TNLA
to assert authority in places it controls and govern in a way that advances its
goal of building a robust, autonomous Ta’ang nation. Working in partnership
with Ta’ang civil society organisations, it has followed the lead of larger
armed groups and created an incipient “Ta’ang State”, complete with courts,
schools and health facilities.
This quasi-state is very much a work in progress,
but since the coup the group and its civil society partners, many of which are
women-led, have moved well down the road toward creating a de facto autonomous
governing body.
To focus on consolidating control, the TNLA has
staked out a middle ground in Myanmar’s post-coup conflict. It now tries to
steer clear of clashes with the military. Although the Ta’ang group has been an
important source of training and weapons for new forces resisting the junta, it
has avoided publicising this support.
It has also kept informal its engagement with the
National Unity Government (NUG) – a parallel administration set up by lawmakers
ousted by the coup – instead allowing Ta’ang civil society groups and
politicians to lead the way in building these relationships. The TNLA has also
maintained contact with the junta. Along with two other ethnic armed groups, it
recently had a rare meeting with regime negotiators tasked with striking
ceasefire deals.
It did so under pressure from Beijing. China has
longstanding ties to Myanmar, with which it shares a 2,160km border, and since
the late 1980s has invested heavily in its neighbour, in part through its Belt
and Road Initiative. In order to protect its economic interests, China is
particularly keen to keep the southern border it shares with Shan State stable.
The TNLA’s positioning helps explain why building
an anti-military coalition in Myanmar has proven so difficult. Most ethnic
armed groups are hostile to the military regime, but they also see little
prospect of it collapsing, making them reluctant to cement alliances with the
NUG or armed resistance. Chinese pressures further push these groups away from
overt confrontation.
At the same time, the TNLA and other ethnic armed groups are influenced by their communities, civil society organizations, and the broader domestic and even international public. They thus have to balance various demands when determining the best pathway to achieving their objectives – in the TNLA’s case, a de facto autonomous Ta’ang State.
The group’s expansion in recent years also reflects
a broader fragmentation within Myanmar’s national borders that has accelerated
since the 2021 coup. With the central administration unable to operate
normally, non-state armed groups such as the TNLA or civil society
organisations working in the areas they control are the purveyors of public
services to millions of people.
The TNLA’s rise is not without risk to it or the
people under its control. Further expansion could provoke conflict with either
other ethnic armed groups or the military. Even absent TNLA growth, the
military may at some point seek to recapture some of the lost territory.
Non-Ta’ang people in Shan State feel threatened by the TNLA’s gathering might,
fanning inter-communal tensions.
The high costs associated with maintaining a large
armed force and system of governance also mean that the TNLA runs the risk of
overreach. The need to raise revenue already appears to be pushing it into
competition with other ethnic armed groups and pro-military militias, which
could lead to sharpening hostilities.
Given the reality of state fragmentation in
Myanmar, the people of northern Shan State will be best served through a
combined effort by the TNLA, civil society and donors to manage conflict risk,
improve governance and deliver services. The TNLA should refrain from further
expansion, which would risk renewed conflict, and take greater care to avoid
provoking other ethnic minorities living in its territory.
It should reform its recruitment policies,
including by ending conscription – often enforced through violence or threats
thereof – and cracking down on recruitment of child soldiers. Meanwhile, donors
should expand support for civil society organisations in northern Shan State,
including not only Ta’ang groups but also those run by other ethnic minorities.
Strengthening civil society would not only allow
these groups to provide more services to civilians, but it would also afford
them a degree of moderating influence over the leadership of armed groups,
particularly when it comes to maintaining peaceful inter-ethnic relations in
this corner of war-torn Myanmar.
II. The Rise of the TNLA
A. Death and Rebirth
Although the TNLA is newer than many of Myanmar’s
other ethnic armed groups, its roots lie in a 60-year armed struggle for
greater autonomy for the Ta’ang people. Referred to as “Palaung” by the
country’s majority Burmans, the Ta’ang speak Mon-Khmer languages and live
mainly in the mountains of northern Shan State, including some particularly
remote areas.
Smaller Ta’ang communities reside in southern Shan
State, China’s Yunnan province and northern Thailand. At least three major
Ta’ang sub-groups, speaking six Ta’ang languages, are dispersed throughout
parts of Myanmar. Historically, the community has had little interaction with
the Myanmar state.
Geographical isolation, however, did not insulate the Ta’ang from the conflict that gradually engulfed Shan State following Myanmar’s independence in 1948. A year after General Ne Win’s 1962 coup, Ta’ang political leaders formed the Palaung National Front to fight for autonomy from the military regime. In 1976, some members broke away to create a new armed group, the Palaung State Liberation Organisation (PSLO), and allied themselves with the KIO.
The PSLO kept up its struggle throughout Ne Win’s
rule, which ended in 1988 amid national protests. Another military regime
quickly took over, however, launching a bloody crackdown on demonstrators.
Soon after the new junta seized power, it started
cutting ceasefire deals with ethnic armed groups in Myanmar’s borderlands. The
PSLO resisted at first, but its leaders were forced to accept a ceasefire in
1991 after a devastating military operation targeting Ta’ang civilians. The
PSLO gradually lost influence and territory, until eventually the regime
compelled it to disarm in 2005.
During the ceasefire period, illicit drugs began to
flood into Ta’ang communities, and human rights groups reported high rates of
addiction. Like other minorities, the Ta’ang came to see the influx of
narcotics as a military strategy aimed at “destroying” their identity and
undermining their political goal of greater autonomy.
The Ta’ang struggle for autonomy went on, however.
The drug addiction crisis, in parallel to the PSLO’s weakening, strengthened
the belief among the Ta’ang that they needed a new armed group to protect
themselves, though the group took some time to come together.
Just months after the PSLO reached a ceasefire in
1991, disgruntled members formed a new organisation, the Palaung State
Liberation Front (PSLF), based on the Thai-Myanmar border, which was primarily
a political entity rather than a fighting force.
