(Daniel Swift’s post from FDD on 18 June 2026.)
China’s
Chokepoint Problem: Why Beijing Is Welcoming a Leader Nobody Likes. No one
likes Min Aung Hlaing. Nevertheless, the leader of Myanmar’s military
government kicked off a five-day state visit in China on June 16, seeking
legitimacy after a sham election that few inside or outside Myanmar take
seriously.
He
remains deeply unpopular at home, where the economy has shrunk 20 percent since
his February 2021 coup. Beijing is growing impatient over his inability to
crack down on scam centers and to bring peace to Myanmar — home of the world’s
longest-running civil war.
China needs stability on its 1,300-mile border with Myanmar and wants the junta to protect a pipeline terminus and port project in Rakhine State that gives it a foothold in the Indian Ocean and a bypass around the Strait of Malacca maritime chokepoint.
Myanmar’s Leader Seeks Legitimacy
Min
Aung Hlaing is on a tour to reinforce his transition from chief of Myanmar’s
military to its civilian leader. His first stop was India on May 30. Now, he is
in China — Myanmar’s most consequential military and economic partner.
While his stated objective is economic, he is there primarily to quell Chinese doubts about his ability to provide security. Myanmar’s military government is fighting a 78-year-old civil war against roughly 25 armed groups across the country. Many of these groups have longstanding ties to China’s bordering Yunnan Province, making a public endorsement from Xi critical to Min Aung Hlaing’s survival.
Crime Creates Myanmar-China Conflict Along Shared Border
China’s
contested border with Myanmar is a locus for organized crime, including drug
trafficking and online scam centers that have ensnared an estimated 120,000
victims in Myanmar alone.
China
has grown increasingly frustrated with Min Aung Hlaing’s failure to crack down
on these criminal operations, and analysts say Beijing tacitly greenlit a major
2023 offensive by ethnic armed groups in northern Shan State partly to force
action on scam centers and drug trafficking that the junta had ignored.
China’s Indian Ocean Outlet Under Threat
The
border is not China’s only headache. China imports roughly 80 percent of its
oil through the Strait of Malacca, a narrow waterway between the Malay
Peninsula and Sumatra that the U.S. Navy can, in a crisis, threaten to close.
To bypass this chokepoint, China built a pipeline that takes in oil at
Kyaukphyu in western Myanmar and sends it to Kunming.
Kyaukphyu
is also the site of a planned deep-sea port under Beijing’s Belt and Road
Initiative — one that analysts warn could give China a strategic naval foothold
in the Indian Ocean, threatening both American and Indian positions in the
region.
The
Arakan Army, one of Myanmar’s most militarily capable insurgent groups, has, as
of June 11, advanced to within five kilometers of Kyaukphyu. China has already
been forced to withdraw infrastructure from the project site due to the
fighting. Beijing has also reportedly deployed drone operators to counter the
Arakan Army, but it wants Min Aung Hlaing to move more infantry, drones, and
fighter jets from central Myanmar to defend its chokepoint bypass.
Washington’s Opportunity
Beijing’s
dependence on Min Aung Hlaing reveals a strategic weakness: China’s most
important energy bypass runs through a country it cannot stabilize, defended by
a military it does not fully trust, against an armed group it cannot stop.
The
conventional wisdom holds that Myanmar is a Chinese vassal — Beijing pulls the
strings and Naypyidaw follows. In reality, the dependence runs both ways — and
that gives Washington an opportunity.
Washington
should maintain economic pressure on the junta and appoint a special
representative to coordinate diplomacy with pro-democracy forces, including the
National Unity Government, and ethnic armed organizations like the Karen
National Union.
This
is not charity. Groups with popular legitimacy are Myanmar’s best chance at
lasting stability — and a democratic Myanmar at the heart of the Indo-Pacific
serves American interests far better than a Chinese client state.
(Dan Swift is a senior research analyst for economics, finance, and trade for the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Dan is a retired U.S. diplomat who served in Burma from January 2015 to August 2019.)
