(Swe Taw’s post from the IRRAWADDY MEDIA on 13 May 2025.)
How Myanmar Junta Uses Air Force to Fight Its
Corner: The military junta, which loves to portray itself as the “Standard
Army,” has gradually struggled to curb the People’s Defence Forces (PDF) who in
the early days of the armed revolt only had rudimentary homemade-hunting
rifles.
Today, the junta’s only remaining advantage is its
air force, for which the regime has spent substantial public funds. Most
countries worldwide have imposed sanctions against the military junta,
restricting its ability to purchase aircraft and other military equipment.
However, countries like Russia and China continue to supply arms to the regime,
enabling it to continue its aerial campaign freely.
During the early days of armed revolt following the coup, the military did not immediately deploy air power, because junta chief Min Aung Hlaing believed his army could easily suppress the resistance forces who were poorly equipped. Even when ground units reported difficulties, they were not granted air support. Troops were pressured to continue fighting without backup.
An example of this occurred in Mindat, Chin State,
where a military convoy was ambushed during the early days of the armed revolt.
Although ground troops reported their dire situation and requested aerial
support, their request was ignored, finally forcing them to retreat in
disarray. Only after many similar incidents in other locations, Min Aung Hlaing
started considering providing air support.
Initially, air support was only approved in
emergency situations, such as defending military bases, command centers, or
convoys under attack. Requests for air support had to go through multiple
levels of approval.
After receiving request from ground forces for air support, concerned regional military commands had to submit request to the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services (Army) Office. The request was forwarded to the military chief, in this case Min Aung Hlaing. Only after approval from Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services (Army) ordered the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services (Air) to provide air support.
Because of this bureaucratic process, air support
was difficult to obtain in a timely matter during the early days after the
coup. Even when ground forces were in crisis, airstrikes could not proceed
unless personally approved by Min Aung Hlaing.
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| Dictator anointing his private killing machines from Russia. |
Not only air support, but requests for the use of transport helicopters, such as the MI-17, also required direct authorization from the junta leader. If he was in a meeting or attending religious ceremonies, urgent military requests were often delayed.
Min Aung Hlaing reportedly tended to keep his mouth
shut when he was asked permission for air support while he was attending
religious events such as pagoda consecration or donation to monks. Apparently,
the junta boss does not want that his order to kill would cancel out the merits
or divine blessings he expected to gain from engaging in religious activities.
In one instance, junta No. 2 Soe Win personally
requested air support from Min Aung Hlaing, holding the battle report in his
hands. But Min Aung Hlaing left for a pagoda consecration, without saying yes
or no. Consequently, the base that requested air support fell. After Min Aung
Hlaing heard that Soe Win flew into rage at the War Office because of that, he
ordered Soe Win to take the matters into his own hands about the air support.
Over time, the authority for air attacks was decentralized. Min Aung Hlaing delegated the authority to approve aerial operations to regional commanders, enabling them to carry out strikes without requiring direct authorization from the top leadership. Attack and transport helicopters were also integrated into regional command structures.
Under this system, air support requests were
handled by air force lieutenant colonel attached to regional military commands.
These officers coordinated with the Commander-in-Chief Defence Services (Air)
to facilitate operations, utilizing aircraft from the nearest available airbase
for strikes. This has allowed Min Aung Hlaing to shift the blame on regional
commanders for air attacks on civilian targets.
According to the Defence and Security Institute, as
the military’s war zones expanded, the process for requesting air support
became more flexible. Lower-ranking officers, including Light Infantry Division
commanders and ground force commanders, were later authorized to request
strikes directly, terminating the lengthy process.
However, at the strategic level, major air
campaigns targeting key strategic locations are exclusively authorized by the
Joint Operations Command (JOC)—a high-level body comprising the deputy
commander-in-chief, air force chief and senior coordinating officers from the
army, navy and air force.
Light attack aircraft such as the Yak-130, K-8, and
FTC-2000G are primarily used for airstrikes. Additionally, more advanced
aircraft like the JF-17, MIG-29, and F-7 are deployed as needed for both
offensive and defensive operations. These aircraft can operate in various
weather conditions, and JF-17 are capable of carrying heavy bombs weighing up
to 1,000 kg (2,200 lb).
Due to the shortage of attack aircraft for air support, the junta has attempted to modify Y-12 transport aircraft for combat purposes. These aircraft are now widely used in air raids with soldiers on board manually dropping bombs from the aircraft, effectively converting them into makeshift bombers. Additionally, paramotors have been used similar way with the soldiers manually dropping bombs from the air.
Key air force bases for nationwide aerial
operations include Magawe, Tada-U, Naypyitaw, Taungoo and Hmawbi air bases and
air force training headquarters (Shan Te) in Meiktila.
Bombs used in the junta’s aerial campaigns are
manufactured domestically. Smaller bombs are produced at Ordnance Factory (Ka
Pa Sa) 3 near Sinte village in Pyay Township in Bago Region, while larger bombs
are manufactured at Ka Pa Sa 21, located near Paungkho Village and Ngepyawgyi
Village, approximately 30 miles from Seikbyu town.
Since these locations and their supply routes
remain under junta control, the air force maintains a steady supply of bombs
for air operations. Currently, the junta heavily relies on air support to
defend resistance offensives in such towns Kyaukphyu in Rakhine, Bhamo in
Kachin, Kyaukphyu, Kachin State, and Taunghkam in northern Shan State.
The regime is also targeting civilian targets in
areas controlled by the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, after talks with the
ethnic armed group in Kunming failed. It is also conducting deliberate air
attacks in northern Sagaing Region to instill fear among the population, after
losing Indaw town on the border of Sagaing and Kachin. These strikes are part
of a broader strategic operation, authorized by the Joint Operations Command
(JOC), led by Deputy Commander-in-Chief Soe Win.
(Author Swe Taw is a defector from Myanmar
military)