By the late 2000s, the military regime was
pressuring many of the country’s ethnic armed groups to become Border Guard
Forces under its control, leading to a certain level of solidarity among them.
In 2009, the PSLF formed an armed wing, the TNLA, with support from the KIO,
which provided the new outfit with training and weapons.
The TNLA is both an armed group and a
nation-building project. The PSLF’s decision to use the term “Ta’ang” – which
is how the Ta’ang people refer to themselves – as the name of its armed wing
reflected a “reshaping of the ethnonational collective identity”. It was a way
for the TNLA to assert leadership of peoples beyond the area traditionally
considered the Ta’ang homeland, including Ta’ang sub-groups in other parts of
Shan State, as well as in China and Thailand.
Using the word Ta’ang was also a symbolic rejection
of the Palaung Self-Administered Zone created under Myanmar’s 2008
constitution, which encompasses only two townships (Namhsan and Mantong). The
TNLA instead fights for a larger “Ta’ang State” that would be carved out of
present-day Shan State, within a genuinely federal system. At the same time,
retaining “Palaung” in the name of the political wing emphasised the continuity
with earlier resistance movements.
B. Gathering Strength
During Myanmar’s decade of political
liberalisation, from 2011 to 2021, the TNLA grew slowly but steadily into one
of the country’s most powerful ethnic armed groups. Particularly in the early
years, its key strategy was to pursue a harsh anti-drug policy – drug users
were forced into rehabilitation camps – that was highly popular among the
Ta’ang.
After it had established a foothold in isolated
areas of northern Shan State, its influence burgeoned. With a strictly enforced
recruitment policy that required most Ta’ang households with more than one
child to supply a soldier, the group expanded its forces. It soon began to
clash with the military and its allied militias.
Despite its growing clout, the TNLA was largely
excluded from the peace process that Myanmar President Thein Sein initiated in
2011. It was one of the few ethnic armed groups that did not sign a bilateral
ceasefire with the quasi-civilian government between 2011 and 2021.
It participated in collective negotiations over the
text of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), but the Thein Sein
government, under pressure from the military, later blocked the TNLA from
signing the accord. (While several reasons were given, it was primarily to stop
“new” groups from joining the agreement.) Heightened conflict and the exclusion
of several groups from the peace process spurred non-signatories into closer
political and military collaboration, including joint offensives.
In late 2015, amid a steady increase in clashes
with the military, the TNLA found itself battling a new foe. Shortly after
signing the NCA that October, the RCSS began to move its forces from the centre
and south of Shan State into northern areas, allegedly with the Myanmar
military’s support. Fierce firefights erupted between the TNLA, on one side,
and the RCSS and the army, on the other, taking a severe toll on the locals and
exacerbating tensions between the Ta’ang and Shan peoples.
For much of the liberalisation decade from 2011 to
2021, the TNLA was on a war footing, fighting either the military,
military-backed militias or other ethnic armed groups. It had little time to
focus on administration or service delivery. That changed in about 2018, after
the TNLA gained a firm foothold in parts of northern Shan State.
Around the same time, the group began shifting away
from the KIO, which had reached an informal ceasefire with the military, toward
building closer relations with the UWSA. TNLA members were dispatched to UWSA
territory for administrative training, which gradually led to improvements in
TNLA governance and services.
At the same time, Myanmar’s imperfect but
nevertheless marked political liberalisation created greater space for Ta’ang
civil society and political groups to operate. The Ta’ang National Party was
formed to contest the 2010 elections, and from 2012 civil society organisations
that had been based in Thailand, such as the Ta’ang Women’s Organisation and
the Ta’ang Students and Youth Organisation, moved inside Myanmar, focusing on
issues such as empowerment of youth and women, documentation of human rights
violations and environmental protection.
After the Thein Sein government lifted longstanding
bans on the teaching of minority languages, Ta’ang literature and culture
committees also emerged. Meanwhile, electricity, road and communications
infrastructure – in particular, mobile internet – improved significantly. The
TNLA was thus better able to speak to all Ta’ang people wherever they lived.
These developments helped the TNLA with its nation-building agenda. Ta’ang
subgroups were, for example, able to cooperate in adopting a single Ta’ang language,
which is now taught in TNLA-run schools.
III. Post-coup Positioning
The February 2021 coup in Myanmar closed out the
period of political liberalisation that helped propel the Ta’ang
nation-building agenda. Since then, the TNLA has been walking a political
tightrope. Although its leaders and supporters generally sympathise with the
anti-military struggle that has engulfed much of Myanmar, seeing it as aligned
with their own interests and values, the group’s objectives and key external
partners compel it to limit its public cooperation with resistance forces.
The TNLA is thus engaged in a careful balancing act
to maintain a diverse set of relationships: with the military, China and other
ethnic armed groups, as well as with post-coup resistance forces, including the
NUG. These competing imperatives also illustrate why it has proven so difficult
for the NUG to build strong partnerships with many of Myanmar’s ethnic armed
groups.
A. An Uneasy Truce
Since the coup, both the military and the TNLA have
sought to limit fighting with each other for highly pragmatic reasons. The
regime’s forces are stretched, and it wants to avoid having to face well-armed
ethnic armed groups on the battlefield. The TNLA, meanwhile, has used the lull
in combat not only to expel other ethnic armed groups from areas it considers
part of its “Ta’ang State”, but also to boost governance and service delivery
in its expanded territory.
As a result, clashes in northern Shan State – long
one of the most conflict-affected parts of the country – have declined, despite
violence at the national level reaching heights not seen since the 1950s.
Although TNLA leaders have said they will not move into major cities, they have
expressed a desire to control “the regions where the majority of the people are
Ta’ang”, some of which – including parts of Mongkaing, Mongyai and Tangyan
Townships – are outside the group’s traditional area of influence in northern
Shan State.
