(Kyaw Htet Aung’s OP_ED post from THE DIPLOMAT on 26 April 2025.)
China Decides How Far the Resistance Can Go in
Myanmar: China has a growing ability to dictate outcomes on the ground in Myanmar.
For resistance forces, the implications are profound.
Since the February 2021 military coup, Myanmar has
descended into unprecedented chaos. The country has fractured under the weight
of violent repression and grassroots resistance across the country. In just
over four years, more than 500 new armed groups have emerged nationwide, adding
to the already long standing ethnic armed organizations (EAOs).
What began as sporadic guerrilla warfare has escalated into a full-scale, multifront conflict. Over 16,000 armed clashes have erupted between the junta’s forces and various resistance groups, marking one of the most intense civil conflicts in Southeast Asia in recent history.
A major turning point came on October 27, 2023,
when the Three Brotherhood Alliance – comprising the Arakan Army (AA), the
Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National
Liberation Army (TNLA) – launched Operation 1027.
Working alongside other resistance forces, they
delivered a significant blow to the junta, seizing territory and forcing the
military out of key strongholds across the country. In perhaps the most
symbolic victory, the MNDAA and its allies captured the Northeastern Regional
Military Command based in Lashio, Northern Shan State – an unprecedented
achievement in the modern era of Myanmar’s civil-war.
On the other hand, China has long been a quiet but
powerful player in Myanmar’s political and security dynamics, all while
officially adhering to a policy of “non-interference.” Since the 2021 coup,
however, Beijing has been recalibrating that approach – aiming to shield its
strategic investments from instability while keeping a watchful eye on
developments along its southwestern border.
In the wake of the second phase of Operation 1027,
China’s role as a mediator took on a noticeably more assertive, even coercive,
tone. Traditionally viewed as a neutral facilitator between the junta and
border-based EAOs, China’s latest round of mediation marked a sharp departure –
not only in its style, but in its strategic intent.
This time, Beijing pushed forcefully for a resolution that aligned with its own interests. It sought to preserve the existing power imbalance between the military junta and the resistance, ensuring that no single actor could gain enough strength to undermine China’s influence in the region.
Using a mix of diplomatic pressure and economic
incentives, China succeeded in securing the outcome it wanted. In April 2025,
after nine months of holding Lashio, MNDAA troops handed the city back to the
junta – a move that would have been unthinkable without Chinese intervention.
This was no isolated event. It marked the
consolidation of a broader pattern and phenomenon: China’s growing ability to
dictate outcomes on the ground in Myanmar. Increasingly, Beijing is deciding
not only who sits at the negotiating table, but also who gets what as the
negotiation result. For Myanmar’s resistance forces, the implications are
profound. China’s assertiveness is not limited to military maneuvering – it is
reshaping the political terrain itself. When China takes the lead in
determining Myanmar’s future, there are three key consequences.
The first major implication is that China is
actively capping the strategic ceiling of Myanmar’s resistance forces in their
pursuit of a military victory. For the resistance, the endgame strategy remains
clear: to dismantle the military junta through armed struggle, a narrative that
continues to dominate both public discourse and tactical planning.
However, China’s coercive style of mediation, most
notably demonstrated in Northern Shan State, subtly undermines this objective.
While Beijing may not react to every town or city that falls into the hands of
resistance forces, it has shown a readiness to intervene when its core
interests are at risk. This signals a clear message: there are limits to how
far the resistance can go before Beijing draws a line.
Importantly, this is not simply a matter of China
siding with either the junta or the resistance. Rather, it reflects a broader
strategic calculation – what might be called a deliberate act of “ground
balancing” in Myanmar’s volatile power equation. From Beijing’s perspective, a
politically fragmented Myanmar is far more manageable than a territorially
fragmented one.
A country weak and divided – but still intact – better serves China’s long-term interests, allowing it to exert influence without the risks that come with state collapse or regional instability. Beijing’s ideal situation is a Myanmar weak enough to be pliable, yet intact enough to serve China’s strategic interests.
A second key implication is the emergence of a
“conflict termination model with Chinese characteristics” that could become a
defining reference point for Myanmar. For years, Western donors and governments
have invested heavily in Myanmar’s peace process – supporting ceasefire
monitoring, dialogue facilitation, and the development of institutional
mechanisms. Yet the results have been modest at best, with few durable
outcomes.
