(Edward Wenming’s post from the VISION TIMES NEWS on 09 July 2025.)
Xi Jinping Cornered: Is a Silent Coup Reshaping China’s Power Structure? On June 30, Beijing’s top-ruling body, the Politburo, called a meeting to review the “Regulations on the Work of the Party Central Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordination Bodies.” The meeting was personally chaired by Xi Jinping, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
As soon as the news broke, it sparked widespread
interpretations. Many observers believe that, coming at this sensitive moment
on the eve of the Beidaihe meeting, Zhongnanhai’s release of these regulations
is effectively creating a new, higher-level Politburo above the existing one.
This not only underscores Xi Jinping’s weakening grip on power, but also
carries multiple hidden political signals.
So what kind of body is this exactly? Why would Xi agree to place a tightening shackle on himself — to elevate a supervisory “matron” over his own authority? What’s so unusual about the wording of this official communiqué? And what kind of political storm is brewing inside Zhongnanhai? Where is China’s shifting political landscape headed?
Strange features of the communiqué
Xinhua released an official dispatch announcing
these new regulations. Though brief, at just 331 characters, it drips with the
stiff, formulaic language of Party speak — too tedious to read out in full
here. It largely outlines the purpose and principles behind establishing this
new body. But what’s striking is not what’s said, but what’s not said.
First, the length: at only 331 characters, it is
the shortest Politburo communiqué issued under Xi’s leadership. The content
steers clear of mentioning the economy, risks, or the future. It merely states
that the Politburo reviewed the “Regulations on the Work of the Party Central
Committee’s Decision-Making and Coordination Bodies.” Yet, the less that’s
said, perhaps the more significant the moment.
Second, and more puzzling: there is no mention at
all of the “Xi core” or “Xi Jinping Thought.” The familiar phrases — “with
Comrade Xi Jinping at its core” and “guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism
with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” — were written into the Party
charter at Xi’s insistence. These slogans are presented as integral parts of
the Party’s theoretical framework, the action guide for the nation’s great
rejuvenation, and doctrines to be upheld and developed long-term.
A Politburo meeting like no other
They signify who’s at the helm, who sets the
direction, and to whom loyalty is owed. These twin slogans are the “double
insurance” of major Party declarations — staples of any top-level communiqué.
A Politburo statement is considered “first-level
sensitive material” within the Party’s propaganda system. It must be drafted by
the Central Office, reviewed by the Propaganda Department, and released by
Xinhua. Every word and even punctuation is scrutinized at the highest levels,
its weight comparable to a Politburo member’s speech.
For both slogans to vanish at once — can that
really be coincidence? Commentator Jiang Feng argues: it’s not that they forgot
to write them — they couldn’t write them. It’s not Xi holding back from
mentioning himself; it’s that no one wants to do it for him anymore — or
perhaps he’s even been ordered not to allow it. Who would dare unilaterally
remove the “Xi core” phrase, unless Xi himself has effectively been removed?
The only real explanation, Jiang suggests, is this:
it’s a collective, cautious, institutional move by the Politburo to begin
“de-Xi-ification.” They won’t topple him outright, but they will stop invoking
him. They won’t reject him explicitly, but they won’t rely on him for
legitimacy either. Xi is being quietly shifted from the Party’s sacred rhetoric
back to a nominal role as meeting chair. This is the Party’s trademark “soft
severing”: language comes first, power adjustments follow. If the communiqué
omits Xi, it’s because the Party has already begun discussing a future without
him.
Who’s in charge — and what are they planning?
The moment I read the official communiqué, the
question that came to mind was: is this an attempt to emulate the Vietnamese
model by establishing a parliament-like body above the Party Politburo? Or is
it the creation of a new, upgraded version of the Central Advisory Commission?
What prompted these questions was a memory of an
event from October 24 of last year, when Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of China’s
Central Military Commission, visited Vietnam and received an unusually
high-level reception.
Vietnam’s military released footage showing Zhang
being welcomed with a red carpet and full honors. Zhang and Vietnamese Defense
Minister Phan Van Giang jointly reviewed the honor guard, and top Vietnamese
officers were all present at the ceremony.
Zhang also met separately with Vietnamese Secretary
General and Military Commission Chairman Nguyen Phu Trong, State President Vo
Van Thuong, and Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh. Strikingly, during these
meetings, Zhang never once mentioned Xi Jinping by name — and Chinese state
media were conspicuously silent about his visit. To some observers, these
unusual signs hinted that Zhang had supplanted Xi’s influence over the
military.
Vanishing slogans
Another telling moment came at the close of this
year’s “Two Sessions.” An AP journalist captured a revealing scene: as Xi
Jinping left the venue, he paused to greet Hong Kong’s former Chief Executive
Leung Chun-ying and Macau’s former leader Edmund Ho. Both men smiled broadly at
Xi, though Leung appeared slightly nervous, clasping his hands awkwardly.