In an effort to avoid fighting the TNLA, after
seizing power the junta relocated many of its forces to bases in major towns,
in effect ceding control of large parts of northern Shan State. Early in 2023,
it even pulled some units out of northern Shan and deployed them to theatres in
south-eastern Myanmar.
In many areas, the boundaries of the TNLA’s domain
are now clearly defined on the ground: within minutes of passing military posts
on the edge of large towns, travellers typically encounter a TNLA checkpoint.
Ta’ang flags and concrete markers bearing the TNLA logo have also become
common, even on main roads.
When, notwithstanding these efforts, some fighting
did break out between the military and TNLA in northern Shan State in July and
August, the dozen or so clashes were all along or close to highways,
highlighting the extent of the TNLA’s sway; on 27 July, the military attacked a
TNLA outpost less than 10km from the outskirts of Lashio, the largest town in
the area and home to the military’s North-Eastern Command.
While the regime continues to control urban areas
in northern Shan State and the main highway to China, the Ta’ang group now has
authority in many rural areas, particularly in the mountains north and west of
the highway. Regime soldiers rarely venture outside towns, except on major
roads.
Although the TNLA generally does not aim to seize
large towns by force of arms, which could well prompt a massive military
counterattack, it does seek to exert influence there through other means – eg,
through taxation, recruitment and law enforcement (it can arrest people in
urban areas). A source close to the group’s leadership explained.
It has been much easier to operate after the coup.
In the past, the military forces tended to follow TNLA troops. But they no
longer do this. For example, the TNLA opened a base and administrative office
on a strategic hill in Lashio Township a few months after the coup. The
military know it is there, but they haven’t reacted.
In May, TNLA forces entered Lashio unopposed. The
sortie was intended partly to help bolster the group’s ranks – the TNLA signed
up some recruits and promptly left town – but it nonetheless demonstrated a
capacity to project power.
Fighting has not entirely disappeared from the
region during the post-coup period, however. The TNLA, either alone or together
with allied armed groups, has staged attacks on military outposts and police
stations. These shows of force are intended to signal the TNLA’s opposition to
the military regime, both to its Ta’ang supporters and other people in Myanmar.
The raids are also a way of demonstrating the group’s growing dominance in
northern Shan State.
The military, too, has occasionally gone on the attack. Its most serious such operation took place in December 2022, when it dropped commandos by helicopter in TNLA territory and raided one of the group’s major bases in Namsham Township. The military later claimed that the fighting with the TNLA was a “misunderstanding”, saying it had intended only to hit People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) – resistance units formed after the coup – who were using TNLA territory to transport weapons to Sagaing.
It said its troops merely retaliated when they came
under fire from the Ta’ang group. The raid was likely a shot across the TNLA’s
bow, warning it not to aid resistance groups (see Section III.B), but the
military has not again attempted such a bold strike.
During clashes between the army and TNLA-backed
PDFs on the boundary between Mandalay Region and Shan State in April and May,
the PDFs withdrew into TNLA territory, but the military’s troops did not follow
– an apparent effort to avoid escalating the fighting. As noted above, July and
August have also seen clashes between the TNLA and the military.
Still, the broader trend is toward avoiding more
conflict. The military and TNLA have maintained their uneasy truce through
back-channel dialogue and regular contact between local commanders. When the
military sends patrols into TNLA-controlled areas, it typically informs its
TNLA counterparts, who then withdraw their forces from the vicinity, returning
only after the troops return to base.
But despite informal cooperation, there is little
prospect at this juncture of a formal ceasefire or political settlement between
the military and TNLA. The TNLA has resisted regime attempts to engage in
negotiations. It has avoided public one-on-one meetings with junta
representatives; the two it has attended, in December 2021 and June 2023,
brought in other armed groups as well and took place under pressure from China
(see Section III.D). Little of substance was discussed at either meeting.
The military has offered the TNLA and other ethnic
armed groups constitutional changes that would give them greater autonomy in
exchange for supporting its planned election, which promises to be
anti-democratic and rigged. Such overtures hold little appeal for the TNLA, for
both practical and political reasons.
The military cannot amend the constitution until
after handing over power to a nominally civilian government, and with the
elections now delayed to an unspecified date, the prospects of altering the
charter are doubly uncertain.
More generally, TNLA leaders distrust the military
and consider it extremely unlikely that the generals would be willing to accept
the full sweep of their political demands. In the current circumstances,
reaching any kind of political agreement with the military – or even a formal
ceasefire – would also trigger blowback from TNLA supporters and the broader
public.
Both sides may be willing, however, to take steps
to bolster what is in effect an unofficial ceasefire, albeit for different
reasons. The military is keen on reducing the number of fronts it needs to
fight on. The TNLA, meanwhile, wants to maintain stability in its territory as
it continues to strengthen its parallel administration.
Although formal agreements with the military remain
unlikely, TNLA leaders know they are in an advantageous bargaining position.
They may be open to informal arrangements that protect the group’s post-coup
territorial gains.
B. Covert Resistance Support
Although it has refrained from directly confronting
the military, the TNLA is an important player in the post-coup resistance
movement. That said, to avoid conflict with either the regime or Beijing –
which wields some leverage over the group, largely because Shan State borders
China – the TNLA has sought to downplay or obfuscate its ties with the
opposition movement.
The TNLA’s political engagement with the post-coup
resistance takes several forms. Notably, it does not interact publicly with the
NUG. Instead, it works with the Ta’ang Political Consultative Committee (TPCC),
a platform that Ta’ang politicians and civil society leaders formed after the
coup to advance the goal of self-determination.
The TPCC is also part of the National Unity
Consultative Council, a countrywide platform affiliated with the NUG.
Meanwhile, the younger brother of TNLA general secretary Tar Bhone Kyaw, Mai
Win Htoo, is the NUG’s deputy minister for federal union affairs.
