(Staff article from the ABC NEWS AUSTRALIA on September 6, 2021.)
It is a passage to which Xu Jiayin, founder of China
Evergrande, China's biggest property group and the world's 122nd largest
company by sales, can relate. For most of this year, his firm has been
floundering, fighting off hordes of angry creditors, defending court actions
and desperately trying to secure enough finance to survive. Now the situation
has taken a sudden turn for the worse.
At its peak, three years ago, the Hong Kong-listed China Evergrande was the world's most valuable real estate group. It's now better known as the world's most indebted property developer, owing more than $US300 billion ($403 billion).
Once a symbol of
glittering success in the most exciting property market on the planet, China
Evergrande is now tanking, and dragging many of its competitors with it, as
global investors and creditors desperately attempt to parachute out of the
troubled Chinese property sector.
The owner of
football club Guangzhou FC, the company two years ago boasted of taking on Elon
Musk's Tesla, establishing an electric vehicle subsidiary with three production
hubs in southern China. By that stage, Mr Xu was China's third-richest person,
with an estimated wealth of $US30 billion ($40.3 billion).
Last week, the
firm, with projects underway in 22 cities, warned that it may default on debt
repayments if its efforts to refinance and sell assets fall short, an
announcement that rattled global debt markets.
Contractors are
lining up for payment, and creditors are fleeing, willing to accept less than
30 cents in the dollar from anyone game enough to buy Evergrande debt.
Meanwhile, tens of thousands of hopeful apartment owners are fretting that a
collapse may see their deposits evaporate.
The only way the
group can lift cash flow is to sell off its vast portfolio of apartments at
heavy discounts. That is threatening to undermine prices across the country and
potentially cause the collapse of rivals as the entire industry comes under
pressure. Either way, a crisis of confidence among buyers seems almost certain.
As an industry, Chinese property development is a hungry consumer of natural resources, particularly iron ore, the price of which has shed almost 40 per cent since May. For years, the country's leaders turned a blind eye to the industry's excesses because it was one of the main vehicles for stimulating economic growth.
But with Beijing
taking a back seat as the firm unravels, its demise looks set to send shock
waves through the steel industry, adding further pressure to iron ore prices. China's
transformation from an agrarian-based economy into an urbanised industrial
powerhouse over the past 40 years has been achieved on a scale and speed never
before witnessed in history.
With the
introduction of a free market came the opportunity for fabulous wealth from
real estate as millions of farm workers flocked to newly built cities. Thus
began the rise of the property moguls. Just as in the West, real estate
speculation has become a national pastime as prices have gone into orbit.
The end result has
been much the same. Sky high rents, unaffordable housing and younger
generations seething that they have been locked out of the market. If there is
one thing to which the Chinese Communist Party has an acute sensitivity, it is
the prospect of large-scale unrest.
To top it off, dodgy building standards, sales and
loan sharks and a host of other illegal activities have dogged the industry,
with a rising tide of resentment against the big developers. Late last year
Beijing introduced what it called the Three Red Lines policy for property
developers, a strategy that aimed to reduce debt within the industry, curb
runaway property prices and lift standards.
A few months back, several large cities, including Evergrande's home turf Guangzhou, began putting price limits on new land releases and restrictions on developers, including sale price caps. They also imposed penalties on developers who failed to deliver as promised or on time.
The dramatic
interventions have been a long time coming and, the real estate barons should
have been prepared, particularly since President Xi Jinping's not so subtle dig
in 2017 that "housing is for living in, not for speculation."
But this comes
hard on the heels of a series of attacks on wealthy business leaders. Late last
year, Alibaba founder Jack Ma, a close friend of Evergrande's Xu, became the
first victim of a crackdown on technology titans. That's since been extended to
profiteering education firms, raising concerns Xi is winding back Beijing's
acceptance of capitalism and eliminating potential rivals in the popularity
stakes.
Last week,
gaming operators were in the spotlight when Beijing decreed kids were
restricted to just three hours a week of online gaming. More recently,
well-known movie stars suddenly "disappeared" as the purge amongst
the popular extended beyond the business world.
How does this affect us?
That's easy. Our
raw materials have played an instrumental role in China's property boom. All
those apartment towers require a huge amount of steel. In fact, property
developers account for around half of all China's iron ore demand. So, any
significant drop in construction will mean less steel, and even less iron ore,
at a time when prices already have fallen around 40 per cent from their May
peak.
Not only that,
as Macrobusiness economist David Llewellyn Smith points out, developers have a
big impact on local government funding. That is vital for infrastructure
spending, accounting for about 20 per cent of total construction — until now,
one of the preferred conduits for stimulating growth.
Any cut to
housing and infrastructure spending will further undermine an iron ore price
already reeling from Beijing's edict that steel output must be curbed to meet
emissions targets. And while Xi finally appears to have engineered an economic
backhand slap on Australia in the form of lower commodity prices, the strategy
could come at an enormous cost at home if declining growth rates deteriorate
further.
The potential to backfire
It is uncertain
how far Beijing will allow this to run. Under Xi, the country has embarked on a
series of economic reforms, many of them worthy, but on each occasion they have
failed primarily because the leadership has pushed too hard, forcing
authorities into a sudden about-turn.
On several
occasions, reforms designed to restrict risky lending backfired when credit
markets seized, forcing the central bank to inject liquidity, which resulted in
an explosion of high-risk lending.
Huge capital
outflows destabilised the renminbi after local firms were encouraged to invest
offshore, forcing Beijing to reverse the ruling. Efforts to promote the
currency as a global reserve also prompted massive outflows which had to be
arrested.
Then there was
the great stock market boom of 2015, engineered by Beijing, which created a bubble
that burst spectacularly. This latest episode may turn out to be a replay. Xu
Jiayin's future certainly looks dim.
But if domestic
growth tanks, there may be little choice but to junk the reforms and plunge
back into housing and infrastructure, to keep the economy ticking over and the
population in jobs. Nothing foments discontent like unemployment.