Behind Xi, CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong and others turned toward him, faces
unseen but clearly showing deference.
Yet Zhang Youxia stood out — he did not turn with
the others. Instead, he glanced back at Xi with a cold look, then turned away
again, focused on packing his documents. For a military leader to show such
overt detachment at a public event — particularly as Xi passed behind him —
sent a powerful signal. In the Party’s political theater, especially at the top
level, body language is laden with meaning. Zhang’s behavior reflected subtle
yet significant shifts in the military’s internal power structure.
The rise of Zhang Youxia
Rumors soon spread that Zhang had seized effective
control of the armed forces. Here’s another version worth mentioning: while Xi
moved to purge Zhang’s allies in the military, his broader crackdown on the
princeling (red second generation) elite also became a breaking point.
Among that group, Liu Yuan — son of Liu Shaoqi —
was one of the most significant figures. Before Xi’s rise, Liu had helped clear
his path by bringing down corrupt General Gu Junshan. After Xi took power, Liu
further assisted in ousting former CMC Vice Chairmen Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong,
consolidating Xi’s grip on the military.
But once Xu and Guo were removed, Liu was sidelined
— stripped of his military post and shifted to a ceremonial role at the
National People’s Congress. In December 2024, word leaked that Liu had
submitted a petition to the Party titled “Unnecessary Words” — a document
outlining major crises facing the CCP and urging a return to “reform and
opening up,” strategic patience, and a gradual transition toward a social
democratic model.
By May, reports emerged that Xi had summoned Liu
for a “chat.” In reality, Liu was detained and placed under house arrest. But
before entering Zhongnanhai, Liu had taken precautions: he informed Zhang
Youxia of his whereabouts, and told him directly, “If I don’t come back, you’ll
know what to do.”
Party elders react
Zhang Youxia then reportedly led 200 of his
personal special forces troops in a surprise raid on Zhongnanhai, successfully
extracting Liu Yuan. Sources say the operation was carried out with the
cooperation of the Central Guard Bureau, using a secret passage to rescue him.
This scenario brings to mind Tui Bei Tu’s 46th
prophecy: “A soldier carries a bow, declaring himself the white-haired elder.
Inside the eastern gate lies a hidden golden sword; the warrior enters the
imperial palace through the rear.”
The verse not only references Zhang Youxia, the
“white-haired elder,” but also hints at the hidden “golden sword” — the Guard
Bureau officers who assisted — and the 200 special forces warriors he led. Though
Zhang Youxia is not at the core of the princeling faction, he is seen as the
most resolute, forceful, and capable red aristocrat currently positioned to
challenge Xi Jinping.
After laying out all this, the key question is:
could this represent an institutional reform attempt, an experiment inspired by
Zhang Youxia and the Hu-Wen elder statesmen? Is this a bid to model Vietnam’s
system? Or, as some commentators suggest, is it a nod to Deng Xiaoping’s
strategy — creating a new, modern version of the Central Advisory Commission to
give Party elders a legitimate regency platform?
Whatever the case, Zhongnanhai’s sudden release of
these “work regulations” — tightening the reins on Xi — clearly reflects the
hand of a powerful anti-Xi force working behind the scenes.
A rejection of Xi’s ‘rule by task force’
Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has sought to
achieve absolute centralization by creating numerous cross-agency leadership
bodies — such as the Central Leading Group for Deepening Reform — with himself
personally at the helm of each. This model of “ruling by task force” enabled Xi
to override the Politburo and its Standing Committee, ruling as he pleased for
over a decade. What began as collective decision-making structures became mere
fronts for “Xi as core commander.”
The entire bureaucracy gradually devolved into an apparatus
for parroting, packaging, and enforcing Xi’s directives. Thus, Xi came to be
enshrined as the so-called “sole authority” — the “Xi core.”
Yet the Xinhua communiqué contains a telling
phrase: “to regulate the establishment, responsibilities, and operations of the
Party Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies.” This
signals that Xi’s model of “ruling by task force” is now facing comprehensive
restructuring.
Purge and reshuffle
The communiqué also calls for “ensuring
coordination without substitution, proper involvement without overreach” and
“putting forward practical and effective policy measures” while “resolutely
avoiding formalism and bureaucratism.” The subtext here is a veiled criticism
of Xi’s prior governance model: his task forces effectively supplanted the core
decision-making authority of Party departments, overstepping their bounds and
fostering rampant formalism and bureaucracy. This represents a rejection of the
hyper-centralized mechanisms of Xi’s era.
And what about “proper involvement without
overreach”? This amounts to an implicit accusation that Xi overstepped his
authority and interfered excessively — a direct repudiation of his autocratic
style.