The TNLA has also granted refuge to a significant
number of activists – not only Ta’ang, but also Burmans and people of other
ethnicities – who are involved with resistance institutions and had to flee
military crackdowns.
Most significantly, however, the TNLA has been
training and equipping armed resistance groups formed since the coup. This
support includes training NUG-backed PDFs, independent resistance groups and
urban guerrilla cells; facilitating weapons purchases; and allowing TNLA
territory to be used for the movement of people, weapons and supplies.
Some of the groups that the TNLA has trained and
armed have returned to other conflict theatres, while others have been deployed
on the fringes of TNLA territory, notably along the boundary between Shan State
and Mandalay Region. In these latter areas, TNLA militants have fought
alongside PDF units from the Mandalay PDF.
The TNLA has provided this support for several
reasons. First, it has benefited financially from training and arming
resistance forces, which have raised significant amounts of money from the
diaspora.
Secondly, the deployment of PDFs and other armed
groups on its territory’s periphery has buffered its lands from
junta-controlled areas of the country.
Thirdly, it has gained from the influx of activists
and civil servants participating in the mass strike against military rule known
as the Civil Disobedience Movement, some of whom provide welcome assistance to
its expanding service delivery system.
The TNLA’s alignment with the resistance is also a
reflection of its relations with Ta’ang elites, particularly politicians and
civil society figures, who have been more vocal in opposing the coup and
constitute an important source of support.
C. Ethnic Rivals and Allies
When the military seized power, the TNLA was
already at war with the RCSS in northern Shan State. The two groups had resumed
fighting in late 2020, and the conflict escalated rapidly over subsequent
months. The Myanmar military’s withdrawal allowed the warring parties to move
more freely than before.
While the military had previously helped the RCSS
entrench itself in northern Shan State, regime leaders did not intervene to
protect it.
As a result, the TNLA pushed the RCSS into a rapid
retreat, driving back most of its remaining forces to bases near its
headquarters on the Thai-Myanmar border. On 12 January 2022, the fifty-ninth
anniversary of Ta’ang National Revolution Day, the TNLA declared “victory” over
the RCSS.
Alliances established over the past decade were
crucial to this success. The Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) joined the TNLA
on the battlefield. The UWSA, meanwhile, provided both the SSPP and TNLA with
weapons.
But despite these fruitful connections, over time
these ethnic armed groups could find it challenging to maintain relations,
particularly when they operate in close proximity. Multi-ethnic northern Shan
State is home to at least eight major ethnic armed groups, as well as dozens of
pro-military militias and Border Guard Forces organised along ethnic lines.
Territorial claims often overlap, and ethnic
communities tend to be distributed according to elevation – with some living on
mountainsides and others in valleys – making it difficult to establish a
contiguous territory without including other minorities.
A further complication is that ethnic identities,
once fluid, have hardened over decades of conflict and zero-sum politics. The
financial demands of maintaining large armies and administrative systems have
also generated increased competition for economic resources.
Frictions have been increasing between the TNLA and
two ostensible allies, the SSPP and KIO, both of which, despite their past
support, are concerned by the Ta’ang group’s growing power in their
neighbourhood. The TNLA’s tensions with the KIO came to a head in May,
following a dispute over taxation of gold mines in Muse Township, during which
the TNLA briefly detained a mine owner.
The two groups subsequently convened a meeting in
the border town of Mai Ja Yang; they later issued a statement reaffirming their
“perpetual alliance” and committing to work together to eradicate the military
dictatorship. But the underlying ill-will remains.
The TNLA and SSPP, meanwhile, have been at
loggerheads over economic resources, including control of an informal border
gate near the Chinese frontier. In August, the SSPP accused the TNLA of
damaging a historical site linked to a prominent Shan monarch, a charge the
Ta’ang group denied.
Other ethnic armed groups are also wary of the
TNLA’s territorial expansion into Kachin and Shan communities in northern Shan
State. Although the TNLA normally only recruits from among the Ta’ang, there
have been reports of men from other minorities being forcibly enlisted; the
group has also detained drug users from other ethnic groups at its
rehabilitation camps.
The group levies taxes upon all individuals and
businesses in the territory it controls – and, as mentioned above, in some
areas under the state’s sway – fuelling resentment among non-Ta’ang residents
and business owners who find themselves having to pay.
Ta’ang flags and markers, along with Buddhist
pagodas, are visible signs of the armed group spreading its wings. The group
has also been accused of resettling Ta’ang households in areas traditionally
home to other minorities, in what some interpret as an attempt to alter
demographics and justify the TNLA’s presence.
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| TNLA remembered and honored their fallen comrades. |
D. China’s Influence
China wields significant influence over ethnic
armed groups based in northern Myanmar – a legacy, in part, of the material aid
it provided to the Communist Party of Burma from the 1960s to 1980s. In 1989,
the Communist Party collapsed when the ethnic minority rank-and-file among its
armed forces mutinied against the group’s Burman leaders and formed new armies
along ethnic lines, the largest of which was (and continues to be) the UWSA.
Each of these groups agreed to ceasefires with the
military under which they were allowed to retain their weapons and autonomous
control of their territory, which became known as “special regions”. Most of
these ceasefires endured through more than two decades of military rule, and
the groups benefited significantly from the regime’s expanding economic and
political ties with Beijing.
Although the TNLA was not formed from the Communist
Party’s splinters, China has some sway over the group due to cross-border
economic and cultural ties, as well as the TNLA’s close relationships with
other ethnic armed groups (particularly the UWSA).
During Myanmar’s decade of liberalisation, China
became a key international actor in the peace process between the government
and the multitude of ethnic armed groups. In 2013, Beijing helped broker an
unofficial ceasefire between the KIO and the military, and later sent a
representative to witness the signing of the NCA between Thein Sein’s
government and eight other ethnic armed groups.
China has maintained close relations with ethnic
armed groups based along its border, all of which have refused to sign the NCA.
