(Antonio Graceffo’s post from the GEOPOLITICAL MONITOR on 14 November 2024.)
As of late October, pro-democracy resistance
fighters in Myanmar had advanced to within a few kilometers of Mandalay, the
country’s second-largest city.
This marks a significant shift in the Myanmar civil
war, a conflict that has hitherto been concentrated in the jungles and
mountains of ethnic states, where groups like the Karen National Liberation
Army, Karenni Army, and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) initially focused on
reclaiming territory in and around their ancestral homelands.
The scope of the fighting expanded dramatically in
October 2023, when several major ethnic armies joined together to recapture
sweeping tracts of the Myanmar countryside, gradually narrowing the zone of
Tatmadaw control to major urban centers.
The approach on Mandalay represents a new phase of the Myanmar civil war. For one it sends a powerful message to the ruling State Administration Council (SAC) that the rebels remain united and determined to take the fight to the country’s economic and political heartland.
Two, it underscores the Tatmadaw’s confinement to
urban areas – the result of a year of tactical retreats – and the ambition on
the part of the rebels to engage in urban warfare despite the considerable
risks involved.
Dry season brings new battlefield realities
Despite the numerous military successes of the past
year, namely the recapturing of swathes of rural territory, Myanmar’s
pro-democracy rebels continue to struggle against the Tatmadaw’s air
superiority. Attack helicopters, jet fighters, and drones now account for a
large portion of casualties, with civilians increasingly among the victims.
As November ushers in the transition from the rainy
season to winter, drier weather brings clearer skies, potentially resonating on
the battlefield. David Eubank, head of the frontline aid group Free Myanmar
Rangers and a veteran of over 25 years in this conflict, commented to the
author that the shift “makes it easier for bombing runs and easier transport
for resupplies and reinforcements… Improved weather favors the government
military.”
This changing season raises concerns about whether
the rebels can capture Mandalay, as the improved weather conditions now play
into the Tatmadaw’s hands. This shifting military dynamic is echoed by a Karen
refugee who would prefer to remain anonymous: “Now, the Tatmadaw has computers
and GPS. They don’t even need to look. They can fly at night, in the dark and
drop bombs directly on [villages].”
Once the rainy season comes to a close, the Tatmadaw typically launches an offensive; and in the likely event of a repeat this year, they can be expected to field a formidable force. Since the introduction of military conscription, the Tatmadaw has added at least 30,000 troops to its ranks—more than the total individual fighting strength of many resistance armies.
Additionally, the Tatmadaw continues to receive
weapons and aircraft from Russia and China. Another disadvantage for the
resistance is the changing terrain. Early on, ethnic armed organizations fought
in remote areas where they have decades of experience, employing guerrilla
tactics to outmaneuver a stronger enemy. Now, however, fighting is shifting to
an urban context, a setting for which they are far less prepared.
According to representatives from the Karenni
National Progressive Party (KNPP), the leading political organization of the
Karenni people aligned with the National Unity Government (NUG) — the
democratic shadow government — Tatmadaw soldiers are entrenched in their
remaining strongholds, protected by hundreds of landmines and drones, and
defended by jammers that neutralize the resistance’s homemade drones.
Another disadvantage for the resistance as they
approach the cities like Mandalay is that their ranks include members of the
People’s Defense Forces (PDF), composed mainly of educated professionals and
city dwellers who joined the resistance after the 2021 coup. While their
commitment to the cause is strong, these PDF members lack the combat experience
of the ethnic armed organizations.
The dry season and the composition of forces may
provide an advantage to the Tatmadaw, but according to Eubank, this advantage
won’t necessarily be decisive: “The resistance can also benefit from better
roads for their own resupplies, and the dry season allows them to deploy drones
more effectively.” Furthermore, while the dry season has provided the Tatmadaw
with an edge in the past, there’s reason to believe that the dynamic could be
changing in 2024.
The resistance now has its own drones and has
captured more territory with road access for trucks, helping to offset some of
the Tatmadaw’s previous advantages at the end of the rainy season. The
Tatmadaw, for instance, generally can’t resupply by land anymore, as their
convoys are at risk of ambush and capture: “They can’t move in anything less
than a battalion-sized unit, and they need air cover,” according to Eubank.