The communiqué’s emphasis on “concentrated and
unified leadership over major work” further hints at criticism of Xi’s one-man
rule, amounting to a semi-public negation of his status as “supreme authority.”
As it states: “The meeting stressed that establishing these decision-making and
coordinating bodies is an important institutional arrangement for strengthening
the Party Central Committee’s concentrated and unified leadership over major
work and ensuring the implementation of key tasks.”
This is highly unusual. The meaning is unmistakably
clear: in the past, we relied on the “core” to achieve unified leadership — now
we rely on “institutions” for unified leadership. In the past, you were the
Party Central Committee, and the Party Central Committee was you. Now, the
Party Central Committee has made other arrangements: you are you, and the Party
is the Party.
This communiqué represents an institutional
correction of Xi Jinping’s decade-long model of personal rule. It is further
evidence that Xi has lost his grip on power. And the irony is that it was Xi
himself who announced it — in effect, a slap in his own face.
The fall of Xi?
Since Xi Jinping came to power, his various “task
forces for governance” have largely consisted of trusted allies positioned
across the Politburo Standing Committee, the broader Politburo, and key
ministries. To effectively overhaul and supervise this model of “rule by task
force” will inevitably require the introduction of forces outside Xi’s inner
circle, along with associated personnel changes, the dismantling of existing
groups, or the establishment of new institutions.
It appears that anti-Xi elders and other factions
may soon intervene in Zhongnanhai’s decision-making and coordination bodies,
and the purge of Xi’s loyalists is expected to continue. In fact, in early
April 2025, Xi’s Tsinghua protégé Li Ganjie was abruptly shifted from Minister
of the Central Organization Department to head of the United Front Work
Department.
Meanwhile, Shi Taifeng — a close associate of Hu
Jintao and a Peking University alumnus like Li Keqiang and Hu Chunhua — was
transferred to lead the Organization Department.
Following this unusual reshuffling, key deputies to
Xi’s Fujian clique loyalists — Cai Qi, Wang Xiaohong, and He Lifeng — were
successively reassigned away from Zhongnanhai’s core institutions. And just on
July 1, Xi’s trusted ally Ma Xingrui, a native of Peng Liyuan’s hometown in
Shandong, stepped down as Xinjiang Party Secretary with no clear future
posting.
The Beidaihe meeting
He was then replaced by Chen Xiaojing, a former
speechwriter once favored by Wang Qishan. Reports suggest that Ma Xingrui may
be implicated in a series of scandals tied to the China Aerospace Science and
Technology Corporation, and like his predecessors Wang Lequan, Chen Quanguo,
and even Zhang Chunxian, he could quietly exit the political stage. Signs point
to Xi’s faction being systematically fragmented and dismantled.
At the same time, Xi’s rivals — including Hu
Jintao’s son Hu Haifeng and Youth League veteran Hu Chunhua — have become
increasingly high-profile. Meanwhile, the purge within the military continues
to intensify. Xi’s loyalist, Politburo member, and vice-chair of the Central
Military Commission, He Weidong, has not been seen publicly for over three
months, with rumors swirling of his detention, critical illness, or even
suicide. The Party leadership is under pressure to offer clarity on He
Weidong’s case.
As is customary, the Beidaihe meeting is expected
to convene between July and early August, where Party elders and top leaders
will reach behind-the-scenes agreements on major political matters. These will
likely be formalized at the upcoming Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central
Committee. The new decision-making regulations announced at the recent
Politburo meeting may well be laying the groundwork for major decisions at
Beidaihe and the plenum.
General Flynn on Xi’s precarious position
On June 27, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General
Michael Flynn — former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and National
Security Adviser — took to X (formerly known as Twitter) to urge close
attention to movements among the CCP’s top ranks, particularly officials in the
government and national security sectors. Flynn suggested that a leadership
reshuffle is clearly underway in China, with potentially enormous consequences.
His post included two images: one of Chinese
officials meeting at the Great Hall of the People, and another featuring Ding
Xuexiang (Vice Premier), Chen Jining (Party Secretary Shanghai), and Zhang
Youxia (Vice Chairman CMC). Ding was placed at the center, implying he might
succeed Xi as Secretary General; Chen appeared positioned as a potential
premier, and Zhang as a future Politburo Standing Committee member and chairman
of the Central Military Commission.
Flynn is no mere armchair analyst — as one of the U.S. military’s most senior intelligence officials, his insights on the CCP carry significant weight and credibility.
Yet no matter who might replace Xi Jinping as
General Secretary, the CCP — described by critics as the greatest scourge of
humanity and the source of immeasurable suffering for the Chinese people — is
widely seen as a regime whose disintegration is inevitable. Any successor would
merely extend the Party’s rule temporarily, clinging to power for just a tad
longer.