In 2017, Beijing pressured seven of these groups – which had, by then, formed
an alliance known as the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative
Committee (FPNCC) – to attend a government peace conference, going so far as to
fly the delegations from Kunming, China, to Naypyitaw on a chartered plane.
Since the coup, China has encouraged the groups
operating along its border to respond to Naypyitaw’s offer for talks and to
avoid engaging with the NUG or the armed resistance movement. From late 2022,
it has engaged more actively, driven in part by concern that conflict could
escalate along the shared frontier.
It has urged both the military and ethnic armed
groups to maintain stability in these areas and steer clear of confrontations
that could harm Chinese economic interests. A June meeting in the border
enclave of Mongla between regime negotiators and three ethnic armed groups,
including the TNLA, was the clearest evidence to date of Beijing’s efforts to
exercise influence over the latter: the groups told the media that China had
brokered the talks and pressed them to attend.
But while the groups would clearly have had trouble
snubbing the talks completely, it was also convenient for them to attribute the
meetings to Chinese pressure, so as to alleviate any fallout among the Myanmar
public, which is largely wary of China.
China’s influence over the northern ethnic armed
groups has limits. Several FPNCC members – including the TNLA – have engaged
indirectly with the NUG and provided support to PDFs and anti-military forces,
even if mostly covertly.
The TNLA continues to arm, train and fight
alongside PDFs on the fringes of Mandalay Region, while another group, the
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, representing the Kokang people, has
openly recruited Burmans and other non-Kokang minorities into a new battalion,
which it deployed (apparently for the first time) in an attack on police and
military posts in Lashio in June.
The leader of a prominent post-coup resistance
outfit in western Myanmar also told Crisis Group it had continued to receive
significant support from the TNLA and other ethnic armed groups since China
became more actively involved in late 2022.
Even the UWSA, China’s closest ally, maintains a
degree of autonomy in the relationship. It has, for example, indirectly
provided weapons to newly formed resistance forces in various parts of Myanmar
since the coup, often via conduits such as the TNLA.
IV. Rebel Governance and Social Order: The TNLA Model
The TNLA has used the post-coup period not only to
secure territory and expand its forces, but also to govern more effectively
where it was already in control. To this end, it has strengthened partnerships
with Ta’ang civil society organisations that are better placed to deliver
services.
Although the TNLA’s self-administration is not yet
as strong as that of more established groups like the KIO or the Karen National
Union, an ethnic armed group founded in 1947 and based along the border with
Thailand, its efforts to provide services, particularly education, have
significantly improved its standing among the Ta’ang.
A TNLA fighter, who has been serving for five
years, said the group’s relationship with the Ta’ang people had “never been
better”, a judgment that civil society groups and residents confirmed.
A. Administration and Rule of Law
The TNLA’s political counterpart, the PSLF, runs a
bureaucracy of about 1,500 staff, most of whom have undergone two years of
training. Its work force is spread across thirteen departments, covering
everything from customs (namely, tax collection) and forestry to public
relations.
As the organisation’s armed wing, the TNLA is
officially part of the PSLF’s defence department. On paper, the military wing
is thus subordinate to the PSLF’s political and bureaucratic machinery.
In practice, however, there is little separation
between the two, and the TNLA is the dominant institution. Most PSLF officials
are seconded from the armed wing. Except for those working in the health
department, these men and women continue to wear the standard TNLA uniform.
Nevertheless, as it expands and grows stronger, the
TNLA bureaucracy is taking on a more civilian character. Standards have
gradually improved as a result of better recruitment and training. Recruits
with higher education levels are diverted into the bureaucracy after completing
three months of military training, for example.
Over time, the group has also tried to make its
administration more responsive to community needs. In some villages,
high-ranking administrative officials make monthly visits, enabling residents
to make requests and suggest priorities.
The Ta’ang group has established a network of
administrators that mimics the Myanmar state’s General Administration
Department, with a central office, five district-level offices, eighteen
offices at the township level and many more at the village-tract level. Many of
the lower-ranking administrators were previously part of the state bureaucracy
but were absorbed into the TNLA system as their villages came under the armed
group’s control.
The administrative system also features informal
village leaders who typically work from home and are supported by the
community. Their renumeration is generally non-monetary: they are compensated
with goods such as rice and other staples.
Although community development is an important
focus for administrators, a key task is to ensure that families provide the
TNLA with recruits. The strengthening of TNLA self-administration has made
enforcement of compulsory military service in Ta’ang communities more
systematic and harder to evade.
“I have to list the young people in the village and
report them to the TNLA administration. That’s one of my main duties. Although
I disagree with it, I have to follow the policy”, confided one administrator.
Like most other ethnic armed groups in Myanmar, the
TNLA has devoted significant resources to establishing and maintaining a
parallel justice system within its territory. The group founded a police force
in 2018, mainly made up of troops seconded from the TNLA.
Since the coup, it has sought to broaden its
criminal justice system by opening more courts and prisons, as well as a law
academy to train judicial officials. Some of the civil servants and lawyers who
sought refuge in TNLA territory after joining the Civil Disobedience Movement
have provided much-needed expertise. Although state-controlled courts still
exist in the township centres, most Ta’ang now use the TNLA justice system.
For now, however, the most formal aspects of the
Ta’ang judicial system – which relies on a mix of Myanmar laws (such as the
Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure), the TNLA’s own statutes and orders,
English common law and customary law – remain embryonic, handling barely a
hundred cases in 2022, most of them drug-related.
The group has few trained judges, and most areas
still lack courts. Instead, hearings usually take place at administrative
offices and are often resolved informally – hence the low case numbers.8 There
are also reports of suspects escaping custody, suggesting a lack of resources
and training in the security apparatus. Some residents of TNLA-controlled areas
also complain about a lack of transparency and consistency in how cases were
settled.