In contrast, China is now advancing its own model,
one marked by assertive mediation and direct participation in ceasefire
monitoring, exemplified by its role in the recent handover in Lashio. If the
Lashio process proves effective, it could set a precedent for how future
conflicts in Myanmar are managed – and shaped by Beijing’s strategic calculus.
At the same time, China’s growing dominance in
shaping de-escalation dynamics is becoming more pronounced, particularly as the
United States scales back funding to organizations across multiple sectors in
Myanmar. Moreover, Beijing wields considerable leverage not only over key
domestic actors but also over influential ASEAN member states such as Thailand
and Malaysia – an influence that inevitably shapes every negotiation process.
Yet while China may be capable of facilitating a reduction in violence, it is unlikely to foster the deeper structural reforms necessary for sustainable peace. For Beijing, positive peace – defined by justice, equity, and long-term political solutions – may not align with its strategic interests, nor does it appear to be a pragmatic objective in the context of today’s Myanmar.
The final and perhaps most troubling implication
concerns the broader geopolitical stakes of China’s active and increasingly
direct involvement in Myanmar. At present, two possible trajectories are
emerging on the global stage: “geopolitical neglect” and “geopolitical
competition” between the United States and China. Both scenarios pose serious
risks to Myanmar’s long-term interests.
In the case of geopolitical neglect, a weary
international community – distracted by crises elsewhere and gripped by
inward-looking priorities – is likely to cede ground to China. Regional actors,
including Myanmar’s immediate neighbors, may prioritize short-term stability
and the protection of their strategic interests over sustainable peacebuilding
and democratic governance.
In such a context, China will be well-positioned to
lead Myanmar’s post-conflict transition according to its own strategic
interests, with little pushback against its preferred outcomes. This passive
acquiescence – effectively letting Beijing shape the future of the country – is
the essence of geopolitical neglect.
The alternative, however, may be even more
dangerous. A resurgence of great power rivalry, marked by strategic denial,
destabilization efforts, and a race for influence and resources, could plunge
Myanmar deeper into chaos. In such a scenario, the country becomes a theater
for geopolitical competition rather than a subject of genuine international
support. Power vacuums would widen, state institutions could collapse further,
and illicit economies, from arms trafficking to narcotics, would thrive in the resulting
instability.
Simply put, the second path could be disastrous.
Whether through neglect or rivalry, the international community’s failure to
act responsibly risks consigning Myanmar to a future defined not by peace or
prosperity, but by fragility and foreign manipulation.
Myanmar has moved far beyond the political crisis
it faced prior to the 2021 coup. The country is now entrenched in a protracted
and complex civil conflict, with both the military junta and resistance forces
locked into their own uncompromising agendas. Meanwhile, the international
environment is increasingly indifferent, distracted by competing global crises
and reluctant to engage meaningfully. In this context, Myanmar may ultimately
have to chart its own exit from the cycle of conflict and fragmentation.
The British colonial scholar John Sydenham Furnivall, the founder of Burmese Translation Society - later becoming Sarpay Beikman, once warned that “after a period of anarchy more or less prolonged, our descendants may find Burma a province of China.” In calmer times, such a statement might have seemed hyperbolic or unduly alarmist.
But in
the current moment of profound instability, Furnivall’s words ring with
unsettling relevance. While Myanmar is unlikely to become a literal province of
China, Beijing’s expanding influence over the country’s political and
territorial reconfiguration is unmistakable – and increasingly decisive.
(Kyaw Htet Aung is the program head of the Conflict, Peace, and Security Research Program at ISP-Myanmar and a political analyst. The views and opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the policies or positions of ISP-Myanmar.)
(Blogger's Notes: At least our Burma will be in peace again like during the British Colonial Times if China rules Burma. For we Burmese have been killing each others for over a thousand years since 8th century, then stopped killing each other for a while during British rule, and then resume the business of happily killing each other again till today since the British left in 1948 January.
Sometimes I sadly thought we Burmese do not deserve a self-rule as a unified people. Burmese are a warlike people and they have inherent brutality in their DNA and their blood. Burmese men like violence in general, especially killing and boasting about it. Just watch this video of Myanmar soldiers boasting of their killings of innocent people.
Compare that disgusting video to the following videos of ethnic Burmese (Shans, Lisus, Palaungs, etc) peacefully enjoying their traditional water festival recently in their Yunan Homeland in China while Burmese in Burma didn't even dare to go out let alone celebrate their water festival. Can't blame the people for preferring Chinese rule to those motherfucking Myanmar Army men.
