(Zachary Abuza’s article from the NIKKEI ASIA on 29 November 2023)
 |
| Time to Demolish the Myanmar Military. |
For the first time since Myanmar's military seized
power on Feb. 1, 2021, there are signs that the leadership is seriously
rattled. The launch of an unprecedented coordinated offensive last month by
three key ethnic armies has had a contagion effect, leading to a wave of
concurrent attacks around the country by allied and affiliated ethnic
resistance organizations and militias, known as people's defense forces.
Alongside the capture of more than 150 military posts, including those at two key trade hubs along the Chinese border, there are reports of growing desertions and the surrender of at least two battalions. While the regime's defeat is not a given, it is now possible to start to imagine a return to true civilian rule.
As such, the
international community should start assisting transitional planning by the
country's democratic forces. Regardless of whether the military collapses or
negotiates a settlement, Myanmar's needs will be enormous. It will require
support recovering from severe economic mismanagement, restoring democratic
institutions and reinstating effective governance.
Equally
important and arguably most urgent, planning must begin for the overhaul of
Myanmar's security forces. A key argument from governments reluctant to support
Myanmar's resistance forces has been that only the military can hold the
fractious country together.
This is a total
fallacy. The military, which has ruled Myanmar almost continuously since 1962
save for a decadelong interregnum beginning in 2011, has long been in constant
war with its own population to justify its hold on power.
Now fears that Myanmar could become a failed state
are rising again, particularly among neighboring countries, as fighting
escalates and the military suffers hitherto unimaginable battlefield losses.
Yet there will be no political vacuum. For all their
faults and limitations, Myanmar's shadow parliament and the parallel National
Unity Government enjoy popular legitimacy, thanks largely to their commitment
to establishing a federal democratic system and devolving significant political
and economic power to state governments.
Rebuilding
Myanmar will be an enormous undertaking and indeed impossible if there is not a
thorough reform of the military. The army must be fundamentally overhauled in
order to prevent another coup d'etat or interference in the democratic process.
Beyond a
transitional justice mechanism for military leaders responsible for atrocities
and widespread arrests, there are four issues that any successor government and
the international community must consider:
First, the Burman-dominated army, known as the
Tatmadaw, must be disbanded and rebuilt from scratch.
Once thought to
number over 400,000 personnel, experts estimate the total force now at under
200,000. This is a broken institution with no sense of profession of arms. Its
counterinsurgency doctrine, known as the "four cuts," is designed to
terrorize the population into submission. War crimes are part of its strategy.
But what could take its place? Given the major
contributions of ethnic armed groups to the resistance, a British- or
Indian-style regimental system, with significant representation by ethnic
minorities, would be most appropriate. This would entail the formation of
distinct units organized along ethno-linguistic lines and tied to specific
regions of the country.
There could be a
small military command, including headquarters, logistics and procurement,
military justice, training and education functions. The navy and air force
could also be centralized.
The ethnic
resistance organizations would have to fold their troops into a national chain
of command, with pay, logistics and some centralized training and doctrine.
They should be allowed to maintain their independent uniforms and insignia. Committing
itself to such a system would garner the National Unity Government trust and
goodwill from its allies.
The
international community should commit to funding disarmament, disengagement and
rehabilitation efforts, as they have in other conflict zones including Mindanao
in the Philippines and Aceh, Indonesia. Much of the rank and file is made up
conscripts who may wish to return to civilian life.
Second, the successor government will have to make
some very hard choices. If parts of the military are demobilized, would those
involved be entitled to pensions or other benefits?
There is an
argument to be made that they should not be, given the destruction and trauma
that the military has induced. But the potential for unrest among disgruntled
former military members would be too great to ignore.
If pensions and
benefits are paid to decommissioned soldiers, would the new government have to
do the same with the ethnic resistance organizations and people's defense
forces? Many members of the resistance forces harbor high expectations that
they will serve as the nucleus of a new national military. Many feel entitled
to jobs, salaries and benefits.
Consider what
happened following East Timor's independence, when former independence fighters
rebelled when they were not given jobs in the police or military that they
believed they were owed.
Third, the successor government should quickly
privatize sprawling military-owned conglomerates Myanma Economic Holdings and
Myanma Economic Corp. Their 100-plus subsidiaries operate in almost every
sector of the economy. Privatization would help fund security sector reforms.