B. Education
The TNLA has made education a priority. At the time
of the coup, state-run schools throughout Myanmar were closed due to COVID-19.
Although the regime attempted a reopening in June 2021, in Ta’ang areas the
schools remained shut because civil servants had fled or were on strike.
In the vacuum, Ta’ang civil society groups working
closely with both the TNLA and the NUG have since established the Ta’ang
National Education Committee (TNEC), which works under an existing civil
society organisation, the Ta’ang Education Institute. Employing a mix of local
teachers – the majority of them women – and others who sought sanctuary in TNLA
territory, the committee says it runs more than 420 schools providing education
to 25,000-plus students.
These schools follow a modified state curriculum
that features new components on Ta’ang language, culture and history; both
Ta’ang and Burmese are used as languages of instruction. Despite teething
problems, the second year of TNEC-led schooling has seen significant
improvement.
More recently, the TNEC has expanded into higher
education, in cooperation with the NUG. In June, it announced plans to open a
Ta’ang Land University for students who had been deprived of higher education
due to COVID-19 and the coup. It is open to applicants who finished high school
prior to the coup or subsequently passed the NUG’s Basic Education Completion
Assessment.
Courses will be administered in part through
institutions such as the NUG’s Myanmar Nway-Oo Online University. Meanwhile, to
support its school network, the TNEC is due to inaugurate a one-year course for
150 trainee teachers at its new Ta’ang Education Academy.
Residents tend to identify education as an area of
improvement under TNLA rule. Almost three quarters of TNEC schools are in
villages where no state-run school was previously present. Along with the
crackdown on drug use, the expansion of the school network is particularly
popular with women.
“Children are now able to learn our language”, a
woman from rural Namtu Township, where a school recently opened, said
approvingly. “I’m also pleased there is going to be a university, so that our
children can have a better future”.
C. Civil Society Partnerships
The coup created an atmosphere in which the TNLA
could expand its administration without significant challenge; it has also
enabled the group to strengthen formal cooperation with Ta’ang civil society in
a way that was not possible prior to 2021.
There are around a dozen large Ta’ang civil society
groups, focusing on issues such as service delivery (particularly health and
education), culture and religion, women and youth empowerment, and human rights
monitoring and advocacy.
Although informal links with the TNLA have always
existed, before the military takeover most civil society activists were based
in towns, rather than in the remote rural areas where the armed group was
strongest. The activists stayed out of the countryside partly because it is
impractical to operate in a conflict zone, but also because they would have run
legal risks had they engaged openly with the TNLA.
That dynamic changed after the coup: many activists
joined the anti-military protests in early 2021 and then fled to TNLA territory
to avoid regime crackdowns, bringing them closer to the armed group.
The TNLA’s post-coup relationship with civil
society differs from that of most other ethnic armed groups, whose leaders tend
to exercise a level of control over civil society figures and organisations.
In the TNLA’s case, however, the relationship
appears to be more of a partnership. One reason is that the elite heading up
both the TNLA and Ta’ang civil society is small in number, with many members
bound by family ties. Some TNLA leaders come from a civil society background
themselves or spent significant time with Ta’ang groups while based in northern
Thailand in the 2000s.
But the TNLA also recognises its own limitations:
it acknowledges that it needs civil society’s skills and knowledge to fulfil
many of its ambitions, particularly when it comes to delivering services. “We
rely on each other now”, commented a TNLA fighter.
As a result, Ta’ang civil society organisations have a significant degree of influence over the armed group. “They can give suggestions to the leaders, who actually listen. They act as a kind of check and balance”, said a source close to the TNLA.
D. The Changing Role of Women
One area in which Ta’ang civil society has been
particularly influential is gender equality. Ta’ang society is highly
patriarchal. Women have traditionally been excluded from community leadership
roles. Social convention holds that they should remain at home to cook and care
for their children. Intimate partner violence is also widespread.
A sexist mindset is hardly unique to the Ta’ang in
Myanmar, but the region’s isolation in recent times has contributed to keeping
traditional patriarchal attitudes in place. It has been left largely to Ta’ang
civil society groups, such as the Ta’ang Women’s Organisation (TWO), to push
for change.
The TNLA’s rise to power and the growing influence
of civil society groups – including the TWO – within its territory has started
to bring about incremental improvements. For one, the expansion of free
education has improved opportunities for children of all genders. TNLA
administrators, although mostly men, have also been instructed to encourage
women’s participation in community activities and to challenge misogynistic
traditional beliefs.
Nevertheless, gender rights activists still express
concern about longstanding practices, including how the TNLA’s justice system
handles sexual violence against women. The system lacks women judges and still
uses customary law that blames and punishes women for the attacks upon them.
There is also a history of light sentences for perpetrators of crimes such as
rape.100
Women are also starting to play a more prominent
role within the TNLA itself, albeit at lower levels. As fighting with the
military has decreased and the TNLA has expanded its bureaucracy, more women
have started joining its ranks, and they are taking on a wider range of roles.
A TNLA member recalled that the group’s “women’s
department” used to be mockingly referred to as the “sewing department”,
because, in keeping with the traditional gendered allocation of tasks, its only
job was sewing uniforms.
In recent years, however, women’s department
members have engaged in monitoring human rights violations and intimate partner
violence. The TNLA has also formed a women’s battalion in which women are
permitted to fill combat roles but not allowed on the front lines of battle.
The group is also assigning more women to its Central Executive Committee.
Nevertheless, gender inequality in the organisation
remains entrenched, with women holding few positions outside the finance,
health, women’s and information departments. Their absence is particularly
notable in the administration department, which sits at the political centre of
the TNLA bureaucracy. “There are still few women in leadership roles, and we
struggle with stereotypes and patriarchy”, said a women’s rights activist.
E. Future Challenges
Although the TNLA has moved a significant distance
in expanding its self-administration, it faces challenges maintaining the
system and improving it further. In many areas under the group’s control, the
Myanmar state has barely existed, even in modern times, due to a combination of
neglect, conflict and geography.