This leaves the Tatmadaw heavily reliant on air support for both offensive and
resupply operations.
The evolving tactics of the Myanmar civil war
With so many moving parts and unknown variables, it
is exceedingly difficult to predict what will happen next or when either side
might collapse. The evolution of drone warfare provides a good illustration of
how quickly things can change. Initially, when college students, engineering
students, and IT experts fled the cities and joined the resistance as drone
makers, the resistance held an advantage in drones.
Now, however, it is believed that the Tatmadaw is
receiving instruction from Russia, based on experiences gained in the Ukraine
war. Earlier this year, the Tatmadaw established a directorate for unmanned
aerial warfare, which, along with more advanced technology and a larger number
of drones supplied not only by Russia and China but also possibly by Iran and
North Korea, has given the junta air superiority, even in the drone space.
For the resistance, unity is their strongest weapon. Myanmar is witnessing the rise of a “network insurgency,” marked by cooperation and mutual support among various ethnic armies and People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), all united by one shared objective: the dismantling of the State Administration Council (SAC) and the defeat of the Myanmar military.
On this,
Eubank notes that “what matters most is whether the resistance can remain
united, coordinated, and persistent in wearing down the military while also reaching
out to those caught in the middle. Some may dislike the dictatorship but aren’t
actively supporting the resistance; gaining their quiet support is crucial,
too.”
Currently, some large, powerful ethnic armed
organizations — most notably the Shan State Army (SSA) and the United Wa State
Army (UWSA)—are in a ceasefire with the government. If they were to join the
rebels, they could be a tremendous asset; however, differing political goals
and objectives have kept them on the sidelines of the civil war.
Finally, another significant advantage of the resistance movement is motivation. The draconian conscription laws of the past year have forced tens of thousands of young men and women into the junta’s army—many of whom do not want to be there and, in many cases, despise the junta, its government, and its military.
In contrast, the ethnic armed organizations and
People’s Defense Forces are fighting for their homes and families. They know
what they are fighting for; they understand what they have lost; and the dream
of establishing a democratic republic sustains them.
This motivation may push the resistance to continue
fighting despite mounting attrition. In some ways, the Myanmar civil war has
devolved into a large-scale, deadly game of chicken, one where each side is
determined to make the other blink first.
Drone warfare in the Myanmar civil war
The Free Burma Rangers, a frontline aid group in
the Myanmar civil war, has been reporting on the increasing incidence of drone
warfare in the conflict. On September 6, 2024, a Tatmadaw drone strike resulted
in the deaths of four civilians—two men and two women, and one person was also
wounded in the attack.
Another drone dropped a handmade bomb on a civilian
home in Loi Lem Lay Village, Karenni State. During the same incident, a
Tatmadaw drone with six propellers experienced mechanical issues while flying
over the battlefield and was subsequently captured by the Karenni Nationalities
Defence Force (KNDF), a pro-democracy ethnic army.
Taken together, these incidents underscore how
drone warfare is still in its tactical infancy, with numerous failed
deployments, and how payloads and weaponization are often being improvised by
soldiers on the ground.
Other rebel armies in the Myanmar civil war,
particularly the People’s Defense Forces (PDF), have developed their own drone
units. For instance, a PDF unit reportedly carried out 125 drone strikes during
the Battle of Loikaw in Kayah State. Another unit claims responsibility for
around 80 drone strikes last year, resulting in the deaths of 80 to 100 junta
troops. These forces are either manufacturing their own drones or repurposing
civilian models by adding deployable explosives. The drones are inexpensive,
widely available, and highly effective.
Even the junta, supported by China and Russia, has adopted similar tactics by attaching mortar shells to their drones, while ethnic armies often use homemade explosives based on mortar shells captured from the Tatmadaw. These devices can range from 40 to 60mm, carry up to 2.5 kg of explosives and shrapnel, and are capable of killing or injuring anyone within a 100-meter radius in open terrain.