The
responsibility of a military should be national defense, not business. Economic
activity led to the absolute corruption of Myanmar's military. A military
should not be financially independent but must be reliant on a budget
controlled by a civilian government.
Fourth, the international community should support
programs for the decommissioning of weapons before they enter the black market
or are used for further predation of the civilian population.
It is too early
to tell whether the resistance will defeat the military or whether some
leadership elements may seek a negotiated deal. In either case, Myanmar's
military cannot ever again be allowed to have unaccountable political and
economic power. This has been the root cause of the country's malaise.
The
international community must begin considering how it can assist in supporting
the next phase of Myanmar's political and economic development. In the
immediate post-junta future, reform of the security sector will be crucial.
(Zachary Abuza is a professor of national security
strategy at the U.S. National War College in Washington and the author of
"Forging Peace in Southeast Asia: Insurgencies, Peace Processes and
Reconciliation." The views expressed here are his own and may not reflect
those of the college or the U.S. government.)
 |
| Second Battalion Burma Rifles. |
Extracts From my Burma in Limbo (Part-5)
British
re-formed Burma Regular Army in 1945 according to the Kandy Agreement between
Lord Mountbatten and General Aung San. Almost
all ethnic troops serving loyally in the British army and irregular units of
ethnic levies were absorbed into their own ethnic rifle battalions of new
army. And 200 officers and 5,200 other
ranks from demobilized, Japanese-founded BNA were reorganized as new Burma
rifle battalions.
And at independence
in 1948 there were First and Second Burma Rifle Battalions of non-BNA Burmese
and ethnic mixed troops formerly from British Army, Third and Fourth and Fifth
and Sixth Burma Rifle Battalions made up of former BNA troops, three Karen
Rifle Battalions, three Chin Rifle Battalions, two Kachin Rifle Battalions, and
Fourth Infantry Battalion of Gurkhas, all together only 15 so-called class
battalions based on race.
That
mixed-matched army was Lord Luis Mountbatten’s compromise solution to keep two
opposing wings, the Burmese majority and the ethnic minorities, together as a
12,000 strong standing army. Army was seriously divided not just along the
racial line but also the ideological line. Most of the former BNA troops
including Colonel Ne Win were considered leftists and anti-British while the
rest of the army were the rightists or conservatives and pro-British.
And naturally
Karens the loyal soldiers of British Raj initially dominated British re-formed
Burmese Army by both troop numbers and the ranks of senior officers. Since the
beginning ex-BNA Burmese troops bitterly resented the fact that Karens
dominated Burmese Army. General Smith Dun the first Commander-in-Chief of
post-war Burmese Army was a loyal Karen.
When Burma
gained her independence in 1948, the Karens were well placed in the defense
services and in their own right, not through any political pressure or string.
There were only two king’s commissioned officers and those two were Karens with
nearly twenty-five years service each.
Although not many
Karens took active part in the gaining of the independence from British they
resisted and fought the Japs from the start to the end, for which they suffered
most. Had not the Japanese been defeated, Burma’s independence could never have
been given by the British.
General Smith
Dun became the C-in-C of the new Burma Army on the independence or rather, was
left by the British as such, with the concurrence of the Burmese Government.
Saw Kya Doe was nominated to be my Deputy with the rank of a Brigadier. Saw
Donny became the Quarter-Master-General with the rank of a full colonel.
There were eight
Karen Lieutenant-Colonels: three commanding each of the Karen Rifle Battalions,
one commanding the Second Burma Rifle Battalion, one the Fourth Burma Regiment
(Gurkhas), one the Burma Signals, one the Training Battalion, one the
Assistant-Quarter-Master-General of South Burma Sub-District, and one
commanding the Light Infantry Brigade at Meikhtila.
With the
exception of one or two who were wartime officers, the rest mentioned above had
services ranging from fifteen to twenty-five years (in the British Army). Hence
General Smith Dun claimed it to be Karen’s own right to be in that position on
Burma gaining independence. Of the small airforce that was in making, Wing
Commander Saw Shi Sho became Chief of Air Staff. In the small navy there were
some Karen officers and men.