Filling those gaps will be a tall order. There are
also not many well-educated Ta’ang readily available to work in the TNLA’s
system, which means the group has to invest a great deal in education and
training.
Moreover, despite strong support for the TNLA among
the Ta’ang, there remains widespread resentment about its strict conscription
policy. To be sure, the stability of the post-coup period has made enlisting in
the TNLA a more attractive prospect, because recruits are less likely to be
deployed to the front lines and have more opportunities to work in
administrative roles.
Nevertheless, it is still not a career that most
young Ta’ang people aspire to, and many continue to try to evade conscription.
If recruiters are unable to locate household members slated for military
service, they frequently detain family members in their place. Multiple sources
living in Ta’ang areas told Crisis Group that underage recruitment is also
commonplace.
“Our policy prohibits underage recruitment and
detaining family members [of those avoiding military service], but the
recruiting teams are still doing it”, said a TNLA member. “There are sometimes
punishments when the case is revealed, but many cases are covered up”.
As concerns resources, the TNLA’s growing
bureaucracy is likely to strain the group’s finances. Although it collects
taxes, the tax base is weak, because Ta’ang areas are generally poorer than
other parts of Shan State. Agriculture, particularly tea cultivation, is the
mainstay of the economy, but it has struggled in recent years due to low prices
and lack of workers.
As a result, the TNLA can only raise a limited
amount of revenue from Ta’ang people. Instead, it relies heavily upon taxes
levied on local businesses and trucks on the Mandalay-Muse highway; in most
cases, however, the businesses are not owned by Ta’ang, so taxes have become a
source of grievance among other ethnic communities.
Addressing these and other grievances – in addition
to maintaining cordial relations with non-Ta’ang populations, especially those
residing in areas under its control – will be a key challenge for the TNLA. The
Ta’ang have long existed on the fringes of society. They have been marginalised
not only by the majority Burmans but also by larger ethnic minorities, such as
the Shan. The TNLA’s expansion has thus upset traditional relations among
ethnic groups in northern Shan State.
But the TNLA does not always manage the risks in
this area as well as it might. Having now turned the tables to some extent, the
group and its supporters have, in some cases, acted provocatively vis-à-vis
other ethnic minorities. Interviewees cited a range of examples, including
building Buddhist pagodas in areas with a high proportion of Kachin Christians,
planting Ta’ang language markers and flying Ta’ang flags in mixed villages, and
resettling Ta’ang people in lowlands.
In recent years, Ta’ang social media users have
also shared a map of a hypothetical “Ta’ang State” covering twelve townships,
despite Ta’ang being a minority of the population in many of these. It is
unclear whether this map reflects an official TNLA position, but the group’s
Ta’ang State TV news webpage uses the map as the background, suggesting a level
of endorsement. Such actions run the risk of provoking further violence in Shan
State, either among armed groups or residents of different ethnicities.
V. Conflict Risks and Recommendations
The 2021 coup enabled ethnic armed groups such as
the TNLA to expand their territory, armed forces and bureaucratic capacity. It
is far from alone: in western Myanmar, the Arakan Army has embarked on a
similarly ambitious project, while in central Myanmar NUG-affiliated entities
are also attempting to administer districts and provide services to the
residents.
Given that the military is stretched on numerous
fronts, there is little prospect of it being able to reassert control in
northern Shan State, particularly now that the TNLA has become a formidable
opponent. It could well be decades before the central state returns to the area
– if at all.
Despite both the TNLA and military seemingly
wanting to avoid conflict, the risk of renewed fighting remains. Their forces
are in close proximity on the ground, and the military could feel threatened if
the TNLA continues to expand its territory. To forestall a scenario where an
accidental confrontation escalates, it is essential that the two sides maintain
the informal communication channels between local commanders they have put in
place.
To avoid triggering armed clashes with the
military, the TNLA should also halt further territorial expansion and consider
scaling back its efforts to exercise influence in urban areas. It should focus
instead on improving administration and services on behalf of the population in
the areas it already controls.
Limiting further expansion would also help mitigate
the risk of conflict with neighbouring ethnic armed groups and communities. The
TNLA’s rise has clearly unsettled non-Ta’ang people in northern Shan State. The
TNLA, moreover, is on track to become even more dominant in the region: to gain
access to tax revenues and recruitment pools that will allow it to continue
enlarging its army and administrative apparatus, it may well push further into
territories where ostensible allies also stake claims.
If it continues to pursue its present aggressive
strategy, with the aim of securing control of all the Ta’ang-inhabited areas in
the north of the state, the TNLA might come into conflict with other ethnic
armed groups, who could be forced into action by those they represent.
The group should also take other steps to avoid
triggering inter-communal tension, such as refraining from erecting
Ta’ang-language signs and Buddhist pagodas in mixed-population areas, which
serve as unofficial markers of territorial control but are antagonising to
non-Ta’ang populations.
Given the TNLA’s aspirations to attain a Ta’ang
State – which it would likely rule, together with civilian allies – the group
will eventually need to find a way to work with and support other ethnicities
living in its territory. That should involve treating them equally and
providing them with the same services Ta’ang people receive.
Ta’ang civil society has an important role to play
in that regard, because it can not only provide these services but also engage
civil society figures of other ethnicities to help avoid misunderstandings and
resolve complaints. The TNLA should work closely with civil society
organisations in part to facilitate the connecting role these groups can play.
As for the TNLA’s relations with the ethnic Ta’ang,
the challenges it faces there are somewhat different. The group’s expansion may
have generated unease among the region’s other ethnic groups, but the Ta’ang
have largely welcomed its growing influence. After a decade of deadly conflict,
they are finally enjoying a degree of stability as a result of the TNLA
avoiding direct confrontation with the military. They also have access to new
services, particularly education – something that women interviewees saw as
particularly important.
But while the Ta’ang strongly support the TNLA’s
vision of a self-administered Ta’ang State, there are steps the group could
take to build greater support and improve its governance. For example, its
recruitment policies remain unpopular. Both for the sake of its supporters and
for humanitarian reasons, the group should, at a minimum, properly enforce its
ban on underage recruitment.
It should shift away from mandatory military
service by making enlistment more appealing, such as by improving conditions
(including wages) for its members. It should also place more women in
leadership roles, particularly in its administration; given the wide-ranging
duties of administrators, this step could help loosen traditional gender roles
and combat everyday gender-based discrimination.
International donors and aid organisations also
have a role to play in northern Shan State. An important first step is
recognising that in post-coup Myanmar, ethnic armed groups and civil society,
rather than the government, are providing public services in areas like those
controlled by the TNLA.
Donors should match their actions to this reality
and increase their support for the robust civil society movement that has taken
root in these places. More funding would not just improve the services the
population receives; it would also augment civil society’s influence over the
TNLA, giving civilians a greater role in governance. To mitigate inter-communal
tensions, donors should also continue aiding civil society organisations from
other ethnic groups present in northern Shan State.
Whenever possible, donors should endeavour to work
directly with local civil society rather than through international NGOs or the
UN, in line with the 2016 Grand Bargain by which donors committed to funding
more local organisations. To achieve this goal, some will need to be more
flexible in how they operate.
Donors must consider that most of Myanmar’s ethnic
civil society groups are unable to register with Naypyitaw or use the formal
banking system due to regime restrictions and security threats, and often
struggle with the voluminous and detailed reporting many of these donors
require. Requiring organisations to keep receipts or seek multiple quotations
from suppliers can put them at risk of arrest; other forms of accounting may be
necessary.
As Crisis Group has argued before, given the
shrinking humanitarian space in many parts of Myanmar, some flexibility may be
essential for aid to reach those most in need of humanitarian support.
VI. Conclusion
In barely a decade, the TNLA has gained control of
a large section of northern Shan State, encompassing significant parts of at
least eight townships. Taking advantage of a lull in fighting after the
February 2021 coup, it has encouraged Ta’ang civil society to greatly expand
services to Ta’ang people, which in turn has helped enhance the group’s
popularity.
The TNLA now has a firm grip on the mountains of
northern Shan State, and it is unlikely to be dislodged in the foreseeable
future, given both the weakness of the military and the priority China puts on
stability along the border.
At the same time, its territorial expansion and
continued cooperation with post-coup resistance forces carry a risk of renewed
conflict with the military. In places, the group’s expansion has also created
tensions with other minorities and ethnic armed groups, which could spark
clashes affecting civilians.
The TNLA’s consolidation of power is symptomatic of
the fragmentation in post-coup Myanmar. A multitude of armed actors are carving
out territory for themselves. The TNLA’s approach of avoiding direct
confrontation with the military while quietly supporting anti-military
resistance forces reflects the complexity of the situation Myanmar’s ethnic
armed groups face.
Reconciling their long-term objectives with
pressure from their base to confront the regime makes for a rocky path to
tread. Complicating matters further, Beijing is keen to reduce tensions along
the border it shares with Myanmar.
Although TNLA leaders are sympathetic to the
anti-military resistance movement, they are unable or unwilling to formally
participate. Instead, they play a behind-the-scenes role. That helps explain
why it has proven so difficult for the NUG and its allies to build a broad
alliance to topple the regime, as many hoped might be possible at first.
Against this backdrop, the best near-term hope for
the Ta’ang people of northern Shan state is that TNLA and its civil society
partners will provide them with governance, services and a level of security
that in the absence of the state will otherwise likely be unavailable. Some of
its actions to date are positive. Others – particularly those that involve
underaged or forced recruitment of foot soldiers – should be stopped.
To the extent that the TNLA is considering
expanding its territorial control, it should shelve the idea, recognising that
it could wind up provoking both competing armed groups and the military regime.
More effective self-administration will be a better focus for its efforts, and
international actors should do what they appropriately can to assist it in this
endeavour.
(TNLA School of Political Science - TNLA PSS for their youths)
(Blogger’s Notes: This article vividly explained how that Motherfucker Min Aung Hlaing fucked the people of Burma up just to enrich his immediate family and thus causing the sudden collapse of both Myanmar Army and Myanmar Union and eventually, sooner or later, their Myanmar Nation to become a slave province of China like Tibet.
The underlying mechanism was quite simple. The Motherfucker’s
illegal coup brought city people out onto the streets to protest massively,
which forced the Myanmar Army to redeploy almost all combat battalions stationed
in the ethnic states into the cities and major towns in Proper-Burma. The
ethnic armies like TNLA, MNDAA, KIA, and AA took that rare opportunity to
regroup and strengthen.
At the same time the city people mainly
the Gen-Z youths, being killed in thousands by the Myanmar Army on the city-streets,
fled to the ethnic states and received military training and weapons from the
ethnic armies to fight back the universally-hated Myanmar Army, together with
their ethnic army allies. When Myanmar Army realized what was happening right
under their eyes they tried to redeploy their battalions. But it was too late.
Ethnic armies and their PDF allieds were
by then too strong to defeat. And the Burmese Gen-Z youths who were the potential
recruits for the Myanmar Army have now abandoned the Army and joined the PDF
units. Without reinforcements the frontline battalions of Myanmar Army rapidly depleted
and easily gave up causing the collapse of Myanmar Army's divisions and commands.
Myanmar Army has its own defense
industries capable of producing millions of guns, but without men to use them those
guns were useless and eventually the army collapsed, period, and the Motherfucker’s
greed was the only reason. Or we Burmese deserve him for WHATEVER HAPPENS AT
ALL HAPPENS AS IT SHOULD, Deus Vult!)
(TNLA's captures of Kyauk-Mel and Moegoke the famous RubyLand.)
